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The Scope of Judicial Review: An
Ongoing Debate
By RAOUL BERGER*

Introduction
This symposium is devoted to what Professor Philip Kurland described as "the most immediate constitutional crisis of our present time,
the usurpation of general governmental powers on the pretext that its
authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment."' Whether there

be agreement on the answer is not nearly so important as to dissect out
the issue. If, as Professor Louis Lusky observes, fortuitous circumstances have enabled Government by Judiciary. The Transformation of

the FourteenthAmendment 2 to "[crystallize] for millions of non-lawyers
the fear that the Court has jumped the bounds of legitimate judicial
review and is pursuing a course that bears dismaying resemblance to
the excesses of the pre-1937 Court,"'3 I am well content. For as I wrote
in the concluding pages, the first step is to isolate the problem and to
make the people aware of its dimensions.4 Cure must begin with

diagnosis.
It is not surprising that the panelists-though of divided coun-

sels-are united in their opposition to my views, for as Professor Stanley Kutler has noted, after 1937 "most of the judiciary's longtime critics
* A.B., 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.,
1938, Harvard University; LL.D., 1978, University of Michigan.
I. Letter from Professor Philip Kurland to Harvard University Press (August 15, 1977)
(in the possession of the editors of Harvard University Press).
2. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMZNDMENT (1977) (hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY).

3. Lusky Essay at 404. The several essays by the panelists will be cited in this manner.
It is worth noting that I have received approving editorials, reviews and letters from all
quarters of the country, which are in marked contrast to the tone of academe, and which
differ from the considerable volume of hate mail that came in the wake of my earlier books
on impeachment and executive privilege. No such mail has come to me in consequence of
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY.

4. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 417-18. Professor Henry Abraham states that it is
because Berger brings "us face to face with the eternal dilemma of the limits of judicial
power, that his work is so significant." Abraham Essay at 472.
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suddenly found a new faith," a "new libertarianism promoting 'preferred freedoms' . ..with an activist judiciary to protect those values."5 And if the panelists are not to be charged with what Kutler
characterizes as the "sense of smug self-satisfaction [that] prevailed in
such circles," 6 the fact remains that they are united in defense of the
"new faith" because it fulfills their social aspirations, never mind the
constitutional cost.7
While conflicting views must make their way in the marketplace of
ideas, the issue is not to be settled by a count of noses but rather, as
W.S. McKectnie, the historian of Magna Carta, said, by an appeal to
historical data and to principles.8 The "True Believers" tend to turn
for comfort to the decisions of the Court, as if the self-serving declarations of one who pretends to power are entitled to weight on that issue. 9
My attempts to direct their attention to the constitutional sources meet
with scant success, though given a document that grants and limits delegated power, it is, as McKechnie observed, that history and those principles that must be decisive.
Academe is wont to brush off criticism of opposing views as "polemical,"' 10 and some historians seem to regard their task as done when
they merely record their opinion of the facts, leaving the reader in
darkness as to opposing views of the same scene. One tempered by law
practice is accustomed to have a judge turn to him for comment on the
argument of opposing counsel in order to dispel confusion engendered
by clashing views. Hence I was moved to write, "A commentator
should spread before the reader the evidence on which his opinion is
based and comment both on discrepant evidence and on opposing inferences. Consequently, a polemical tone is inescapable. . ... ,

To

avoid criticism of views that seem erroneous, I wrote, "is to court the
charge of ignoring an influential body of contrary opinion, of selecting
5. Kutler Essay at 513 (emphasis added).
6. Id at 514.
7. In his Farewell Address Washington warned, "[L]et there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good. it is the customary
weapon by which free governments are destroyed." 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 299.
8. Faced by contrary opinion of respectable predecessors, McKechnie wrote, "[Tihe
truth of historical questions does not depend on the counting of votes or the weight of authority," but rather "on the historical record." W. McKECHNIE, MAGN k,CARTA 135 (1905).
9. "No man," said Madison, "is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) at 56 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1938).
10. Kutler Essay at 514.
11. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 9.
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only the evidence that advances one's own argument, and, even worse,
to cast the reader adrift on a sea of conflicting opinions."' 2 Since penning those words I came across a similar statement by the distinguished
historian, Charles McIlwain, explaining that during the course of his
study of the High Court of Parliament,
I came to the conclusion that the weight of contemporary evidence was against some views held by men whom I have always
looked up to . . . . As these divergences . . . concerned things
which are the very marrow of the subject under discussion, this
has unavoidably given to certain parts of the book a polemical
cast, and might lead one to think that it was written from the
beginning merely to bolster up a preconceived theory. Such is
not the case.'
I too can honestly say that "I entered upon this study without preconceptions."' 14 My studies of the 1787 period had engaged me for years,
and so when I turned to the Fourteenth Amendment, the terrain was
for me terra incognita. What social preconceptions I entertained before
long encountered historical evidence that, in Huxley's words, jarred
against my "inclinations."' 5 But long since I learned not to make my
predilections the test of constitutionality;' 6 in 1942 1 wrote that I liked it
no better when the Supreme Court read my predilections into the Constitution than when the Four Horsemen read in theirs. 7 Let the reader
8
determine whether as much can be said for my critics.'
Their failure to come to grips with my central thesis has been and
remains a constant source of wonderment. In my opening pages I
stated,
the proof is all but incontrovertible that the framers meant to
leave control of suffrage with the States, which had always exercised such control, and to exclude federal intrusion. On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the framers being
unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as written into
12. Id
13. C. MCILwAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY ix (1910).

14. Id
15. T. HUXLEY, MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE 151 (1896), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 1.

16. Chief Justice Marshall cautioned that "It]he peculiar circumstances of the moment
may render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional."
JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.MARYLAND 190-91 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
Professor Felix Frankfurter observed that "wisdom and justice are not the tests of constitutionality." Can the Supreme Court GuaranteeToleration?, 43 NEW REPUBLIC 85, 86 (1925).
17. Berger, Constructive Contempt. .4 Post Mortem, 9 U. CHm. L. REv. 602, 604-05, 642
(1942).
18. See Cover, Book Review, 178 NEW REPUBLIC 26, 26-28 (1978); Brest, Berger v.
Brown et al, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10.
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the text. It is, therefore, as if the Amendment expressly stated
that "control of suffrage shall be left with the States." If that intention is demonstrable, the "one man, one vote" cases represent
an awesome exercise of power, an 180-degree revision, taking
from the States a power that unmistakably was left to them. That
poses the stark issue whether such revisory power was conferred
on the Court.' 9
To round out the picture, I examined the meaning the terms of the
Amendment hadfor theframers, and in course thereof, examined the
history of the antecedent Civil Right Act enacted by the same Congress
at the very same gession. Most of the critical discussion has bogged
down in the details of that analysis, and has ignored the larger central
issue: given a clearly discernible intention, may the Court construe the
Amendment in undeniable contradiction of that intention?
On that score Professor Richard Kay has contributed a valuable
insight: suppose that Congress substituted a four year term for the express constitutional two year term of a Congressman. Who would defend that substitution, even though we would be "just as much ruled by
the framers from their graves" as when effect is given to the clearly
discernible intention of the framers. 20 When, therefore, Professor Arthur Miller urges that "the Founding Fathers cannot rule us from their
graves,"'" his logic leads to a total rejection of the Constitution. In one
form or another, disguised in soothing rhetoric, that is the thesis of
academe. But it has yet to be candidly explained to the people and
accepted by them in the form of an amendment, the only instrument of
change the Constitution provides.
Even those who applaud the Court's new activist role are anxious
that it be subject to "limits," acknowledging that unrestrained power is
alien to the Constitution.2 2 And their differences regarding the form
19. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 7-8. See Berger on Kutler, infra, at 595, nn. 42-43.
My responses to the several essays by the panelists will be cited in this manner. The eminent
British political scientist, Professor Max Beloff, viewing the scene with the detachment of an
observer 3000 miles removed, declared the evidence to be "incontrovertible." Beloff, Arbiters f,4merica'sDestiny, THE TIMES (LONDON) HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT, April 7,
1978, at II. A proponent of activism, Dean Alfange, wrote that "the cumulative impact of
[Berger's] quotations is impressive. It must be conceded that many of Berger's conclusions
on specific historical points are not easily challengeable.... [H]is historical argument is
very powerful. Those who wish to challenge it will confront a formidable task in light of the
volume and persuasiveness of the evidence he has amassed in support of his position." Alfange, On JudicialPolicymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the "Or'inal
Intent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 606-07 (1978).
20. Kay, Book Review, 10 U. CONN. L. REV. 801, 804 (1978).
21. Berger on Miller, infra, at 586, n.81.
22. Professor John Hart Ely wrote, "If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of
the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly
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such limits should take underlines the difficulties, if not the hopeless-

ness, of the task. Against this, I plead only that if the intention is
clearly discernible (in which case there can be no difficulty of ascertainment), the Court is bound to give it effect. It is not empowered to reject
the choices of the framers in favor of its own.
One point, I had thought, was beyond dispute: the fact that suffrage and segregation were excluded from the scope of the Amendment.23 It is dispiriting, therefore, that an historian like Professor

Kutler should challenge that view.24 And it is inexplicable that after
acknowledging that "Berger's scholarship of the past decade has substantially influenced and enriched our understanding of American con-

stitutionalism,"' he should go on to impeach my credentials as an
historian. What happened in the interval to vitiate my "scholarship,"
for in my prior studies of impeachment and executive privilege I invoked the selfsame intention of the framers to determine the meaning
of the terms they employed? The answer, I suggest, is that liberals were

ready enough to embrace that approach to topple Richard Nixon, but
condemn it bitterly when it is used to test the Warren Court's espousal
of causes dear to their hearts. Such a double standard is a reproach to
scholarship.2 6
I would remind the reader that "[g]overnment by a self-designated

elite-like that of benevolent despotism or of Plato's philosopher
kings-may be a good form of government for some peoples, but it is
not the American way."'27 When the rejection of judicial "Platonic

Guardians" bears the imprimatur of Learned Hand,2 8 it is not to be
rejected out of hand after the fashion of Professors Miller and Kutler.
inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators would have to conclude, whatever the framers may have been assuming, that the
courts should stay away from them." Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 448 (1978).
23. See note 19 supra, and Berger on Miller, infra, pp. 580-81.
24. See Berger on Kutler, infra, at 594-595, nn. 35-42.
25. Kutler Essay at 511.
26. Professor Charles Black, who had been counsel for the NAACP in the desegregation case, writing during the impeachment investigation of President Nixon about the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," noted some remarks by the Framers and said, "the
men present were representative of their time, and their understanding, at the moment when
the crucial language was under closest examination, tells us a great deal about its meaning."
C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 28-29 (1974). No thought of other times, other
manners.
27. McDougal & Lans, Treatiesand Congressional-Executiveor Presidential4greements:
InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy: II, 54 YALE L.J. 534, 578 (1945). Ely has
recently quoted Robert Dahl to the same effect "[R]ule by aristocracy, even in modem
dress, is not what Americans have ever wanted." Ely, supra note 22, at 411.
28. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
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No one who is devoted to the law should persist in leading it down the
wrong path through pride of opinion. We are all fallible and to confess
error is to acknowledge the fact. But I am not persuaded by my critics
that I am in error; instead their conflicting efforts to rationalize the
"new faith" have strengthened my convictions. I have undertaken to
point out their errors in order to dispel confusion, and because, as
Chief Justice Thomas McKean said in the Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention, "refutation. .. begets a proof." 9 And I have dwelt on
the splenetic nature of the Miller-Kutler-Alfange criticisms because
they reveal that I have touched a raw nerve, and because unfair and
distorted criticism reveals doubt about the strength of their own case
and incapacity to bring dispassionate judgment to evaluation of my
study. Finally, my commitment, unlike that of my critics, is not to a
particular cause-be it desegregation, abortion, and the like-but to
the Constitution, the bulwark of our liberties.3" My credo is that of
Charles McIlwain: "The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal
limits to arbitrary power and a complete responsibility of government
to the governed."' 31 No dispensation has exempted the judiciary from
these requirements.

29. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 541 (1836).
30. Justice Story sought to impress "upon Americans a reverential attachment to the
Constitution, as in the highest sense the paladium of American libertN!" He considered it
"the only solid basis, on which to rest the private rights, the public liberties, and the substantial prosperity of the people." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION vii, 2
(1833).
31. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 146 (rev. ed. 1947),
quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 298-99. Mcllwain has been reformulated as R.H.
Tawney's Law: "It is a condition of freedom that men should not be ruled by an authority
which they cannot control." Beichman, Probing Mysteries of Great Leadershp, Boston
Globe, Oct. 15, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
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Comment on Professor Louis Lusky's Essay

On many points Professor Lusky and myself are in accord; but we
differ on a fundamental issue: he defends "the Court's new and
grander conception of its own place in the governmental scheme,"'
which rests, he notes, on "two basic shifts in its approach to constitutional adjudication": "assertion of the power to revise the Constitution,
bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article
V," and "repudiation of the limits on judicial review that are implicit in
the orthodox doctrine of Marbury v. Madison,"2 and it may be added
are explicit in the constitutional history. The Court itself has never
openly avowed such grandiose claims; they are but a product of the
recent past, articulated by academe on its behalf in order to justify its
revolutionary decisions.3
My view is that the Court is not empowered to create a "new and
grander" version of its power; "an agent," said Hamilton, "cannot newmodel his commission." 4 Some would regard our difference as a choice
between competing philosophies of judicial review, but I cannot regard
a rejection of constitutional limitations as a matter of philosophical
choice-that is a political choice reserved to the sovereign people. Of
course, Professor Lusky has his own rationale for a judicial power of
constitutional revision; and I would not maintain that my "prescription
for legitimacy is.

.

.the only one possible," 5 for I lay no claim to papal

infallibility. But to confine myself to his essay, I would urge that it is
vastly to be preferred to his solution.
My resort to the "original intention" of the Framers as the test of
power, by no means novel, rests on a long tradition that Thomas Grey
has written, "is one of great power and compelling simplicity ...
deeply rooted in our history and in our shared principles of political
legitimacy. It has equally deep roots in our formal constitutional law.
1. Lusky Essay at 408.
2. Id. at 406. (emphasis added).
3. Berger on Kutler, infra, at 593. See id.at nn. 42, 122. As Professor Bork observed,
"The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results. . . do not spring from the mere will of
the Justices in the majority but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding
of the Constitution .... Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers, not to the
Court." Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3-4
(1971), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 319.
4. 6 A. HAMILTON, WoRKs 166, Letters of Camillus (H. Lodge ed. 1904). "Inall free
states, the constitution is fixed; it is from thence, that the legislative derives its authority;
therefore it cannot change the constitution without destroying its own foundations." Letter
of the Massachusetts House to the Earl of Shelburne, H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 65 (8th ed. 1968).
5. Lusky Essay at 408.
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The contrary view, John Hart Ely recently observed, conduces

to "untethered" discretion and is "undemocratic as well";7 and although he recognizes that "an untrammelled majority is indeed a dangerous thing . . .it will require a heroic inference" to deduce that

"judicial enforcement of an 'unwritten constitution' is an appropriate
response in a democratic republic." 8 He draws that "heroic inference"
from the alleged "invitation" expressed in the "general" terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment and elsewhere in the Constitution. For Grey,
the answer lies in the alleged fact that the Founders embodied "natural
rights" in the Constitution9 (what Dean Pound labelled as "purely per-

sonal and arbitrary" discretion),"° a view that Professor Lusky dismisses out of hand."

For him the answer lies in an assumption,

expressed in his By What Right? that "the Founding Fathers intended
• . .to empower the Court to serve as the Founders' surrogate for the
indefinite future-interpreting the Constitution. . . as is thought right
by men who accept the Founders'politicalphilosophy... .""2 In his essay he restates this as the Court's self-imposed task in the last forty

years of "conforming the Constitution to what its makers would...
have prescribed.

. .

had they been living and acting in the middle of

the 20th century."' 3 Senator Sam Ervin, in homelier diction, said that
6. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975).
Grey quotes Robert Bork: "The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their
fair implications, and not construct new rights." Id. at 704. The capitalized "Framers"
refers to the draftsmen of the Constitution; the lower case "framers" to those who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretation: Its Allure andImpossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399,403,
404 (1978).
8. Id. at411.
9. Grey, supra note 6, at 716; see also Abraham Essay at 482.
10. Pound, Common Law andLegislation,21 HARV. L. Rv.383, 393 (1908).
11. Grey "seems to offer a rationalization for whatever the Court elects to do rather
than a criterion of legitimacy." Lusky Essay at 414. Yet Lusky remarks of my observation
re the "alternative approaches" proposed by Grey and himself that Berger counters them
"to his own apparent satisfaction, in a scant ten pages," id at 410, though he joins me in
rejecting Grey in two lines out of 50 pages, unwittingly employing a double standard.'
12. L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT. A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 21 (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as BY WHAT
RIGHT?] quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 393.
13. Lusky Essay at 413. Certainly the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no
intention of making the Court their "surrogate." In the 1866 debates, Charles Sumner
stated, "[I]f words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we
turn to the framers. . . ." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 677 (1866), quotedin GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 372. That is confirmed by a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report (Jan. 25, 1872) "signed by Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in Congress [declaring that] '[in construing the
Constitution we are compelled to give it such interpretation as will secure the result which
was intended to be accomplished by those who framed it and the people who adopted it."
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men of this persuasion would "interpret the Constitution to mean what
it would have said if they, instead of the Founding Fathers, had written
it."'14

The claim that the Founding Fathers gave the Court a power of
attorney to "adapt" the Constitution to changing exigencies was repeatedly dismissed by Justice Black; away, said he, with "rhapsodical
strains, about the duty of. . . [the] Court to keep the Constitution in
tune with the times.. . . The Constitution makers knew the need for

change and provided for it" by the amendment process of article V, 15 to
the mechanics of which, the Court has insisted the legislative bodies
must rigorously conform. 6 Black could avouch the doughtiest apologist for judicial review, Hamilton, who stated in his No. 78 of The Federalist: "Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves.

. .

and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments,

their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such
can warrant
17
an act."'
Since Professor Lusky jumps off from what "the Founding Fathers
intended," let us review what they had in mind. Having learned from
history how a procession of dictators had betrayed democracies which
entrusted them with power, the Founders stood in dread of power and
meant to curb it by resort to a written, "fixed constitution."'" As Philip
Kurland explains:
A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, preface at 2, 571 (1967). At

about the same time, Thomas Cooley wrote, "The meaning of the constitution is fixed when
it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time." T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 68-69 (6th ed. 1890). One of the foremost advocates of broad libertarian rights
in the 39th Congress, John Farnsworth of Illinois, stated on March 31, 1871, with respect to
the Fourteenth Amendment, "Let us see what was understood to be its meaning at the time
of its adoption." A. AvrNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 506 (1967).
For similar utterances by: Senator Richard Yates of Illinois, see id. at 374; James Garfield
of Ohio, see id. at 526, 528; Charles Willard of Vermont, see Id. at 540; Senator Oliver
Morton of Indiana, see id. at 622; William Lawrence of Ohio, see id. at 662.
14. Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 10.
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting), quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 101 n.9.
16. "It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies. . . to alter the method [for
change] which the Constitution has fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920). In
the First Congress Elbridge Gerry, one of the Framers, stated, "The people" have directed a
"particular mode of making amendments, which we are not at liberty to depart from ....
Such a power [to alter] would render the most important clause in the Constitution nugatory." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 503 (1789), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 318.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 509 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941), quotedin GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 316.
18. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 8-16 (1969).
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The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of government and its limits, that government is the creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not authorize
and must not do what it forbids. A priori, such a constitution
could have only a fixed and unchanging meaning, if it were to
fulfill its function. For changed conditions, the instrument itself
made provision for amendment which, in accordance with the
concept of a written constitution, was expected to be the only
form of change.... 9
20
The Founders' attachment to a "fixed constitution" is well attested;
first and last the Constitution was meant to limit delegated power, in
Jefferson's words, "from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."'"
Apparently Professor Lusky rejects Madison's insistence that if "the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation
. . .be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a
consistent and stable [government], more than for a faithful exercise of
its powers. '"22
As conceived by the Framers the judicial role was poles removed
from the "Court's new and grander conception of its own place in the
governmental scheme. 2 3 Judicial review itself was an innovation, resting on the debatable dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case24 and a few pre1787 state cases, some of which excited stormy disapproval leading to
removal proceedings. 25 Even in our own times, Learned Hand, Archibald Cox and Leonard Levy consider that the evidence that judicial
review was contemplated by the Framers is inconclusive. 26 Under19. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978).
20. Madison stated in the Federal Convention that "it would be a novel & dangerous
doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence."
2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 92-93 (1911). For
similar remarks by Samuel Adams, see 2 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, 325 (H. Cushing
ed. 1906); see also note 4 supra; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, 277 (1969).
21. 4 I. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1901), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 252.
22. Lusky Essay at 404. This was likewise Jefferson's view. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 366-67.
23. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
24. Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 LAW Q. REv. 543 (1938); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
25. The cases are discussed in R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 36-44
(1969).
26. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958); Alexander Bickel remarked that Hand
was "unwilling to rest on the historical evidence." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 15 (1962) Cox and Levy's views are discussed in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
355 & n.16.
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standably, Hamilton assured the Ratifiers that of the three branches
"the judiciary is next to nothing."2 7 James Bradley Thayer and
Learned Hand justly observed that the judicial function was to police
constitutional boundaries, to prevent the other departments from
"overleaping" their bounds, not to interfere with the legislative or executive discretion within those bounds.28 Judicial participation in legisla-

tive policy-making, let alone constitution remaking, was categorically
rejected. It had been proposed to make the Justices members of a
Council of Revision that would assist the President in exercising the
veto power, on the ground that "laws. .. may be dangerous. . . and

yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect. 29 But Elbridge Gerry objected, "It was quite foreign from
the nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures."3 0 Nathaniel Gorham likewise considered that judges "are
not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures"; 3 and Rufus King added that judges "ought

not to be legislators"; 3 2 John Dickinson cautioned that judges had "become by degrees the law giver[s]." 33 Then there is the fact, noted by
Morton Horwitz, that "fear of judicial discretion had long been part of
colonial political rhetoric,"3 4 pungently expressed by Chief Justice
Hutchinson of Massachusetts: "the Judge should never be the Legislator: Because, then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this

tends to a State of Slavery."35 To conclude, therefore, that the Framers
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
28. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 305 (emphasis added). For additional historical
material, see Berger on Kutler, infra, at n.102. The courts, said Oliver Ellsworth, were a
"check" if Congress should "overleap their limits." 2 Elliot, supra note 22, at 445, quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 304.
29. James Wilson, quoted in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 20 at 73, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

at 301.

30. 1 Farrand, supra note 20, at 97-98; 2 Farrand at 75, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 301.
31. 2 Farrand, supra note 20 at 73, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 301.
32. 1 Farrand, supranote 20, at 108; cf id. at 98, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
at 302.
33. 2 Farrand, supra note 20 at 299, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 302.
34. Horwitz, The Emergence o/an InstrumentalConception 0f4merican Law,1780-1820,
in 5 PERsPEcTrvEs IN AMERICAN HIsToRY 287, 303 (1971), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JuDICIARY at 306.
35. Horwitz, supranote 34, at 392, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 307. For
similar utterances, see Wood, supranote 20 at 304, 298. Hutchinson echoed Montesquieu,
the oracle of the Founders: "ITihere is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be subject to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator'
XXI MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, ch. 6 (1748).
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made the Judges their "surrogate" for revision of the Constitution (after exluding them from policy making and carefully supplying the article V machinery for amendment) represents, with due deference, the
veriest wishful thinking.
Being of a more philosophical bent than myself, Professor Lusky
ascribes to me an intention to encompass far more than was my purpose. 6 My book addresses several aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment, no more. Whether the principles applicable thereto can be
applied elsewhere is another matter. Given, as he notes, "Justice
Harlan's irrefutable and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the right to vote,
much less to guarantee that all votes have equal weight,""7 on what
theory may the Court displace the framers' choices by its own "one
person--one vote" doctrine? Mark that this posits a clearly discernible
legislative intention squarely reversed by the Court, an arrogation of
power to set aside unmistakable constitutional limits and to rule in
place of the sovereign people. Lusky inveighs time and again against
my "tunnel vision" reliance on the "original understanding" as a "useless and even destructive endeavor;"3 8 but does he mean to apply such
strictures to the Harlan demonstration, which led Harlan to declare:
"[W]hen the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of
the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which
the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." 39 Even an ardent apologist for the Warren Court, Judge J. Skelly Wright, averred
that "the most important value choices have already been made by the
framers of the Constitution," and that judicial "'value choices' are to
be made only within the parameters" of those choices.4 °
History, Lusky maintains, "is at best one factor," and he places
more emphasis on "the practical effects that would ensue if [Berger's]
prescription were followed. ' 41 Consider the Harlan suffrage example:
though I have no love for weighting the rural redneck vote 10 to 1
36. "It is clear," states Lusky, that Berger "would undo" the judicial revisory power and
repudiation of its limits, "with respect to the whole Constitution as amended, and not the
Fourteenth Amendment alone." Lusky Essay at 408.
37. Id. at 406.
38. Id. at 410.
39. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 202-03 (1970), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 330.
40. Wright, ProfessorBickel, The Scholarly Tradition,andthe Supreme Court,84 HARv.
L. REV. 769, 777, 784, 785 (1971), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI4RY at 322.
41. Lusky Essay at 410.
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against the urbanite, I like even less an arrogation of power to cure an
undeniable evil. The end does not justify the means. In "a decent,
democratic society," wrote Emile Zola, "good ends cannot be used to
excuse bad means, if only because it is those who employ the means
who decide which ends are good."4 2 On the opposite view the Inquisition extirpated the Albigensians in the interest of a higher morality.
With Washington, I hold, "let there be no change by usurpation; for
though this, in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed."4 3 Consequently I cannot accept Professor Lusky's proposition that the legitimacy of judicial power "must turn on the single question whether it is
less hazardous to societal welfare than any visible alternative."' That
determination, as Zola noted,4 5 cannot safely be left to those who
would exercise additional power; it cannot be left to them to hold their
own acts legitimate, for as Lord Chief Justice Denman held, "The prac46
tice of a ruling power in the State is but a feeble proof of its legality.
In truth Lusky is torn between conflicting aspirations. He aligns
himself with Professor Herbert Wechsler4 7 and myself in rejecting the
"notion that the Supreme Court can legitimately function as a continuing constitutional convention enjoying the totalfreedom that such a convention, if regularly established, would possess."48 He is critical of
"scholars who approve whatever innovations may from time to time
seem desirable to a majority of the Justices, for 'modernization' of the
Constitution. . . and then construct a constitutional rule adequate to
serve as a major premise for the desired result," 49 because this would
make the Court "simply another legislative house," 5° oblivious to the
fact that this applies to his own constructs.5 1 He observes that "[s]ome
if not all of [the Justices] seem to recognize the constraint of nothing
outside themselves, to follow no star except each one's conception of

42. Whitman, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1977, at 29.
43. 35 G. WASHIrNGTON, WRrrINGs 228-29 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 299.
44. Lusky Essay at 408, quoting By WHAT RIGHt?, supra note 12, at 24.

45. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
46. Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839), cited in GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 375.

47.
(1959).
48.
49.
50.
51.

Weschler, Toward Neutral Princilesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
Lusky Essay at 411 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 430.
Id.
See notes 57, 67 and accompanying text infra.
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the public welfare ..
."I' His objective is to formulate a principle
that can "serve to defend the Court from the accusation that it has cast
off all restraint [an accusation he himself makes]53 and set itself above
the law," 54 a theory "that will preserve the legitimacy of constitutional
'55
innovation by the Court, and hence preserve judicial review itself.
Although he agrees that the Court may not serve as a "constitutional
56
convention,"
it does not follow that judicial constitution-making is intrinsically
illegitimate. Rather, judicial overconfidence calls simply for insistent reminders that constitution-making by judges is not acceptable as standard practice, but is instead a last resort-usable
only when the elected branches are not merely unwilling but for
some reason unable to realize a basic national objective....1'
This paraphrases the "vacuum"f theory: when the legislature fails to
exercise the legislative power it descends on the Court. But such failure
does not transfer the legislative power to the Court. John Adams' 1780
Massachusetts Constitution made the separation of power explicit, forbade each branch to exercise the power of another, and particularized
that the "[judiciary shall] never exercise the legislative. . . powers...
[so that this] may be a government of laws, and not of men."5 8 The
"vacuum" theory improbably posits that the Framers who denied the
Justices a share of policy-making power in the veto process authorized
a complete take-over if Congress failed to legislate! And where is the
constitutional warrant for "constitution-making by judges"!
What are Lusky's own test of "legitimacy?" He fleetingly refers to
"the single question whether [judicial review] is less hazardous to societal welfare than any visible alternative,"5 9 and again to "rules based on
societal necessity."' 60 Certainly Brown v. Board of Education61 represented no such consensus for the Court rebuffed Justice Jackson's plea
62
to tell the people that it was "declaring new law for a new day,"
rightly fearing it would be suicidal. Not long since Chester Finn wrote
that the issue of racial discrimination "has been fanned into the most
".

52. Lusky Essay at 433.
53. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
54. Lusky Essay at 409, quoting By WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 12.
55. Lusky Essay at 418.
56. Id. at 411.
57. Id. at 416-17.
58. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, eitedin I B. PooRE 960, citedin GOVERNMENT BY
JuDIciARY at 290. For additional materials, see Berger on Kutler, infra, at nn. 149-50.
59. Lusky Essay at 408, quoting BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 12, at 24.
60. Lusky Essay at 414.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. For the absence of such consensus, see Berger on Kutler n. 130. infra.
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protracted, rancorous, and divisive blaze of the post-war era"; 63 in the
words of Philip Kurland, "The Court has moved faster than society is
prepared to go."' The "consensus" exists only in the eyes of the Court
and its zealous partisans. Were it demonstrable, it would collide with
Hamilton's pronouncement that "even knowledge of [the people's] sentiments" can not warrant a departure from the Constitution prior to
amendment. 65 And who is to decide whether judicial review "is less
hazardous to societal welfare" but the Court, thus enabling it to confer
power on itself, a boot-strap lifting test.
Professor Lusky has still other basic criteria for judicial power:
First, "a national objective . . . inferable from. . . the known purposes of the Constitution." 66 Since the "known purpose" of the Fourteenth Amendment admittedly was to exclude suffrage from its ambit,
the "one person-one vote" decision falls by his own test. Lusky's second test is "a comprehensible reason why the Court is better fitted than
other organs of government to effectuate that objective."67 Again a
self-conferred power, for presumably Lusky means the Court rather
than Congress to make that determination. But section 5 of the
Amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce by
appropriate legislation the provisions of this article." In 1879 the Court
held, "it is not said that the judicialfpower . . . shall extend to enforcing" the Amendment; "It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged, '6 8 a consequence of the deep-seated distrust of the Court that
followed the fugitive slave and DredScott 69 decisions.7 0 "If either of
these [aforesaid] elements is lacking," Professor Lusky states, "the
Court's rule is an exercise of raw power."7 By these tests the reapportionment and desegregation cases cannot stand.
Professor Lusky would plunge the Court into a boiling cauldron of
racial tension on the theory that "the basic value of judicial review [is]
the bridging of dangerous social schisms such as those resulting from
race. . that are too broad to be healed through majoritarian legisla63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 328, n.55; see also Berger on Miller at n. 57.
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 328, n.55.

Supra note 22.
Lusky Essay at 414, quoting By WHAT RIGHT?., supra note 12.

Id.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at

221.
69. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
70. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 222; see also Berger on Kufler infra, at nn. 12123.
71. Lusky Essay at 414, quoting BY WHAT RIGHT?, supra note 12, at 107.
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...
72 He criticizes the "unwarranted failure" of the Court in
tion.
the Bakke case "to resolve the conflict presented by 'reverse discrimination'" because it "can be expected to exacerbate rather than ease
existing social tensions. 7 3 The fact, as he notes, that there were six
opinions, that ultimately the decision was that of one "lone 'swing
man,' ,74 suggests, however, that this is a political hot potato not fit for
settlement by the litigation process. The Court may well draw back
from deepening involvement in such a divisive political struggle in
which assertion of black rights means displacement of rights, for example, gained by whites in the labor field by years of service, thereby fanning racial discord. It was precisely such ill-considered intervention by
75
the Court in the slavery conflict that proved disastrous in DredScott.
To this Lusky replies that on my analysis "both Court and Congress would be left powerless to satisfy. . . the national obligation to
do what can be done to retrieve the century lost ' 76 by the blacks by
virtue of the Court's frustration of the guarantees of the privileges or
immunities clause in the Slaughter-House Cases.7 7 In the first place,
there are widespread differences as to the scope of the "national obligation," even on the Court itself, as the badly split Bakke case attests. He
himself condemns the post-1968 school desegregation doctrine because
it has "led to grotesquely destructive results," and "wantonly . . .
wreck[ed] a number of local public school systems and outrage[d] the
communities they serve." 78 How can he call on the Court "to resolve
deeply divisive conflicts"7 9 when he is estranged by its solutions? To be
sure, when the result conforms to his predilections, he has praised "the
tremendously valuable work [the Court]. . .has done in the past third
of a century;" 80 however, when it runs counter thereto, as in the post1968 decisions, it constitutes "a bold revision of history, 8 1 though not
nearly of the same order of revisory magnitude as the 1954 desegrega72. Lusky Essay at 420.
73. Id. at 435.
74. Id. at 434.
75. Professor Wallace Mendelson says of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), "Let that disaster stand for all time as a warning to judges who-unmindful of their
proper role-attempt to impose extra-constitutional policies upon the community under the
guise of interpretation." Mendelson Essay at 453.
76. Lusky Essay at 430-31.
77. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
78. Lusky Essay at 424.
79. Id. at 433.
80. By WHAT RIG-Ir?, supra note 12, at 6, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
392.
81. Lusky Essay at 424.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Spring 1979]

tion decision.

2

If history is to be disregarded in the latter case, neither

can it serve Professor Lusky's demands. Secondly, if the power was not
granted, it cannot be summoned from the void. "Had the power of
making treaties," Madison declared, "been omitted, however necessary
it might have been, the defect could only be lamented, or supplied by
an amendment of the Constitution." 3 Especially when the omission
concerns matters the Tenth Amendment reserves to the States, 84 it cannot be judicially corrected on the plea that there is a "national obligation" to do so. "The constitution," Chief Justice Marshall held, "was
abuse of power which
not intended to furnish the corrective for every
85
governments.
state
the
by
committed
may be
Account must be taken of several criticisms Lusky levels at my
views. It is a mistake, he considers, to approach the construction of a
constitutional provision "in precisely the same way as if it were interpreting a statute, [to ask] what were the written words intended to mean
by those who employed them?"8 6 Yet that was the criterion applied by
the 1866 framers, 7 who are my central concern. That Madison insisted
upon giving effect to such intention in order to safeguard our democracy, apparently carries no weight with Lusky,88 though he acknowledges that Chief Justice Marshall would have agreed "that the
Constitution should be applied in accordance with the intent of those
who made it."8 9 In fact Chief Justice Marshall so held.90 Professor
Lusky thinks to discredit the statutory analogy by remarking that "Berger cites three statutory interpretation cases, decided.

. .

in 1845, 1861,

and 1903, and the seventh edition of Bacon's Abridgment, published in
1832." 91 The latter dates back to the mid-1700s and was familiar to the
Founders. Professor John Hart Ely, a critic in Lusky's camp, recently
wrote that "In interpreting a statute.. . a Court will obviously limit
82. Cf. Berger on Kutler, infra, at nn. 40, 60-62.
83. 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1900-1901 (February 2, 1791), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 381 n.32.
84. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
85. Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
86. Lusky Essay at 404.
87. See note 13 supra.
88. Lusky Essay at 404-05.
89. Id. at 405.
90. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). For a general discussion of these cases, see
GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY at 378-79.
91. Lusky Essay at 404.
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itself to a determination of the purposes and prohibitions expressed by
or implicit in its language," and he concluded that "the Constitution is
[not] different in this respect," in reliance on Marshall's assumption in
Marbury v. Madison that "constitutional review involves merely the
traditional judicial function of comparing one legally prescribed mandate with another to see if they conflict ..
."92 The matter need not
rest on inference because the Founders, as Julius Goebel wrote, were
accustomed to "resort to the accepted rules of statutory construction to
settle the meaning of constitutional provisions."93 References to such
rules are found in the First Congress, which contained many Framers
and Ratifiers.94 Such rules, Justice Story averred, provide a "fixed
standard" for interpretation of the Constitution, 95 without which a
"fixed constitution" would be forever unfixed. Plainly the Founders
viewed the task of constitutional construction as subject to the same
limits as that of statutory interpretation. And surely it would be unreasonable to maintain that while courts must give effect to the intention
of the legislature they are free to disregard the clearly discernible intention of the sovereign people, as the 96
Court unmistakably has done with
respect to suffrage and segregation.
Professor Lusky reserves his greatest emphasis for the argument
that the judicial decisions of the last 25 years are "irreversible," 97 that
"we cannot turn back the clock,"9 that the "most lawless government
or governmental measures will finally be accepted as legitimate," 99 presumably after the fashion of ducal dynasties established by Renaissance condottieri-in the absence of a Constitution. He overlooks the
Court's repudiation per Holmes and Brandeis of Swift v. Tyson,l"° in92. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretatiom Its Allure andImpossibility, 53 IND. L.. 399, 402
n.11 (1978).
93. 1 J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 120 (1971).
Earlier Edward Corwin wrote that the Founders borrowed from the English the "numerous
rules for the construction of written instruments ... [for] the business of constitutional construction." Corwin, The "Iigher Law" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 370-71 (1929).
94. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 507, 517 (1834) (print bearing running title "History of
Congress"). See also Berger on Miller infra, at nn. 23-26.
95. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 399
at 283 (1833). In THE FEDERALIST No. 78, Hamilton stated that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
96. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, chs. 4-7.
97. Lusky Essay at 403.
98. Id. at 418.
99. Id. at 415.
100. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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volving a much more debatable constitutional issue than "reapportionment," after the lapse of a century, branding it "an unconstitutional
assumption of power by courts. . . which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."'' 1 Professor
Lusky himself urges the "Justices to confess that the Court itself, because of its misinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
1873 Slaughter-House Cases. . . bears primary responsibility for the
nation's slowness in making good the national commitment to extirpation of the remnants of slavery ..
."'0 What is it that exalts the alleged "acceptance" by the people of the recent twenty-five-year course
of the Court above the hundred-year "acceptance" of the SlaughterHouse Cases but the fact that he is convinced that the latter cases were
wrong and the former "right."
The argument of "acceptance" is in fact unseaworthy. To argue
that "the people at large have accepted the legitimacy of the basic decisions claiming enlarged judicial power"'1 3 flies in the face of the fact
that the Court declined to tell the people that it was "declaring new law
for a new day."'" They were never told that the Court was "claiming
enlarged judicial power." Instead, as Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote
President Franklin Roosevelt, "People have been taught to believe that
when the Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak but the Constitution, whereas, of course, in so many vital cases, it is they who speak
and not the Constitution."'' 0 5 Acceptance, or in legal terminology, ratification, of assumed power, requires disclosure; 0 6 none was ever
made. 7 Professor Lusky would substitute, for the exclusive article V
101.

Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79 (1938), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-

ARY at 297 n.56. Lusky states that the "most convincing example" of the acceptance and
legitimation of "the most lawless" measure, is that the Constitution "defied the unanimity
requirement imposed on the 1787 Convention by the Articles of Confederation and by the
specific resolutions endowing most of the state delegations with their authority.. . . Berger's logic would have it that the whole United States government was illegitimate down to
May 29, 1790, when the thirteenth ratification (by Rhode Island) came in. . .

."

Lusky

Essay at 415-16.
The Articles of Confederation could not bind the sovereign people, when they decided
to accept a new constitution, notwithstanding that the draftsmen had exceeded their instructions. Ratification operates to legitimate the agent's action in excess of authority. Would
that a segregation amendment had been sanctioned by a similar majority.
102. Lusky Essay at 427.
103. Id. at 413.
104. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 681, 689 (1976), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

at 130.
105.

ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 383 (M.

Freedman, ed. 1967), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 281 n.143.
106. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 155 & n.93.

107. Grey comments on the Court's "resort to bad legislative history and strained read-
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amendment machinery for change, judicial revision fortified by tacit
acquiescence. 10 8 Usurpation would be legitimated by inertia, contrary
to Hamilton's assurance that the representatives of the people were unauthorized to depart from the Constitution prior to an amendment.10 9
For generations jurisprndes, striving for scientific methodology,
have searched for legal principles; Professor Lusky adheres to his own
version of "neutral principles." 110 But for me, as for Ely, if a "[neutral
principle] lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks as
special it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business
imposing it.""' Most of the rationalizations of the Court's "new and
grander" revisory role proceed from the tacit assumption that academe
can start afresh and lodge the amendment power in the Court, 1 2 ignoring the fact that ours is a government by consent of the governed. As
one of the most acute Founders, James Iredell, declared, "The people
have chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They have
' 3
not chosen to be governed or promised to submit upon any other." "
Assertion of the power to revise the Constitution-never explicitly
avowed by the Court-is but a product of the recent past, asserted by
academe in order to justify the Court's revolutionary decisions.
After noting the "two seismic changes that have taken place in the
last twenty years"'1 14 in shaping the Court's "new and grander"" 5 conception of its role, namely, the Court's assertion of a power to "revise
'' 17
the Constitution, '' 16 and to repudiate "the limits on judicial review,
Professor Lusky observes that Berger "assumes that they are fully reversible and may indeed be wiped away if shown to be contrary to the
original intention" of the Framers." 118 Why not? Is the Court any
ing of constitutional language to support results that would be better justified by explication
of contemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from the constitutional text." Grey,
supra note 7, at 706.
108. See GOVERNMENT BY JuIIcLARY at 353 (discussing a similar view adopted by
Charles Black).
109. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
110. Lusky Essay at 411-14.
111. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949
(1973), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY at 285.
112. Berger on Kutler, infra at n. 156.
113. 2 G. J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-1858),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 295-96.

114. Lusky Essay at 407.
115. Id. at 408.
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id. To my surprise, Professor Lusky asserts that my book "ignores these two seismic changes," id. at 407, when my thesis is that these changes are without constitutional
warrant.
118. Id. at 407-08.
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more entitled to enlarge its own power than was President Nixon?
Where was it empowered to "revise the Constitution"?
Turning now to Professor Lusky's practical argument: "Were we
to follow the Berger recommendation with respect to desegregation, it
is entirely likely that the huge and increasingly well-organized nonwhite minority would write finis to the open society."'1 19 Such a prophecy of doom cannot alter constitutional facts; judges are not authorized
to revise the Constitution to forestall "civil disorder." 120 Nor should an
overwhelming majority be threatened with in terrorem consequences if
it demands judicial compliance with the Constitution. In fact, however, I did not, on practicalgrounds, insist on overruling the desegregation decision. To the contrary, I stated that it would
be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo the past in
the face of the expectations that the segregation decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry-expectations confirmed by every decent instinct. . . . But to accept thus far
accomplished ends is not to condone the continued employment
of the unlawful means.12 1
The fact that eggs cannot be unscrambled does not warrant continuing
breakage. Lusky himself condemns the post-1968 decisions as "grotesquely destructive," 1 but where he unwittingly makes his predilections
the test of constitutionality, I sought for surer footing in the clearly
discernible intention of the framers to leave control of suffrage and segregation to the states. We need to remember Marshall's caution: "The
peculiar circumstances of the moment may render a measure more or
less wise, but cannot render it more or less constitutional." '2 3 Because
the result is laudable, it does not follow that it is constitutional.

119. Id. at 413.
120. Id.
121. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
122. Lusky Essay at 424.

at 412-13.

123. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 190-91 (G. Gunther

ed. 1969), quotedin GoVERNNrr BY JuDIcIARY at 271; see also, text accompanying note 29
supra.
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Comment on Professor Wallace Mendelson's Essay

Some important areas of agreement emerge from Professor Mendelson's essay:' The due process and equal protection provisions "have
been savagely abused by judicial 'interpretation' ,,;2 due process "long
ago became a term of art,"3 it meant in the Fourteenth Amendment
what it meant in the Fifth; "to incorporate the words is to incorporate
their traditional meaning, and no more," namely "a fair hearing"; 4 natural law is concerned with "amorphous moral postulates," not "manmade legal rules";5 the DredScott dictum was a "disaster" that should
"stand for all time as warning to judges" against an "attempt to impose
extra-constitutional policies upon the community under the guise of
interpretation." 6
More important for immediate purposes is that like Professor
Lusky, who adverted to "Justice Harlan's irrefutable and unrefuted
demonstration in dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect the right to vote,"7 Professor Mendelson holds that
the Amendment "does not forbid suffrage discrimination," 8 that the
framers "made clear that their purpose was to exclude voter problems
' and that
from the equal protection and related clauses of Section L,"
"the Fifteenth Amendment made good the omission of suffrage rights
in section .'10 But he does not pause to inquire how to reconcile the
"activist" construction of the terms of the Amendment, the "one person- one vote" doctrine, I I with such exclusion.
In Government by JudiciaryI did not purport to write a treatise on
how to ascertain, weigh and effectuate the legislative intention in all
circumstances.' 2 My focus was very narrow: if the control of suffrage
was clearly left to the states the "one person, one vote" cases represent
"an awesome exercise of power, an 180 degree revision. . . . That
poses the stark issue whether such revisory power was conferred on the
Court."' 3 In other words, given a clearly discernible purpose, where
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Mendelson Essay, supra.
Mendelson Essay at 446.
Id. at 453.
Id. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 193-214.
Mendelson Essay at 450.
Id. at 453.
Lusky Essay at 406.
Mendelson Essay at 452 (referring to § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Id. at 453.
Id.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 284-86.
Id. at 8.
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was the Court authorized to displace the framers' choices by its own?
To this question Mendelson makes no clear answer but engages instead
in a general discussion of section 1, though he acknowledges that the
framers "made clear that their purpose was to exclude voter problems"
from section 1.14 Whatever the meaning of the terms of section 1, they
5
cannot comprehend what the framers so plainly rejected. 1

If

"[j]udicial edicts derived from standards not discernible in statute or

Constitution is government by judges,"' 6 even more clearly is that the
case when such edicts proceed in the teeth of the framers' unmistakable
intention. And if we give credit to Mendelson's concurrence that suf-

frage was excluded (my central thesis), on this score at least the
Amendment does not "ree[k] of compromise,"' 7 nor is it an "enigmatic
basic law." 18
Since the purpose of an ongoing debate is to clarify and narrow

the issues, I shall now address some particulars relating to the terms of
section 1. In several chapters I inquired what did the terms mean to the
framers who employed them.' 9 Due process, Mendelson agrees, was

employed in a procedural, not substantive sense,2" as is confirmed by
the records of the 39th Congress which framed the Amendment. 2 1 As

does Professor John Hart Ely,22 Mendelson rejects the substantive content whereby the Court, by its own confession, perverted due process
into an instrument of misrule.23
But he questions my view that the "privileges or immunities"
clause "'had [a] clearly defined and narrow compass' revealed in the
'rights . . . enumerated' in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. " 24 He finds
14. Mendelson Essay at 453.
15. Former Solicitor General Robert Bork wrote: "If the legislative history revealed a
consensus about segregation in schooling... I do not see how the Court could escape the
choices revealed and substitute its own, even though the words are general and conditions
have changed." Bork, NeutralPrinciplesandSomeFirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L. J.
1, 13 (1971), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 214.
16. Mendelson Essay at 445.
17. Id. at 437.
18. Id. at 443.
19. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, cbs. 2, 3, 10, 11 & 12.
20. Mendelson Essay at 453.
21. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 201-14, citing the relevant portions of the
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865-1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE].
22. Ely, Constitutionallnterpretivis
n Its Allure andImpossibilitg53 IND. L.J. 399, 41516 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), wherein the Court acknowledged
its "abandonment of the use of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify
laws which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise... ...
" Id. at 731.
See also GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 258 n.39, 265-66.
24. Mendelson Essay at 446 (quoting GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 18, 36).
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. inthe proceedings of the thirty-ninth Congress."5
only "confusion.
It is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that "Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve what in principle the
1866 Act sought to do," namely, to insure to blacks that "they were to
have, in the words of the Act, 'full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security ofperson andproperty, as is enjoyed by

white citizens,' "26 which is what I demonstrated, adding that rights
other than those enumerated were excluded. In place of my "narrow"
meaning, Mendelson in effect substitutes no meaning at all, for he concludes that the clause "is non-justiciable, because it provides no judicially discoverable or manageable standards for adjudication, ' 27 surely
a paradoxical repetition of the century-old Slaughter-Housefeat of reducing the clause to a dead letter.
Since the "'identity' between Act and Amendment" is pivotal, I
begin with the proof. "Over and over in this debate" on the Amendment, Charles Fairman said, "[t]he provisions of the one are treated as
though they were essentially identical with those of the other. '2 An
ardent advocate of an "activist" reading, Howard Jay Graham, wrote
that "virtually every speaker in the debate on the Fourteenth Amendment-Republican and Democrat alike-said or agreed that the
Amendment was designed to embody or incorporate the Civil Rights
Act."'29 Another devotee of a broad construction, Harry Flack, ob-

served that "nearly all said it was but an incorporation of the Civil
Rights Bill.

.

.there was no controversy as to its purpose and mean-

ing."30 For example, George Latham stated that "the 'civil rights bill'
which is now a law.

. .

covers exactly the same ground as this amend-

ment."' I There were other confirmatory remarks, and so far as I could
find, not one remark to the contrary. Consequently the Act is of cardinal importance for the meaning of the terms employed in the
Amendment.
What did the Civil Rights Act seek to secure, and what did the
Amendment "incorporate"? Originally, the bill provided
25. Mendelson Essay at 447.
26. Id. at 451 (emphasis added)(quoting Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 21. 14 Stat. 27).
27. Mendelson Essay at 451.
28. Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorfporatethe Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN L.
REV. 5, 44 (1949)(emphasis added), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 22-23.
29. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 291 n.73, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 23 n.13.
30. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908), quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 23 n.13.
31. GLOBE, supra note 21 at 2883 (emphasis added), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 23.
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[t]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities. . on account of race. . . but the inhabitants of every race
. . . shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase. . . real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, and
shall be subject to like punishments. . . and no other.32
Thayer and others assured the Framers that "when those civil rights
which are first referred to in general terms are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that general words
which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which
have been enumerated. 3 3 The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and manager of the bill, James Wilson, explained that the "civil
rights and immunities" clause was very narrow in scope, saying that the
words do not
mean that in all things, civil, social, political, all citizens, without
distinction of race or color shall be equal. . . . Nor do they
mean that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their children
shall attend the same schools. These are not civil rights and immunities. . . . I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute
rights of individuals, such as 'The right of personal security, the
right of personal liberty, and the rights to acquire and enjoy
property.
Notwithstanding, John Bingham, draftsman of the Amendment,
protested that the "civil rights" phrase was "oppressive," that it would
"embrace every right that pertains to a citizen as such" and strike down
"every state constitution which makes a discrimination on account of
race or color in any of the civil rights of the citizen."3 5 In short, he was
opposed to striking down all racial discriminations, and at his insistence the "no discrimination in civil rights" clause was deleted, to obviate a "latitudinarian" construction going "beyond the specific rights'
named in the section."36 How can we attribute to Bingham, who rejected "civil rights and immunities" because it was too "oppressive," an
intention to incorporate in the Amendment's '"privilegesor immunities"
the even broader construction urged by activists?
In support of his conclusion that the privileges or immunities
clause is non-justiciable because it provides no discoverable standards,37 Mendelson states that he is not "aware of any common law, or
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 21, 14 Stat. 27. See also GLOBE, supra note 21, at 474.
Id. at 1151, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 28.
GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1117, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 27.
GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1291-93, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 120.
GLOBE, sufpra note 21, at 1291-93, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 122.
Mendelson Essay at 451.
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other tradition or usage. . . that elucidates this inherently obscure and
enigmatic terminology. It is in a word unintelligible.""' He finds "no
help---indeed only more confusion-in the proceedings of the 39th
Congress.1 39 No wonder. Three of the witnesses he summons were
Democrats, two of whom, Rogers and Hendricks, were bent on discrediting every measure to ameliorate southern mistreatment of blacks. 40
Before examining his three Republican witnesses, let me attempt to
supply the elucidation Mendelson failed to find.
The "privileges or immunities" clause, as the debates show, was
taken from article IV, section 2 of the original Constitution, 4 ' and that
in turn was derived from article IV of the Articles of Confederation.42
The object of the latter was to secure "mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states," 43 and to that end the
free inhabitants ... shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each
state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as
the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property
imported into any State. .... I

For the Founders a general provision such as "entitled to all privileges
and immunities" was limited by the subsequent enumeration, as
Madison made crystal-clear, 45 and as was reiterated in the 1866 de38. Id. at 446.
39. Id. at 447.
40. See, e.g., GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1122, 2538. Senator Reverdy Johnson, a Democrat from Maryland, a border state, was more practiced and conciliatory, but it is safe to say
that he dragged his heels. In any event, his statement that he did not understand the "effect"
of the privileges or immunities clause, Id. at 3041, quotedin Mendelson Essay at 449, merely
betrays ignorance of the explanations made to the Senate by Senator Trumbull. See notes
55-58 infra.
41. John Bingham, draftsman of the Amendment, stated that he had drawn the "privileges or immunities" clause from article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, which reads: "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1034, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 22;
see also Senator Trumbull's views, infra note 56.
Article IV employed "privileges and immunities," whereas the Fourteenth Amendment
used "privileges or immunities"; why the shift was made was not explained.
42. 3 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 12 (1911).
43. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1963).

44. Id., emphasis added.
45. "For what purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more
natural or common than first to use a general phrase, and then to explain ... it by a recital
of particulars." THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (J. Madison) at 269 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). Earlier,
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bates.4 6 Consequently the antecedent provision secured equality only
for the "privileges of trade and commerce" and the like. The "privileges and immunities" phraseology was borrowed by article IV of the
Constitution; the Civil Rights Bill, as Senator Trumbull explained,
sought to make the privileges theretofore available to out-of-state persons equally available to resident blacks.4 7
The article IV clause had been judicially construed in three cases,
which were repeatedly cited in the 1866 debates. In Campbell v. Morris,4 8 Judge Samuel Chase, before long appointed to the Supreme
Court, stated on behalf of the Maryland court that the "privileges and
immunities" of article IV had a "particular and limited meaning," that
is "the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as personal property,. . . that such property shall be protected and secured
by the laws of the State, in the same manner as the property of the
citizens . . . is protected. . . . It secures and protects personal
rights."4 9 On behalf of the Massachusetts court, Chief Justice Parker
held in Abbott v. Bayley" that the article IV phrase confers a "right to
sue and be sued," that citizens who go to a second state "cannot enjoy
the right of suffrage," but "may take and hold real estate."'"
The third case, Corfield v. Coryell,5 2 decided by Justice Bushrod
Washington on circuit, also clung to the commercial-property rights
enumeration. Washington, however, expansively referred to all rights
and privileges, after the style of the Articles of Confederation, even
including the "right. . .to pursue and obtain happiness. '5 3 But he
decided that an out-of-state citizen could not dredge for oysters in a
sister state-surely an innocent pursuit of happiness. Nevertheless,
Washington said, the transient could vote in the sister state, though, as
the Supreme Court later held, and as Abbott earlier indicated, one
could not retain citizenship in one state and vote in another. 54 Washthe same view had been stated in M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, "Statutes" I(2)(7th ed. 1832).
46. For the statement of Martin Thayer, see text accompanying note 33 supra, see also
the views of various congressmen in GLOBE, supra note 21, at 632, 662, 1124, 1159, 1293,
1836, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 31 n.40.
47. See GLOBE, supra note 21, at 475,595-96, 600, 1757, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 41-42.

48. 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797).
49. Id. at 554, cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 33-34.
50. 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827).
51. Id. at 91, cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 34.
52. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
53. Id. at 551-52, cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 31-32.
54. Abbott v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89, 91 (Mass. 1827), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
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ington's confusion of values-oysters no, voting rights yes- illustrates
why dicta are entitled to little credit. Senator Lyman Trumbull, chair-

man of the Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill,
said of Washington's dictum, that "[t]his judge goes further than the
bill" in including the "elective franchise. ' 55 And he said of Co,ield
and the other cases that they held that under the "privileges and immunities" of article IV, section 2 a citizen had "certainfundamental rights,
such as the right to life, to liberty . . "56 He identified the rights "defined' in section 1 of the bill as 'fundamentalrights belonging to every
man as a free man," thus drawing those rights from article IV as read
by the cases.5 7 Bickel observed that "Radicals and Moderates alikewho spoke in favor of the bill were content to rest on the points Trumbull made. The rights to' be secured by the bill were those specifically
enumerated in section 1."58
In the House, Thayer, as we have seen, 59 assured the framers that
the "enumeration precludes any possibility that general words which
have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which have
been enumerated."6 Shellabarger spoke to the same effect. 61 The specific enumeration responded to the desire, made explicit by Senator
John Sherman, to secure such rights to the freedmen, "defining precisely what they should be."'62 Later he stated that the bill "says that

these men must be protected in certain rights, and so careful is its language that it goes on to define these rights, the rights to sue and be sued
[etc.] . . ."63

Thus Mendelson's failure to find any "common law" ' overlooks
Trumbull's explanation that he sought to incorporate the meat of the
cases and article IV, section 2 in the Civil Rights Bill, and William
Lawrence's recognition that "the courts have by construction limited
at 34. This principle was later reiterated in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174
(1874), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 32 n.43.
55. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 475, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 33.
56. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 474-75 (emphasis added), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 29.
57. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 476 (emphasis added), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 29 n.31. It is what Trumbull thought the cases meant, not how we read them today,
that is important. See Berger on Kutler, infra at 592, n.19.
58. Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingand the Segregation DecisioA 69 HARV. L. REV.
1, 13 (1955), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 29 n.31.
59. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
60. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1151, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 28.
61. GLOBE, supranote 21, at 1293, eitedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 170, 176-77.
62. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 42, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 24.
63. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 744, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 30.
64. Mendelson Essay at 446.
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the words 'all privileges' [of article IV] to mean only 'some privileges.'" 6 5 So, too, the foregoing history quite plainly delineates the
limited scope of the Act. Although Mendelson recognizes that "Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve in principle
what the 1866 Act sought to do,"6 6 he rejects in the "privileges or immunities" context the view that the "intended function [of the Amendment] was simply to incorporate the substance of the 1866 statute into
the Constitution,"67 notwithstanding it was undisputed that the two
were meant to be identical. This he does in reliance on six witnesses,

two of whom, Democratic opponents of both Act and Amendment, are
not, under established principles, acceptable witnesses as to the legislative intention.

Mendelson also remarks that he failed to find "in the

leading news journals of the day even a hint of evidence which suggests
that the ratifying public thought the 'rivileges' clause was a shorthand
reference to the civil 'rights'legislation of 1866."' 69 If no specific identi65. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 1835.
66. Mendelson Essay at 451.
67. Id. at 450.
68. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 157-65 ("Opposition Statements Examined").
69. Mendelson Essay at 450 (emphasis in original). Professor Mendelson's revised
Slaughter-House Cases opinion incorporates as an appendix a survey of contemporary
newspaper opinion, broken down into three categories: the radical Republicans, the Democrats, and the conservative-moderate Republicans. The Democrats "were trying to make the
proposed amendment as obnoxious to the States as possible." Appendix at 460. It is a rule
of construction that the views of opponents of a measure are entitled to no weight. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 157 n.2, 160. For the radicals, the proposed amendment did not go
far enough; it was "'a feeble thing.'" Appendix at 456. It failed to "provide southern
blacks with effective political power," id. at 458; civil rights and political rights were inseparable. Id. at 461. The omission of "political rights," later provided by the Fifteenth Amendment, see notes 7-10 supra, was explained in the Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction: "the States would not surrender a power they had exercised and to which
they were attached," and therefore it was thought best to "leave the whole question with the
people of each State." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 84. It is true that the radical view of

"civil rights" was "expansive," including both "political power" and "education." Appendix
at 462. But that battle was lost. Chairman James Wilson assured the House that "civil
rights" included neither political rights nor mixed schools. See text accompanying note 34
supra. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was drawn in severely limited, "enumerated" terms.
See notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, attempts to remove all distinctions were repeatedly rejected by the framers. See notes 88-90 and accompanying text infra.
The disappointment of radical editors cannot cancel out the crystal-clear intention of the
framers to give "civil rights" a limited meaning.
The radical press recognized that the Amendment was a "reenactment of the Civil
Rights Act." Appendix at 457, 463, and the debates show that they were in fact deemed to
be "identical." See note 28 and accompanying text supra. The Appendix suggests that "if
'civil rights' meant something more than the recently enacted Civil Rights Act it is difficult,
if not impossible, to define precisely what this crucial term was thought to mean." Appendix
at 461. In that case, the rule favors a construction which gives, rather than deprives, a term
of meaning. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941). Finally, reliance on

556
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fication with the "privileges" clause may be found, the want was supplied by Flack's canvass of "speeches concerning the popular
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment," which led him to conclude
that "the general opinion held in the North. ..was that the Amendment [including the privileges or immunities clause] embodied the
Civil Rights Act,' 70 which was limited to enumerated rights.
It is time to turn to Mendelson's three Republican witnesses.
Bingham, the principal drafter, stated that the "proposed amendment
will supply" a want, "to do that by Congressional enactment which
hitherto they have not had the power to do," namely, "to protect...
the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic. ' 71 By
this Bingham presumably had in mind the decision in Kentucky v. Dennison72 which denied to the federal government "implied power to exercise any control over a state's officers and agencies. 73 George Miller
of Pennsylvania observed, that section 5 of the Amendment "is requisite to enforce the foregoing sections

. . .

is not contested."'74 In this

75

resides no "confusion" as to the scope or meaning of "privileges or
immunities." As Mendelson himself states, "in Congressman Bingham's view, the privileges or immunities and related clauses entailed no
new constitutional prohibitions whatsoever; they merely authorized
congressional enforcement of prohibitions already contained in the
Constitution; ' 76 more accurately, as Trumbull made plain, they made
available to in-state black residents what article IV, section 2 theretofore conferred only on out-of-state white residents of a sister state.7 7
Next Mendelson cites Stevens: "[Flor him the theme of section 1
.. .was racial equality."78 But it was the limited equality of the Act.
radical editorials ignores the fact, cited by Senator John Sherman while the Amendment was
up for ratification, that "we defeated every radical proposition in it." GOVERNMENT BY JuDICIARY at 105. As Professor M. L. Benedict stated, "[Tihe nonradicals had enacted their
program with the sullen acquiescence of some radicals and over the opposition of many."
Id. at 239. No editorials can diminish such facts.
70. M. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 153 (1908) quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 151-52.
71. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2542, quoted in Mendelson Essay at 447.
72. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
73. Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against Private
Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1357 (1964), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 226. See

Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860).
74. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2511, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 275; see

also GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2765 (Senator Howard).
75. Mendelson Essay at 447.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. GLOBE, supranote 21, at 600. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 41-42.
78. Mendelson Essay at 447 (emphasis in original).
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After his introductory statement, "[t]his amendment. . . allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States so far that the law
which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." Stevens
launched upon an enumeration which parallels that of the Act:
Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the
black man precisely in the same way. . . . Whatever law protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black
man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all. Whatever laws allow the. . . white man
79 to testify
in court shall allow the man of color to do the same.
Manifestly he was recapitulating its stated purpose to give "equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security ofperson andproperty,as is
enjoyed by white men." 80° That he had nb intention of repudiating his
confreres' emphasis on the enumerated rights of the Civil Rights Act is
evidenced by his closing remark, "Your civil rights bill secures the
same thing.""1 And it is confirmed by his summation of the Amendment, stating that he had hoped to free our institutions "from every
vestige of. . . inequality of rights. . . [so] that no distinction would be
tolerated. . . . [But] [t]his bright dream has vanished," 2 proving, as
Fessenden said in the Senate, impossible of realization. 3
Finally, Senator Howard, who introduced the proposed amendment in the Senate, Mendelson asserts, "differed" from Bingham and
Stevens "concerning the nature of the prohibitions Congress would
have power to enforce against the states."8 4 Howard correctly noted
that the Supreme Court had never "undertaken to define either the nature or the extent of the privileges and immunities thus guaranteed [by
article IV]. . . . But we may gather some intimation of what probably
will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring" to CoTfeld v. Coryell.5
After reading therefrom, Howard "added the personal rights guaranteed. . . by the first eight amendments of the Constitution,"8 6 none of
79. GLOBE, supranote 21, at 2459 (emphasis in original), quotedin Mendelson Essay at
448.
80. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 21, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).
81. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2459, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 172.
82. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 3148 (emphasis added), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDI-

CIARY at 173. Stevens also stated: "This ... is not all that the Committee [on Reconstruction] desired. It falls far short of my wishes, but. . . it is all that can be obtained in the
present state of public opinion." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2459.
83. Id. at 705, quoted infra at pp. 559-560.
84. Mendelson Essay at 448.
85. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See text accompanying notes 52-55
supra.

86. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2765, quotedin Mendelson Essay at 449.
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which had been mentioned in any of the three cases,"7 and which were
added by the First Congress and were of entirely different provenance

from the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. As to my central concern, suffrage, there were no differences, for Howard said, "The

right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus
secured" by "the proposed amendment." 8
From the foregoing remarks Mendelson gathers that "the chief

sponsors of the proposed amendment were at odds as to the meaning of
the privileges or immunities clause. . . . The fact is that, apart from
what we have just quoted, there was virtually no discussion of this pro-

vision in the Congress that proposed it."8 9 Presumably Mendelson
confines himself to the Amendment, because the term "'civilrights and
immunities" was amply discussed in the concurrent debates on the

Civil Rights Act, and it was made plain that it did not include suffrage.90 Having settled the meaning of "privileges and immunities" in
those debates, during the very same session and on a parallel track, as it
were, the framers justifiably could take for granted that the terms of the
Amendment were not being used in a different and new sense.91 After
Howard spoke, Senator Poland explained that the clause "secures noth-

ing beyond what was intended by the original provision in the Constitution,"9 2 ie., article IV, a tie-in that others had made earlier. Senator
Doolittle echoed these remarks.93 When the Amendment was returned
to the House, George Latham stated, "The civil rights bill. . . covers
exactly the same ground as this amendment," 94 and Henry Van Aernam of New York said the Amendment gives "constitutional sanctions
and protection to the substantial guarantees of the civil-rights bill." 95
87. Campbell v. Morris 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797); Abbott v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89
(Mass. 1827); and Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See
text accompanying notes 48-57 supra.
88. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2766.
89. Mendelson Essay at 450.
90. Senator Hendricks observed, "I have not heard any Senator accurately define, what
are the rights and immunities of citizenship." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 3039-40, quotedin
Mendelson Essay at 449. They had been defined in connection with the Civil Rights Act of
1866 by Senator Trumbull. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra, see also text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
91. For discussion of inparimateria,see note 113 infra. Where terms have been given a
meaning in a prior act that is par!materia, that meaning will be given to the terms in a later
act. Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1871). This is equally important authority for what otherwise rests on argument; it is equally important for equal protection. See
Berger on Alfange n.99.
92. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2961, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 148-49.
93. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2896, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY AT 149.
94. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2883, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 150.
95. GLOBE, supra note 21, at 3069, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 150.
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Given Mendelson's view that "Congress proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment to achieve what in principle the 1866 Act sought to do;"
namely, to insure that blacks would "have, in the words of the Act, 'full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security of person and
property,' "96 and the unanimity respecting the identity of Act and
Amendment, more than Howard's casual remark is needed to cancel
out the meaning the leadership had attached to privileges and
immunities.
Mendelson considers that the phrase "privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" would be a strange, irrational way of referring to the "rights" covered by that legislation [the Act]. The making of contracts, the acquisition and conveying of property, for
example, are state-law matters that haQe nothing to do with national
citizenship. 9 7 In this Mendelson follows the reasoning of the Slaughter
House Cases.9 8 But the evidence gathered from the debates in Government by Judiciarydemonstrates beyond cavil that the term "citizenship
of the United States" was added to the Fourteenth Amendment merely
to insure that a black would be a citizen, and to insure that a citizen of
a state could claim the guaranteed rights in that dual capacity, not to
take away with one hand what had been so painstakingly given by the
other.9 9 And that conclusion is confirmed by the continued references
to the fact that the Amendment conferred the same rights as did the
Act.
We "cannot rightly prefer" a meaning, the Supreme Court declared, "which will defeat rather than effectuate the constitutional purpose,"'" as Mendelson notes, "to constitutionalize" the Act. 10 1 The
"standards," in my judgment, are readily discoverable in the "identical" Civil Rights Act, where Justice Field and his three concurring dissenters experienced no difficulty in discovering them 100 years ago.' 0 2
But whatever the meaning of "privileges or immunities," be it broad or
96. Mendelson Essay at 451.
97. Id. at 450.
98. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
99. To the evidence gathered in Government by Judiciaryat 37-51 (chapter entitled "The
'Privileges or Immunities of a Citizen of the United States' ") add Senator Howard's statement that "citizens of the United States [are]. . . entitled, as citizens to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2765.
100. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941).
101. Mendelson Essay at 450.
102. "What, then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by State legislators? In the first section of the Civil Rights Act Congress has given its
interpretation of these terms. . . ." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872)
(Field, J. dissenting).
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narrow, it could not include suffrage, because Mendelson agrees that
the Fourteenth Amendment "does not forbid suffrage discrimination,"' 3 and that is my central proposition.
What Mendelson fails to find in the privileges or immunities
clause he locates in the equal protection clause. Not that he has shaken
down his doubts. He begins, "[lit may be that ihe equal protection
clause. . . is too obscure for judicial enforcement" because "classification is indispensable to the legislative process. The equal protection
clause, then, must have a narrowermeaning than its bare words may
suggest."'" This narrower meaning he finds in the fact that to resolve
doubts as to the "constitutionality" of the Civil Rights Act----"to constitutionalize it".-"Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to
achieve what the 1866 Act sought to do," namely, to give blacks "in the
words of the Act, 'full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings
for security ofperson andproperty,as is enjoyed by white citizens.' "105
Mendelson reads this, however, as "more than an intimation of equal
treatment for all races," and distills "a declaration that the laws of a
state shall be the same for each and every race; that all persons regardless of race shall stand equal before the law; and that no state shall
classify or discriminate on grounds of race."10 6 What begins as a "narrower meaning" has speedily burgeoned into a full-blown one. Yet he
himself states that the "racial equality which [the Act] explicitly mandates in contractualand conveyancing matters is covered presumably
by the equality clause of the amendment"; 0 7 the "ideal of equality" is
° Thus he
adumbrated "onlyparty in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 108
would extract from a statute, "constitutionalized" by the Amendment,
which carefully restricts "equality" to "contractual and conveyancing
matters," an across-the-board grant of "equality" which, by Mendelson's own admission, the framers rejected in the field of suffrage. 1 9 All
that the Act prohibited was discrimination with respect to the rights
there enumerated; and it was these rights to which they afforded "equal
protection."
Mendelson makes no reference to my demonstration that throughout the debates on the Civil Rights Bill, the framers referred interchangeably to "equality," "equality before the law" and "equal
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Mendelson Essay at 452.
Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 451-52.
Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
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protection" but always in the circumscribed context of the rights enumerated in the bill. Shellabarger's remarks in the House are illustrative: "Whatever rights as to each of these enumerated civil (not
political) matters the State may confer on one race. . shall be held by
all races in equality. . . It secures. . . equality ofprotection in those
enumerated civil rights. .. " 110 Bickel, having searched the debates,
concluded that the Moderate leadership, which prevailed,'1 ' had in
mind a "limited and well-defined meaning. . . a right to equal protection in the literal sense of benefitting equally from the laws for the security of person and property.""' 2 Were there nothing but the doctrine
of inparimateria,I1 3 it would be necessary to show that "equal protection" had taken on a new and uncircumscribed meaning when it was
transplanted to the Amendment. There is in fact hard evidence that its
meaning was to remain restricted. In an early version of the Amendment, provision was made for both "the same political rights and
privileges and. . . equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty,
and property,""' 4 evidence that "equal protection" was not meant to
comprehend "political rights," as Shellabarger had earlier made explicit.'
When the "political rights" phrase was deleted, the deletion
manifested an intention to exclude "political," and a fortiori, unmenGLOBE, supra note 21, at 1293 (emphasis added), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDIat 170.
111. This is the view of a Reconstruction study by M.L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF
PRINCIPLE (1975), discussed in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 237-38.
112. Bickel, The OriginalUnderstandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1, 56 (1955), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 170 n.20. Though Senator Howard
stated that the equal protection clause "abolishes all class legislation in the States and does
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of person to a code not applicable to another," he went on to state the Civil Rights Act enumerations: "It prohibits the hanging of a
black man for a crime for which the white man is not to be hanged. It protects the black
man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over a white
man. Is it not time that we extend to the black man. . . the poor privilege of the equal
protection of the law." GLOBE, supra note 21, at 2766. It should be noted that: (I) "fundamental rights" were the code words for those rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act; (2)
Howard explicitly excluded suffrage from his "all class legislation," and (3) he stamped
equal protection as a "poor privilege," a label that is incompatible with full scale equality.
113. M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, "Statute," 1(3) (3d
ed. 1768), long ago stated, "If divers Statutes relate to the same thing, they ought to be all
taken in consideration in construing any one of them"; "all acts in par materia, are to be
taken together, as if they were one law." Particularly should this be the case where both
were enacted at the same session and dealt with the same subject matter, so that familiarity
with the terms and meaning of the prior act may be presumed. See also United States v.
Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564 (1845).
114. Bickel, T'he Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 31 (1955) (emphasis added) cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 171.
115. See text accompanying note 110 supra.

110.

CIARY
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tioned rights from the scope of the Amendment. Then there is the evidence that repeated efforts to abolish all distinctions were rejected," 6
epitomized by Senator Fessenden, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction: "We cannot put into the Constitution, owing to
existing prejudices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all
class distinctions,"' 1 7 a failure also sadly acknowledged in Thaddeus
Stevens' comment on the Amendment.1 18
The narrow compass of the Civil Rights Act is so clear that if, as
Mendelson correctly holds, the Fourteenth Amendment was meant "to
achieve what in principle the 1866 Act sought to do,"' 19 there is no
room for a reading of "equal protection of the laws" to mean acrossthe-board equality. Confirmation is furnished by Mendelson himself.
The Amendment, he notes,
was not enforced in the North. It was soon found too revolutionary, too subversive of accepted ways of life to be enforced in the
South without troops. Yet extended military occupation was out
of the question. When that ended by mutual consent, the Fourteenth Amendment became with respect to blacks little more
than a tabled promise.' 2 °
It is more reasonable to conclude that a promise "too revolutionary, too
subversive of accepted ways of life" was never made, for, as George
Julian, a leading Radical, stated in the House, "The real trouble is we
hate the Negro,"' 2 1 a statement also made by others. 2 2 "On one basic
issue," Mendelson observes, "North and South were largely in agreement: blacks were generally considered inherently inferior beings."' l
To conclude that the North nevertheless was ready to make a "prom116.

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at

163-66.

BY JUDICIARY at 99.
118. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
119. Mendelson Essay at 451.
120. Id. at 443. By "mutual consent," Mendelson refers to the malodorous Hayes-Tilden
deal. "There seems no doubt," wrote Samuel Eliot Morison, "that a deal was made by the
Republicans with Southern Democratic leaders, by virtue of which, in return for their acquiescence in Hayes' election, they promised on his behalf to withdraw the garrison and to wink
at non-enforcement of Amendment XV [sic] guaranteeing civil rights to the freedmen. The
bargain was kept on both sides." S. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 333-34 (1965). In plain words, the North turned the blacks over to the tender
mercies of the recalcitrant South.

117.

GLOBE, supra note

121.

GLOBE,

21, at 705, quoted in GOVERNMENT

supra note 21, at 257, quotedin GOVERNMENT

BY JUDICIARY

at 91.

122. See, e.g., GLOBE, supranote 21, at 257, 739, 911, 2799, 2948; see also GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 13.
123. Mendelson Essay at 441. For similar remarks by other scholars, see W. BROCK, AN
AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 285-86 (1963); D. DONALD,
CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 202, 252 (1970); see also other commentators

cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 12-13 n.39.
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ise" of across-the-board equality reads back into the minds and hearts
of the framers the somewhat more enlightened views of our times; and
it is contrary to statements by some of the framers who voted for the
Amendment that they were not prepared to go beyond the rights
granted by the Civil Rights Act.' 2 4
The congressional discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, Men' 125
delson remarks, did not "address the problem of racial segregation."
The reason, as Bickel explained, was that "[ilt was preposterous to
worry about unsegregated schools, for example, when hardly a beginning had been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously
26
special efforts, suitable only for Negroes would have to be made."'1
Even so, Chairman Wilson felt constrained to assure the House that the
Civil Rights Bill did not mean that black "children shall attend the
same schools. These are not civil rights and immunities."'' 27 And repeated efforts to ban segregated schools in the District of Columbia,
where Congress did not have to yield to State prejudices, came to

naught. 12
Finally, there is Mendelson's reference to "that unique experiment
in government by judges called Warren Court activism."' 2 9 He lists a
string of idiosyncratic decisions, explained in opinions that grew "more
and more devious, sloganistic and directed to the human thirst for fairy
tales. . .[the] purpose [being] to obscure (for lesser minds) a raw exercise of judicial fiat. Make-believe, it seems, is activism's concession to
the Rule of Law."' 3 0 Is it for this that we need government by judici-

ary?

124. See also text accompanying notes 60-63 supra. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
124-25, 170-71.
125. Mendelson Essay at 446, n.51.
126. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976), quoting from a cover letter accompanying
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment which Bickel had compiled in the
course of his research while serving as Justice Frankfurter's law clerk, citedin GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 100.
127. Quoted supra at n.34; see Berger on Kutler, infra at pp. 597-98.
128. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, 635 (1976); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered-The SegregationQuestion, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 1085 (1956); and GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 123-28. In a bitter critique of my book, Paul Brest agrees that "the
nation was not ready to eliminate" school segregation in the 1860s." N.Y. Times, Dec. 11,
1977 (Book Rev. Section). See Berger, Academe v. The FoundingFathers,Nat'l Rev., Apr.
14, 1978, at 468, 470.
129. Mendelson Essay at 443.
130. Id. at 440-41.
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Comment on Professor Henry J. Abraham's Essay.

Professor Abraham's attempt to fashion some "limits" on the current grandiose conception of the judicial role' discloses the all but insuperable difficulty of the task. Although it is gratifying to find myself in
agreement with him at many points, the ongoing debate will be advanced by dwelling on our disagreements.
His essay, to my mind, is strewn with internal contradictions, with
attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable. Thus the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "specifically rejected its application to segregated
schools and the franchise" and left suffrage "'with the States' ,;2 nevertheless "the basis and spirit for its enactment rendered constitutionally
3
permissible" the desegregation decision, Brown v. BoardofEducation.
How is a specific exclusion of segregated schools from the Amendment
to be reconciled with the view that the "basis and spirit" of the Amendment authorized the decision that it outlawed segregation? So too, if
article III implicitly authorizes the judiciary "periodically [to revise],
even [revolutionize], the Constitution," 4 it cannot be that judges are
merely "appointed to 'defend the Constitution,' not to revise it."' 5 If the
judiciary was not "empowered to act as a superlegislature,"6 even more
clearly it is not empowered to act as a "continuing constitutional convention."7 For the process of amendment was reserved by article V
exclusively to the people themselves, 8 and then only by the procedures
1. Abraham Essay, supra.
2. Id. at 467-68. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
3. Abraham Essay at 480 (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). Repeatedly Abraham stresses "invocation of the spirit as well as the letter of a constitutional
provision." Id. at 478. See id. at 481. If, as he agrees, segregation and suffrage were excluded by the framers, that position represents "the spirit" of the Amendment. Beyond that,
Hamilton rejected the argument that the courts were empowered to "construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 524 (A. Hamilton)
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis in original), quotedin R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 294 (1977).
4. Abraham Essay at 482.
5. Id. at 485.
6. Id. at 482 (referring to proposals such as that advanced by Professor Forrester in
Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977)).
7. J. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1922), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 2. Compare Professor Levy's statement that the "Court is and must
be for all practical purposes a 'continuing constitutional convention' in the sense that it must
keep updating the original charter by reinterpretation." L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 29-30
(1974), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 2 n.5.
8. Berger on Lusky at 535, n.17. Elbridge Gerry, one of the most important framers,
stated: "The people [have directed] a particular mode of making amendments, which we are
not at liberty to depart from ....
Such a power [to alter] would render the most important
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there mandated.9 Ours is still a government by consent of the governed; change requires consent. One of the most penetrating advocates
of judicial review, James Iredell, later a Justice of the Supreme Court,
averred: "The people.., have chosen to be governed under such and
such principles. They have not chosen to be governed or promised to
submit upon any other."' 0
Again, Abraham perceives that "our constitutional democracy,
based upon majoritarian rule with due regard for minority rights [as
spelled out in the Constitution], does not shroud the judicial branch
with the mantle of Platonic guardians," ' I that the "primary salient fact
of American constitutionalism" is "that lawmaking is emphatically the
province of the legislative branch,. . . laws are designed to be made by
the people's duly elected representatives" who "are replaceable via the
electoral process."' 2 He therefore agrees that "the judicial branch has
indeed been guilty of engaging in vital aspects of governmental policy
13
formation that are constitutionally delegated to. . . the legislature."'
The judges, he says, "must resolutely shun prescriptive policymaking";' 4 they must have "a resolute commitment to an abjuring both of
decision making based upon personal philosophical commitments and
value judgments," of "reach[ing] out [to] settle issues that may well require determination but which have not been resolved by the people's
elected representatives."' 5 With all this I heartily concur. How do
these principles fare in application?
He defends what he himself terms a "double standard," differentiating between the Court's approach to "economic-proprietarian" legislation and "legislative. . . action affecting fundamental civil rights and
liberties."' 6 It would be "libertarian suicide," he considers, to transfer
"the judicial guardianship of our basic civil rights and liberties to either
the legislative or the executive or both,"' 7 overlooking that judicial soclause of the Constitution nugatory." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 503 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834)
(Running title: History of Congress).
9. It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to alter the
method [for change] which the Constitution has fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227
(1920). See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 316-19.
10. 2 G. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-1858),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 295-96.
11. Abraham Essay at 481. For a discussion of minority rights, see Berger on Kutler,
infra, at 605, n.n.112-18.
12. Abraham Essay at 472-73.
13. I1d. at 472.
14. Id. at 481.
15. Id. at 479.
16. Id. at 475.
17. Id. at 481.
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licitude for civil liberties bloomed very late indeed.' 8 He thus assumes
that such "guardianship" was vested in the judiciary without explicitly
identifying the source of that grant.19 The historical records show,
however, that the Framers conceived the role of the judiciary in very
limited terms, certainly not as the maker of the policy,2" as Abraham
recognizes. In my comment on Professor Lusky's essay I briefly summarized the facts showing that judicial review was an anxiously regarded innovation so that Hamilton was constrained to assure the
2
Ratifiers that of the three branches "the judiciary is next to nothing." '
The judiciary, as Abraham recognizes, were merely to police the constitutional boundaries, to assure that the other branches did not "overleap" their bounds, not to exercise the legislative discretion within those
boundaries. 2 2 Hamilton flatly stated that judges could be impeached
for "usurpations on the authority of the legislature. ' 23 Non-exercise of
its power by the legislature was not made an excuse for a judicial takeover. The judiciary, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 drafted by
John Adams made explicit, was never to exercise legislative power. 24
The Court's belated and gingerly approach to civil liberties was
derived from its disallowance of economic regulation under the "liberty
of contract" slogan drawn from the due process clause. Economic
due process is now admittedly discredited;26 and it has not been
demonstrated that "liberty" was placed on higher ground in the due
process clause than "life" and "property." They all stand on a par.
Judge Learned Hand remarked that the Framers would have regarded
the current reading of the Fifth Amendment as "constituting severer
restrictions as to Liberty than Property" as a "strange anomaly."'27
18. Henry Steele Commager said of the pre-1937 Court that the record "discloses not a
single case, in a century and half, where the Supreme Court has protected freedom of speech
[and] press. . . against Congressional attack." Commager, JudicialReviewand Democracy,
19 VA. Q. REV. 417, 428 (1943), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 332. See also
Kutler Essay at 512-13.
19. But Abraham hastens to add: "That does not mean, however, that the judiciary is
or should be empowered to govern." Abraham Essay at 481. The correlative of a "guardianship," however, is that the ward is without power of self-government.
20. Berger on Lusky at 535-36. See also text accompanying note 83 infra.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
22. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 305; Berger on Lusky at n.28.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 526-27 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937), quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 294.
24. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 250 n.5.
See also T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA III (Peden ed. 1954).
25. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 269-71.
26. Id. at 265-66.
27. Id. at 267, quoting L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50.
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"There is no constitutional basis," he averred, "for asserting a larger
measure of judicial supervision over" liberty than property.2 8 Professor
Stanley Morrison justly observed that the difference merely represents
29
"the subjective preferences or convictions of the individual judge.
Interference with libertarian legislation (and afortiori,constitutional
alteration) cannot rest on due process, for Hamilton declared, reflecting
centuries of English and colonial history, that "[t]he words 'due process' . . . can never be referred to an act of the legislature"-they apply
"only" to proceedings in courts;3 0 that is, due process is procedural,
never substantive. Nor can judicial libertarianism be grounded on the
Fourteenth Amendment, for the framers restricted its scope to protection of "person and property."3
Abraham would justify the "double standard" in cases involving
civil liberties-what Professor Lusky describes as the Court's "new and
grander. . . place in the governmental scheme" 3 2-- on four grounds
which for the most part are drawn from judicial rationalization of this
"new" role, not really rooted in constitutional grant, namely: "(1) the
crucial nature of basic freedoms, (2) the explicit language of the Bil4 of
Rights, (3) the expertise of the judiciary in matters involving the maintenance of fundamental liberties, and (4) the discrepancy in access to
the political process between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.' 33 Of
these in turn, the fact that a freedom is "crucial" does not avail if the
power was not conferred. "Had the power of making treaties," said
Madison, "been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the
defect would only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment
of the Constitution." 34 Free speech is certainly crucial to a democratic
society, yet when Madison urged that the free speech guarantee of the
Bill of Rights be extended to run against the states, the First Congress
voted him down. Jefferson, that apostle of free speech, insisted that
states have "the exclusive right" to control freedom of the press. 5
28. Id. at 267, quoting L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 51.
29. Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Include the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 140, 167 (1949), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 267-68.
30. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962),
quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 194. For the full quotation, see Berger on Kutler at
592, n.15.
31. Berger on Mendelson at 550-54, nn.28-63.
32. Lusky Essay at 408.
33. Abraham Essay at 476.
34. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900-01 (1791), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 381
n.32.
35. Letter to Abigail Adams dated Sept. 11, 1804, quotedin Frankfurter, John Marshall
and the JudicialFunction, 69 HARV. L. REv. 217, 226, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICI-
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Doubtless Abraham would rest on the incorporation on one theory or
another of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment; he disagrees with Charles Fairman's demonstration 36 that Justice Black's

claim 37 to that effect is without historical foundation.3 8 My minute
study of the 1866 debates led me to set forth the evidence that confirms
Fairman .3 Here I shall only repeat Bicke's view that Fairman "conclusively disproved Black's contention, at least, such is the weight of

opinion among disinterested observers."'' This also covers Abraham's
second point, reliance on "the explicit language of the Bill of Rights,"
for that applies only to the federal government, not the states. As to his

third point, judicial "expertise" cannot confer power. Under a grant of
limited powers-for so the federal government has always been regarded 4I -the threshold question always is: where was the power conferred?4' Turning to his fourth point, the "discrepancy inaccess to the

political process" was built into the Constitution for the protection of
the propertied minority.4 3 Disproportionate representation was a com-

monplace of American history until overthrown by the Court in the
ARY at 272. See also Bork, NeutralPrinciplesandSome FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND.
L.J. 1, 22 (1971).
36. Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill ofRights?2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949).
37. For Black's view on incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring).
38. Abraham Essay at 468.
39. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 134-56.
40. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962), quoted inGOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 137 n.17. If Fairman and Bickel are right, of which I have no doubt, I
would vigorously dissent from Abraham's statement that the need for a decision articulating
"the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel in all criminal cases [including
State cases] ... is beyond rational argument." Abraham Essay at 479. In these pages Professor Mendelson wrote, "We are not aware of anything in the background or legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment which suggests it was calculated to give Congress or
federal courts general supervisory control over state judicial proceedings." Mendelson Esis all but certain that the Fourteenth
say at 454. And Dean Alfange has written: "[I]t
Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize the
administration of criminal justice in the states." Alfange, On JudicialPolieymakingand ConstitutionalChange: Another Look at the "OriginalIntent" Theory ofConstitutionalInterpretation, 5 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 603, 607 (1978).
41. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS V.THE SUPREME COURT 13-16 (1969); G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 283-84 (1969).
42. Lee assured the Virginia Ratification Convention that "[w]hen a question arises
with respect to the legality of any power" the question will be, "Is is enumerated in the
Constitution?" GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 14.
43. G. WOOD, supra note 41 at 474-76, 484, 492, 507-14, 516, 554, 557. See also Berger
on Kutler at 605, n.114.
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1960s,44 and it was perpetuated by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment who left suffrage to the states.4 5
Unwittingly Abraham is swayed by his own predilections. Thus
the "double standard" of which he approves has been judicially expanded in ways that would "have troubled both Holmes and Cardozo," 4 6 and "has taken the form of what is unquestionably a 'double

standard' within a 'double standard'-a patent manifestation of 'government by judiciary,' whatever one may think of its merits."'47 With
the "double standard" as a theme, however, it was open to the Court to

compose a set of variations. In company with other libertarians, Abraham is critical of the abortion cases: "[T]he Court should not view itself as a 'social reform agency' [as] when it wrote what, in effect,
constitutes a Federal Abortion Code .

*"48

What was the desegre-

gation decision but a revolutionary "social reform" measure? 49 The
debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress show that segregation was excluded from the scope of the Amendment, as Abraham agrees, but not
a word refers to abortion.5 0 Does the Court have more power in the
face of express exclusion than of silence? Once it is posited that the
Court may interfere on behalf of "liberty" there is no bar to its judicial

delineation. We learn that a right is "fundamental" only after the
Court labels it as such. So too, Abraham can accept the desegregation
decision as within "the basis and spirit" of the Fourteenth Amendment
but rejects the decisions that followed in its train: "[T]he Court had no

constitutional mandate to turn itself. . into a combination of national school board, transportation expert, disciplinarian, employment
manager and admissions director."5 1 But given the judgment that ob44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 307-17 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also
Berger on Miller at 580-81, nn.30-35.
45. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 72-74.
46. Abraham Essay at 476.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 479. See also Ely, The Wages ofCrying Woff A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
49. Professor Archibald Cox wrote: "The school desegregation cases overturned not
only the constitutional precedents built up over three quarters of a century but the social
structure of an entire region." Cox, he New Dimensions of ConstitutionalAdjudication,51
WASH. L. REV. 791, 802 (1976), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 428 app. II.
50. With Justice Harlan we may view the state reapportionment cases "as a much more
audacious and far-reaching judicial interference with the state legislative process ... then
[sic] the comparatively innocuous use of judicial power in the contraceptives case." The
quotation is in the paraphrase of Kauper, Penumbras,Peri7heries,Emanations,Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 256 (1965),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 392.
51. Abraham Essay at 480 (footnotes omitted).
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literation of segregation is constitutionally required, it follows that busing and affirmative action and the like are merely remedial actions to
effectuate the constitutional mandate. The Latin maxim, "where there
is a right, there is a remedy" was taken up in English and American
law. 2 Once the basic decision is made that segregation is wrong, the
means whereby to remedy the wrong traditionally have been left to the
courts. In a prior work having no connection with segregation I wrote:
When the path-breaking Statute of Westminster 11 (1285), for example, gave rise to the vast jurisdiction of Action on the Case, it
merely authorized the issuance of writs in cases "of like nature"
lest it happen that the court should fail "to minister justice unto
the complainants." How justice was to be "ministered," what the
ingredients of judgment were to be, traditionally was left to the
judges. . . . Every novel grant of jurisdiction, I submit, therefore posited that judges, in deciding disputes, would exercise
powers that were suitable to the jurisdiction conferred.5 3
Those who are unhappy with the judicial expansion of the desegregation decision might well reexamine whether a decision which led to
such untoward results, such an unprecedented departure from traditional ways,54 was itself sound.
Several of Abraham's reflections call for analysis. He "emphatically" does not reject Bickel's "conclusion" that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment "chose language which would be capable of
growth,"' 5 though he makes no effort to meet my criticism of Bickel's
"open-ended" theory. 6 Bickel advanced it as a tentative hypothesis
which has since hardened into dogma and become a bastion of activism. Some factual highlights will show that it is without historical warrant. Bickel clerked for Justice Frankfurter when Brown v. Board of
Education came to the Court, and Frankfurter set him to work on the
legislative history. Bickel came up with an "impressive" memorandum
in which he declared that "it is impossible to conclude that the 39th
Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to
conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were
adopting."5 7 This is a far cry from a choice of language "capable of
52. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone:
"[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy. .. ."). Madison stated in THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 282 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) that "a right implies a
remedy."

53. R. BERGER, supra note 41, at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
54. See, e.g., note 49 supra.
55. Abraham Essay at 468 (emphasis in original).
56. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 99-116.
57. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976) (quoting Bickel Memorandum to Frankfurter (1953)), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 118.
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growth." In the period prior to the Brown decision, Frankfurter is said
to have asked: "What justifies us in saying that what was equal in 1868
is not equal now?" and answered: "[Tihe equality of laws enshrined in
a constitution which was 'made for an undefined and expanding future
. . .' is not a fixed formula defined with finality at a particular time,"
58
thereby scuttling the established attachment to a "fixed constitution."
Thus inspired, Bickel, now a research fellow at Harvard, engaged in
revising his memorandum for publication, asked, "what if any thought
was given to the long range effect of the Amendment under future circumstance, of provisions necessarily intended for permanence? '59 And
he ventured the hypothesis:
[Clould resort to "equal protection of the laws" have failed to
leave the implication that the new phrase, while it did not necessarily, and certainly not expressly, carry greater coverage than
the old, was nevertheless roomier, more receptive to the "latitudinarian" construction? No one made the point with regard to this
particular clause.6
"It remains true," he wrote, "that an explicit provision going further
than the Civil Rights Act would not have carried in the 39th Congress."6 And he noted that the Republicans drew back from a "formulation dangerously vulnerable to attacks pandering to the prejudice of
the people."6 2 But, he speculated, "may it not be that the Moderates
and Radicals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country with language which they could, where necessary, defend against
damaging alarms raised by the opposition but which at the same time
was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances?"6 3 The
votes of 125 to 12 in the House and 34 to 4 in the Senate against suffrage proposals demonstrate that there was no need for such a compro58. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 601, 685 (1976) (quoting Statements of Felix Frank-

furter, Conference of Justices, Dec. 1952), quoted in GOVERNMENT

BY JUDICIARY

at 132.

See Berger on Lusky at 536, n.19. "Limited government requires that at a particular point
in history the limits are decided upon and that they remain relatively fixed." Kay, Book
Review, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801, 805 (1978). Professor Philip Kurland explained: "The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of government and its limits,
that government is the creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not authorize
and must not do what it forbids. Apriori, such a constitution could have only a fixed and
unchanging meaning, if it were to fullill its function." P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). See also 2 WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 325 (H. Cushing ed.
1968); Berger on Lusky at 533, n.4.
59. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 101.
60. Id. at 101-02.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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miser 4 Bickel's hypothesis is that the compromisers concealed the
future objectives they dared not avow lest the whole enterprise be imperiled, a sorry basis for a sweeping judicial revision of the Constitution which invades rights reserved to the States.
Bingham, draftsman of the Amendment, had insisted on the deletion of the "Civil rights and Immunities" phrase in the Civil Rights Bill
because it was "oppressive" and would strike down all discriminations.65 The deletion was explained by Wilson, chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, as designed to obviate a "latitudinarian" construction going beyond the specific rights named in the section. 6 How
can we attribute to Bingham an intention to incorporate in the Amendment's "privileges or immunities" clause the very power to terminate
all discriminations that he had rejected?
In company with other academicians, Abraham is troubled by the
untrammelled sweep of the power he ascribes to the Court, stating that
there is "a crying need to find and establish lines and limits," but such
limits "have been elusive in both definition and application."'67 In fact,
he observes, the "quest for a viable line between judicial activism and
judicial restraint" is "[i]nfinitely more difficult."6 8 He enumerates
seven different approaches, notes that there are yet others, and observes
that they "are illustrative of the dilemma-and of the ubiquitous difficulties inherent in the search for definable limits to permissible constitutional adjudication. 6 9 Confessedly the permissible search for viable
"limits" is "at once frustrating and controversial."7 For judges, not
academicians, draw the lines, and after the fashion of all wielders of
power look indulgently upon their own unceasing expansion of their
powers. 7 To exhort the Justices to practice "self-restraint"7 2 is like
urging a cat not to spring on a mouse, as Abraham acknowledges when
he states that "even avowed champions of judicial self-restraint have
64.

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 105.

65. Berger on Mendelson at 551, n.35.
66. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1366 (1867), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 122.
67. Abraham Essay at 469-70.
68. Id. at 478.
69. Id. at 471-72.
70. 472.
71. Madison noted that "all power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be
effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321
(A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 292. "Judicial power," wrote Justice Frankfurter, "is not immune against this human weakness." Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 292.
72. Abraham Essay at 481, 485.
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been willing to embrace a judicial approach that unquestionably
manifests a 'double standard' between judicial review of [economic and
libertarian legislation]."7 3 Self-restraint ceases at the door of the Justices' own predilections. Towards the close of his career, Justice
Holmes expressed his "more than anxiety" because he could see
"hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of [States'] rights if
they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable."'74 Forgotten is his caution: "I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or
moralbeliefs in its prohibitions."" Not long after, Chief Justice Stone,
whose "preferred freedoms" Carolene footnote7 6 proved "to be a veritable Pandora's box,"7 7 stated: "The Court is now in as much danger
of becoming a legislative and Constitution making body, enacting into
law its own predilections, as it was [in the heyday of the Four
Horsemen]." 7 8
When Abraham translates my "solution [as amounting] to the entirely commendable exhortation that judges stay within the limits of
their constitutionally assigned judicial function,"79 he mistakes my
meaning. I have learned to expect no self-restraint from the Justices.
The paramount task, as I see it, is to educate thepeople to understand
that the Court has arrogated ungranted power; once they grasp the fact
of usurpation, they will remedy it. Would the people stomach "busing"
or "affirmative action" if they understood that the framers "specifically
rejected" the Amendment's "application to segregated schools," 80 and
that the Justices have displaced the choices of the framers by their
8
own? '
As in the case of Professors Lusky, Mendelson and Ely, Abraham
73. Id. 475.
74. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 383.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For the text
of Justice Stone's footnote, see Abraham Essay at 475, n.38.
77. Abraham Essay at 476.
78. A. MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM: AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE 145-46 (1955) (quoting Chief Justice Stone), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 278. Archibald Cox stated that "the Warren Court behaved even more like a Council
of Wise Men and less like a Court than the laissezfaire Justices." A.- Cox, THE ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 50 (1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 279.
79. Abraham Essay at 478.

80. Id. at 467.
81. See Professor Felix Frankfurter's Letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, Berger on
Lusky at 545, n.105.
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has his own prescription: identification of "institutional role commitments and meritorious court personnel."8 2 The former, he states, requires increasing awareness by the judiciary that its role "is that of
saying 'yes' or, more dramatically, 'no' to the other branches," ie., the
policing of departmental boundaries.8 3 The desegregation case was
hardly an instance of saying "no"; it represented a takeover of national
policy making on a grand scale. It is not lack of "awareness" that is in
question; the Warren Court was well aware in light of Justice Harlan's
"irrefutable and unrefuted" demonstration 84 that "one person-one
vote" constituted "prescriptive policy making." 5 But it was moved by
an irresistible compulsion to impose its will in place of that of the framers. As to "meritorious" appointments, Professor Stanley Kutler remarks that for years "liberals prayed and argued for 'good men' on the
courts. One wonders if Franklin D. Roosevelt's judicial appointments
from 1937 to 1943 empirically demonstrated the existence of God to the
liberals. '8 6 Some of Richard Nixon's widely criticized nominations
prove even less. With all the improved devices for choosing "good
8 7
men" noted by Abraham, political considerations continue to reign.
Over the years the result has been an array of merely competent to
mediocre appointees, a Holmes or Brandeis being the rare exception,
often relegated to dissent.88 As often as not we have had more gifted
men off the bench than on, to mention only Jefferson, the two Adamses,
Madison, Clay, Webster, Calhoun, Lincoln, Charles Francis Adams,
when the Court boasted only of Marshall, Story and Taney. Learned
Hand confessed that he would not know how to select Platonic Guardians, and would not want to be ruled by them if he did, 9 whereas the
activists would entrust the destiny of the nation to such a group of
unelected, unaccountable, life-tenured appointees. Were a better selection possible, I should yet be counselled by John Stuart Mill:
82. Abraham Essay at 481.
83. Id.
84. Lusky Essay at 406.
85. Abraham Essay at 481.
86. Kutler Essay at 513.
87. Abraham Essay at 483-85. Abraham is aware that this approach may "be regarded
as unrealistic, perhaps naive." Id. at 483.
88. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 335-36. Justice Story wrote of the appointment
of Justice McKinley: "[S]ome. . .who do know him, speak of him in very moderated terms
of praise--so moderated as to leave me with the conclusion that he has not the requisite
qualifications for the office." J. MCCLELLAN, JUSTICE STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoN 292 n.79 (1971) (quoting Justice Story).
89.

L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
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The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of
conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the
best and some of the worst feelings incident to human nature,
that it is hardly kept under restraint by anything but want of
power. 90

Not judicial self-restraint but an unrelenting campaign against usurpation seems to me the only cure.
In fine, Abraham's essay strengthens my preference for what he

calls my "unbending keystone of the original intention of the drafters
of the Constitution"'" over his "elusive" and "[i]nfinitely more diffi-

cult" criteria for principles limiting "untethered" discretion.9" My "unbending keystone" was applied only to a clearly discernible intention;
that is not "[i]nfinitely more difficult" to ascertain; it represents a choice
made by the framers and ratified by the people, and therefore calls for
obedience by every principle of democratic government to which Abra-

ham is attached.
The frankest alternative is that suggested by Professor William R.
Forrester-to acknowledge that the Court "has become our Legiscourt," and as Abraham notes, to "candidly face that fact and let the
justices decide issues on policy rather than strained [and disingenuous]
constitutional grounds. 9 3 That, however, is not a decision for

academe but for the sovereign people who at long last are entitled to be
told that the Court has taken over national policy making, and to be
asked to ratify the takeover.9a That will be the moment of truth.
90. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1885), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 413 n.20.

91. Abraham Essay at 478.
92. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra,see also Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretation:
ItsAllure andlmpossibilty,53 IND. L.J. 399, 448 (1978), quotedin Introduction at 530, n.22.
93. Abraham Essay 472 (quoting Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging? 63
A.B.A.J. 1212, 1215 (1977). Professor Thomas Grey observed that courts "resort to bad
legislative history and strained reading of constitutional language to support results that
would be better justified by explication of contemporary moral and political ideals not
drawn from the constitutional text." Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27
judges resort to bad interpretation in
STAN. L. REV. 703,706 (1975). And he comments: [I]f
preference to honest exposition of deeply held but unwritten ideals, it must be because they
perceive the latter mode of decisionmaking to be of suspect legitimacy." Id. More crudely
put, the Court is aware the people, if informed, would reject rule by a Council of Wise Men.
See also Berger on Mendelson at 559, n.130; Berger on Miller, infra at 587, n. 84-87.
94. During the desegregation case, Justice Jackson urged the Court to disclose that they
were "declaring new law for a new day." R. KLUGER, supra note 57, at 681, 689 (1976),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 130. Richard Kluger considers that this was "a
scarcely reasonable request to make of the brethren," R. KLUGER, supra note 57, at 683
(1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 130-3 1, presumably because it would have
blown up a fire-storm.
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Comment on Professor Arthur Miller's Essay

lfhen our beliefs are in conflict with the evidence, we become irritated,wepretend the conflict does not exist, or wepaper it over with
meaninglessphrases.'

Professor Miller labels me as one who "'first invents a false theory
as to the nature of things, and then deduces that wicked actions are

those which show that his theory is false.' "2 What is this "false, puerile
theory"? It is the theory that the Court is not empowered to alter the
Constitution, to substitute its predilections for the choices of the Framers, a theory that has the sanction of Justices Holmes, Black and Harlan

among others. It is a view, wrote Professor Thomas Grey, who is a
devout activist, that is "of great power and compelling simplicity...
deeply rooted in our history. . . and in our formal constitutional law
. . . the theory upon which judicial review was founded in Marbury v.

Madison."4 One of my critics, Professor John Hart Ely, agrees that it is
a view which "stretches back" to Hamilton and Marshall and "seems to
enjoy virtually universal contemporary acceptance." 5
1. Jastrow, Have Astronomers Found God?, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1978, (Magazine), at
19, col. 1. The doctrines which Government by Judiciarychallenges, Professor Richard Kay
observes, "have now become almost second nature to a generation of lawyers and scholars.
Thus it is hardly surprising that the casting of a fundamental doubt on some basic assumptions should produce shock, dismay, and sometimes anger." Kay, Book Review, 10 CoNN.
L. REV. 801, 801 (1978).
2. Miller Essay at 489. For my deduction of "wicked actions" he cites my "response to
[his] rather mild criticism of [my] book," id. at n.15, a "mild criticism" that must be permitted to speak for itself: he charged me with "lawyer's history," with an "antiquarian viewpoint," with a "puerile theory of interpretation," with viewing the Constitution "through the
eyes of a mechanic," and sneeringly referred to me as an "ex-Washington lawyer turned
historian." Miller, Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977, § E, at 5. For a response,
see Berger, Academe v. The FoundingFathers,NATIONAL RE iEW, April 14, 1978, at 468.
I ruefully confess that I am short on philosophy, the "in" thing just now in academic
circles, and probably I have been corrupted during years of law practice by the judges'
insistence that counsel meet opposing arguments. Miller on the other hand eschews "contentious debate," a "polemical tone," Miller Essay at 490, and therefore resorts to discussion
that is "more conclusory than comprehensive." Id. at 498. More plainly, he speaks ex cathedra.
3. For Holmes' views, see notes 19, 65 & 66 and accompanying text infra;,for Black's
position, see note 52 and accompanying text infra. Justice Harlan declared: "When the
Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the
realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect." Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 330.
4. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705 (1975).
5. Ely, Constitutionallnterpretivisr"ItsAllure andImnpossibiiy,53 IND. L. J. 399, 412
(1978).
[5761
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Miller is hardly a dispassionate critic; he has long been a perfervid
adherent of the opposing school, the result-oriented school that ap-

plauds "judicial law making"6 and a "goal-seeking and purposive" ju-'7
risprudence that proceeds "in terms of consequences [and] results."
That school is scarcely older than the desegregation decision in 1954;8
the claims that it makes on behalf of the Court have never been nakedly avowed by the Court itself.9 Instead, as Miller noted, there is a
"lack of consensus on the Court as to the appropriate role of the judiciary .... 2'0 Miller is entitled to his view, but he is not entitled to
belittle and misrepresent those who do not share it. He would sweep

under the rug a problem that Professor Kurland considers presents "the
most immediate crisis of our time, the usurpation by the judiciary of
general governmental powers on the pretext that its authority derives
from the Fourteenth Amendment."" Scholars of no less stature than
Miller are critical of the goal-oriented view he represents. Professor
Henry Monaghan wrote:
Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an important one. It will not do, as some have already done, to brush it
aside in a peremptory manner. For I would insist that any theory
of constitutional interpretation which renders unimportant or irrelevant questions as to original intent, sofar as that intent can be
fairly discerned,is2 not, given our tradition, politically or intellectually defensible.'

Miller scornfully dismisses the "intention of the Framers" as a "filiopietistic notion."' 3 Invective is no substitute for analysis.
Typical is his charge that his opponents invoke the shades of the
Framers because "[i]f we pretend that the Framers had a special sort of
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Miller Essay at 490, n.22.
Id. at 505.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Berger on Lusky at 533, n.3.
Miller & Howell, The Mfyth ofNeutrality in Constitutional4djudication,27 U. CHI.

L. REv. 661, 678 (1960), citedin GOVERNMENT

BY JUDIcIARY

at 331 n.65.

11. Letter to Harvard University Press (Aug. 15, 1977).
12. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard,13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 117, 124
(1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See Kommers, Role ofthe Supreme Court, 1978
REv. oF POL. 409, 413: "The tendency of many reviewers of Berger's book is to dismiss his
theory out of hand, in part because the modem liberal mind just cannot imagine turning the
clock back to the days prior to Brown v. BoardofEducation and because of the fundamental
fairness or simple justice for which Brown stands. But, as Berger suggests, if the Supreme
Court's purpose is to establish justice without reference to the original intent of the framers,
then what remains to circumscribe judicial power? Berger's critics have given singularly
unsatisfactory answers to this question." See also note 1 supra. See Perry, Book Review, 78
COLUM. L. Rnv. 685 (1978).
13. Miller & Howell, supranote 10, at 683. For the opposite view, see GOVERNMENT BY
JUDIcIARY, at 288, 363-72; Berger on Lusky at 536, n.22.
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wisdom, then perhaps we do not have to think too hard about how to
solve pressing social problems,"' 4 when the real issue is whether the
solution of those "pressing social problems" was confided to the judiciary. When invective and distortion fail him, he resorts to a parade of
irrelevancies, for example, devoting several pages to one of his "two

basic points: (1) constitutional interpretation is not a judicial monopoly."'" Of course not, but how does that justify the judicial take-over of
legislative policy making, or the displacement of the Framers'
choices? 6 Or he quotes Justice Byron White to the effect that the
Court "make[s] new law and new public policy,"1 7 and states, "I cannot

see how one can disagree with the historical observations made by Justice White."' 8 Certainly, as Justice Holmes earlier stated, "judges do

and must legislate, but they can do so interstitially; they are confined
from molar to molecular motions. A common law judge could not say
'I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and
shall not enforce it.' "19 It is because the Court has acted in just that
fashion, refusing to give effect to the intention of the Framers to exclude suffrage and segregation from the Fourteenth Amendment, that I
essayed to demonstrate that the judiciary has arrogated a power with-

held. This is translated by Miller as a striving for "an elegantiajurisin
Supreme Court decision-making"!20

My quintessential flaw, in his eyes, is to make "the Constitution
like any other written instrument-a contract, a will, a conveyance, a
statute."'" Thomas Rutherforth, in a work "well known to the colo14. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions ofthe FoundingFathers, With
SpecialEmphasis Upon the Doctrineof the SeparationofPowers, 27 ARK. L. REv. 583, 596
(1973). For the opposite view, see GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 364-65.
15. Miller Essay at 490.
16. Again, Miller learnedly discourses on the difference between "'the law of the case'
and 'the law of the land;' [a] difficult jurisprudential question, not mentioned by Berger";
Marbury v. Madison "only means that the Court decided the merits of the case for Mr.
Marbury." Id. at 495. Yet in the same breath he states that there Marshall "'established
that the Supreme Court had the right of judicial review of acts of Congress,"' id. at 489,
palpably not confined to "Mr. Marbury."
17. Id. at 490 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.)).
18. Miller Essay at 491.
19. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (emphasis added), quoted in
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 321 n.32.
20. Miller Essay at 502.
21. Id. at 488. In his review in the Washington Post,he added that this "is to forget that
it is the fundamental law." Miller, Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977 § E, at 5.
A "fundamental law" that can be made to mean anything the justices choose to make it
mean, even in direct contradiction of the plain intention of the framers, is no "law" at all; it
is the fiat of a caliph.
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nists," identified the interpretation of statutes with that of contracts and
wills-a view applied to the Fourteenth Amendment by its contemporaries22--and explained that "[t]he end to which interpretation aims at,
is to find out what was the intention of the writer, to clear up the meaning of his words. ' 23 The Founders in turn, as I have shown, assimilated
the task of constitutional to that of statutory construction.2 4 Are the
courts, which consider themselves bound to effectuate the will of a tes-

tator, freer to substitute their own choices for the clearly discernible
choices of the Framers? In an article which Miller praises as an "accurate and insightful perception of the realities of constitutional adjudica-

tion,"'

Judge J. Skelly Wright stated: "Constitutional choices are in

fact different from ordinary decisions. . . . [T]he most important
value choices have already been made by the Framers of the Constitution."26 Judicial "value choices," he continued, "are to be made only
within the parameters" of those choices. 27 Notwithstanding, Miller
maintains that cases need not "be decided 'in accordance with the spe-

cific intentions of the framers,'" for which he cites a recent law review
article.28
22. Called on to determine whether a women's suffrage statute would come within the
Fourteenth Amendment, a unanimous report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee on
January 25, 1872 and "signed by Senators who had voted for the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments in Congress," declared that "[t]he Constitution, like a contract between private parties, must be read in the light of circumstances which surrounded those who made it."
REPORT ON RIGHT OF WOMEN TO VOTE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No.
21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872), citedin Avins, THE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES 571 (1967)
(emphasis added). That was repeated in the Senate on February 1, 1872 by Senator Matthew Carpenter. Id. at 601.
Carpenter rebuked the Senator from Massachusetts in March 1870, saying, "what is the
meaning of all this wild talk about the Constitution being construed in the light of modem
progress and new American ideas?" Id. at 433. Charles Sumner, for example, referred to "a
new rule of interpretation of the Constitution, according to which. . . every word. . . is to
be interpreted uniformly for human rights," a rule made at Appomatox, although he acknowledged that his appeal to the Declaration of Independence found little favor with his
colleagues. Id. at 596-97. Of such theories, Carpenter said: "This loose method of construction, this utter contempt of the Constitution, bodes ill for our country, and nothing but evil."
Id. at 433.
23. 2 RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAw 307-09 (1754-1756), quotedin GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 366.

24. Berger on Lusky at 543-44, nn.91-96.
25. Miller Essay at 508-09, n. 133 (citing Wright, ProfessorBickel, The Scholarly Tradilion, andthe Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REv. 769 (1971)).
26. Wright, supra note 25, at 784.
27. Id. at 785.
28. Miller Essay at 498 (citing Munzen & Nickel, Does the ConstitutionMean What It
Always Aeant?, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1054 (1977). The essay of Professor Abraham,
supra, and the article written by Professor John Hart Ely, supra,note 5, both express anxiety
about untethered judicial discretion and propose limits thereon. The constitutional limita-
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It is time to descend from a cloud of generalizations to some brute
facts. Justice Brennan observed that seventeen or nineteen Northern
States had rejected black suffrage in 1865-1868.29 Understandably,
Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
of both Houses, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, stated:
The northern States, most of them, do not permit negroes to vote.
Some of them repeatedly and lately pronounced against it ...
[W]ould it not be futile to ask three-quarters of the States to do
for themselves and all others, by ratifying such an amendment,
the very thing
30 most of them have already refused to do in their

own cases?
Another member of the Committee, Senator Jacob Howard, who explained the Amendment to the Senate, said that "three-fourths of the
States. . .could not be induced to grant the right of suffrage, even in
any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race."'

The chair-

man of the Joint Committee, Senator William Fessenden, said of a suffrage proposal that there is not "the slightest possibility that it will be
adopted by the States." 32 The Report of the Joint Committee con-

firmed that "the States would not consent to surrender a power they
had always exercised, and to which they were attached," and therefore
thought it best to "leave the whole question with the people of each
State. '3 3 Professor Nathaniel Nathanson who, like Miller, favors the

Court's activist role, observed that the second Justice Harlan "quite
convincingly demonstrated" that the Fourteenth Amendment "would
not require . . .Negro suffrage," and that "Berger's independent research and analysis confirms and adds weight to those conclusions. 3 4
Professor Gerald Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers

agree" with Harlan's conclusion that Chief Justice Warren's "one pertion of power is central to our system of government. And as Professor Kay observes: 'To
implement real limits on government the judges must have reference to standards which are
external to, and prior to, the matter to be decided. This is necessarily historical investigation. The content of those standards are set at their creation. Recourse to 'the intention of
the framers' in judicial review, therefore, can be considered as indispensable to realizing the
ideas of government limited by law." Kay, supra note 1, at 805-06. See also Berger on
Abraham at 571, n.58.
29. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.), quoted in
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 90.
30. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE] quoted
in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 58-59.

31. GLOBE, supra note 30, at 2766, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 56.
32. GLOBE, supra note 30, at 704, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 59.
33. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, S. REP. No. 112, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1866) cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 84.
34. Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REv. 579, 581 (1978).
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son--one vote" "lacked all historical justification."35
This incontrovertible history poses the central issue: where was
the Court empowered to revise the choices of the Framers, to override
the will of the Ratifiers? Instead of coming to grips with the issue,
Miller ridicules the "bootless search for the intention of the Framers."3 6
It was not "bootless" in the case of suffrage and segregation37 which are
the core of my book. This it is that Miller derides as "searching in a
heaven of legal concepts for the one true principle." 3 And he warns,
"[s]trict adherence to [the theory of original intention] can lead the
Court and the nation into unwisely rigid postures, as the Dred Scott
decision demonstrates. '39 True it is that that case "inflicted what probably is the most grievous wound the Court has ever suffered,"4 0 but it
was not obedience to the original intention that "inflicted" the wound
but that, has historian George Bancroft wrote, "[tihe Chief Justice...
without any necessity or occasion volunteered to come to the rescue of
the theory of slavery,"'" just as the nation was steeling itself to drown it
in blood. Today the Court, urged on by enthusiasts like Miller, stands
in danger of repeating that "grievous" mistake by interfering in social
conflicts that divide the nation and excite bitter rancor.
"I concede, quite cheerfully," Miller writes, "that the Justices often
invoke what they claim is the intention of the Founding Fathers. . . as
a means of explaining or justifying their decisions. . . judges not being
ready as, for example, Professor Ray Forrester is, for 'truth in judging.' "42 A nation that insists on "truth in advertising" cannot afford
less than "truth in judging." Where Miller "cheerfully" accepts untruthful and misleading statements, I would insist with Thomas Huxley
35. Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1977, at 4. See also Berger on Kutler at
595, n.42 (remarks of Professor Bork).
36. Miller Essay at 500; see also id. at 490.
37. Respecting segregation, Miller considered it "rather doubtful that the historical record is so 'inconclusive' as Chief Justice Warren asserted in Brown v. Board of Education.... insofar as the framers of the fourteenth amendment had any intent regarding
racially segregated schools." Miller & Howell, The Myth ofNeutraliy in ConstitutionalAdjudication,27 U. CHI L. Rav. 661, 674 nA8 (1960), referring to the Chief Justice's remarks at
347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 24345.
38. Miller Essay at 498.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 498 n.74.
41. See GLOBE, supranote 30, at 801, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 222 n.4.
Professor Mendelson declared that Dred Scott was a "disaster" that should "stand for all
time as warning to judges" against an "attempt to impose extra-constitutional policies upon
the community under the guise of interpretation." Mendelson Essay at 453.
42. Miller Essay at 489-90 (quoting Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?, 63
A.B.A. J. 1212 (1977)).
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that "the foundation of morality is to have done, once and for all, with
lying,"4 3 especially when we are asked by Miller to regard the Court as
the "national conscience."' Not the least remarkable aspect of Miller's
article is his obliviousness to the moral problem. He dismisses Marshall's statement that "UJudicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge,"45 with "[t]hat is a nice
sentiment, were it true, but it is not. Judges make law, they always
have and always will," 46 unaware that to practice the very thing they
are disclaiming (to reassure the people) is discreditable. To the question were the Justices empowered to revise the Constitution in spite of
the Framers he answered with an ipse dixit: the Framers intended to
leave it "to succeeding generations [meaning judges]. . . to rewrite the
'living' Constitution anew,' 4 in contradiction of the Article V reserva48
tion of that power to the people exclusively.
To dispose of Article V he summons Senator Daniel Moynihan's
observation that "this is not the only way change takes place, as John
Marshall demonstrated when he established that the Supreme Court
had the right of judicial review of acts of Congress. ' ' 4' Now Daniel
Moynihan is an estimable Senator and respected sociologist, but he
would hardly claim that he is a constitutional authority. Since he is
avouched as such by Miller it is appropriate to point out his error.
Marbury v. Madison, to which Moynihan refers, does not illustrate constitutional "change" but resistance to it; it held that Congress was not
authorized to "change" the Constitution by adding to the Court's "original jurisdiction."5 And Marshall flatly declared that the exercise of
the judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right to change" the
Constitution.5 It is sorry scholarship which leads Miller to adopt a
43. Quoted in H. MENCKEN, TREATISE OF RIGHT AND WRONG
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 416-17.

194 (1934), quoted in

44. Miller & Howell, supra note 37, at 689, citedin GOVERNMENT B- JUDICIARY at 331.
45. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824).
46. Miller Essay at 498.
47. Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance ofthe Intentions ofthe FoundingFathers, With
SpecialEmphasis Upon the Doctrine ofthe SeparationofPowers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 584, 595
(1973), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 363.
48. For a statement by a Framer, Elbridge Gerry, that the power is exclusive, see GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 318. In the same Congress, the maxim expressio unius was referred to; and the Supreme Court held that an express grant to A signified an intention to
withhold the power from B. See id. at 223.
49. Moynihan, Imperial Government 65 COMMENTARY No. 6 at 25, 31, quotedin Miller
Essay at 489.
50. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 41-42 (1960). See also Grey, Do
We Have an Unwritten Constitution 27 STAN L. REV. 703, 707 (1975).
51.

JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.
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statement so contrary to the historical facts. Justice Black dismissed
rhapsodical strains, about the duty of the Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution
must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged
with a duty to make those changes.. . . The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it [by the amendment process of Article V.]52
Nevertheless, Miller insists that "[o]nly through growth without
amendment" has the Constitution "endured as the fundamental law,"
by which he means judicial "adaptation," purportedly because it "must
suit the aspirations of each generation of Americans."5 3 Few would
urge that the Court's denial over a fifty year period of legislative power
to levy an income tax, to outlaw child labor, or to regulate wages and
hours, "suit[ed] the aspirations of. . . Americans. ' ' "
Turning to the present, do the Court's abortion, obscenity, death
penalty and busing decisions "suit the aspirations" of the present generation?5 5 Scholarly uneasiness over the trend of the post-1968 decisions has been noted by Professors Abraham and Lusky in these
pages. 5 6 About desegregation Miller himself tells us, "a quarter-century after Brown the struggle still continues over the civil rights of the
black community. There is an eroding commitment to decent treat1969), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 377. Professor Lusky observes that Marshall would have agreed "that the Constitution should be applied in accordance with the
intent of those who made it." Lusky Essay at 405. See also GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
378-79.
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting), quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 101 n.9. Black could have cited Hamilton, the outstanding
apologist for judicial review. See Berger on Lusky, supra, at note 17. Where Miller sees no
problems, Professor Lusky asked, "does establishment of new constitutional rules by the
Court offend Article V... which prescribes for the amendment process? Does it outrage
the principle of separation of powers? . . . In short, is the Court guilty of plain usurpation?"
L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 79 (1975), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 354 n.13.
Washington so regarded it. 35 G. WASHINGTON, WRITINGS 228-29 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 299.
53. Miller Essay at 508.
54. For Henry Steele Commager's scathing indictment of the pre-1937 Court, see Judicial Review andDemocracy, 19 VA. Q. REV. 417, 428 (1943) quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 332; see also Kutler Essay at 512.
55. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 325-27. Appraising the scene in the Fall of
1975, Derrick Bell, a black professor, stated: "Today, opposition to desegregation is, if anything, greater than it was in 1954." Bell, The Burden ofBrown on Blacks: History Based on
Observationson a Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 25, 26, 36 (1975), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 327. Another black, Roy Wilkins, wrote in 1978 that "the attitude of whites towards blacks is basic in this country. And that attitude has changed for the
worse." Racial Ouzlook Lack of Change DisturbsBlacks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1978, § A, at
26, col. 1.
56. See Abraham Essay at 469-70, 475-77; Lusky Essay at 416.
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ment under the Constitution for blacks, as well as for other disadvantaged elements of our society."5 7 Those who like Miller and his patron
saint, Sanford Levinson,5" throw themselves into the struggle, hold the
Constitution in contempt and call upon.the Court to act in its despite.5 9
For a Professor who would put "an ex-Washington lawyer turned
historian" in his place, Miller is remarkably free and easy in his citations, as his reliance on Senator Moynihan's constitutional authority
has evidenced. Of the same order is his statement that Holmes "repudiated [my] view,"' 6° citing Missouri v. Holland.6 1 There the issue was
whether the treaty-making power extended to an agreement with Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds which annually traversed
parts of the United States and Canada. Addressing the argument that
the treaty infringed powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, Justice Holmes stated that "[w]ild birds are not in the possession
of anyone, and possession is the beginning of ownership," that the
"States [therefore] are individually incompetent to act."'6 2 On that
analysis a state could not claim a "reserved" power to do so. 63 Holmes'
true sentiments were later clearly expressed in Baldwin v. Missouri. "I
cannot believe that the [Fourteenth] Amendment was intended to give
us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its
prohibitions. ' 65 And he wrote that it is not the function of judges "to
renovate the law. That is not their province." 66 Chief Justice Hughes,
it is true, took a different view in the mortgage moratorium case, 67 but
his Court then went on to gut the New Deal under the banner of the
now discredited economic due process doctrine, illustrating that power
can be malign as well as benign. Repeatedly Miller relies on what the
57. Miller Essay at 494; see note 55 supra. In December, 1978, William Brashler wrote:
"The schism between white and black America is still painfully present, and appears all but
irreparable." Brashler, The Black Middle Class: Making It, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1978, § 6
(Magazine), at 34, 36, col 1.
58. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
59. See notes 93-7 and accompanying text infra; see also Berger on Kutler, infra at 61112, n.156.
60. Miller Essay at 497.
61. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
62. Id. at 433-34.

63. See

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY

at 380-81.

64. 281 U.S. 586 (1930).

65. Id. at 595, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 383.
66. 0. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 239 (1920), quotedin GOVERNMENT
JUDICIARY at 384.

BY

67. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See Miller Essay at
497, n.69. Hughes rested judgment on Marshall's "it is a Constitution we are expounding,"
not knowing that Marshall had explained he did not assert "a right to change [the Constitution]." 290 U.S. at 442-43. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 374, 377.
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Justices have said about their exercise of power, e.g., Chief Justice
Warren said that the Court "had the awesome responsibility of often
speaking the last word 'in great governmental affairs.' "68 It is a selfconferred responsibility, and needs to be measured by Lord Chief Justice Denman's observation that " 'It]he practice of a ruling power in the
State is but a feeble proof of its legality.' "69 To justify judicial usurpation by the Court's own words is the veriest boot-strap lifting. An emperor cannot anoint himself.
Next Miller advises us to "study carefully [the] profound words of
a very wise judge," 70 Learned Hand, who in summarizing the wideranging attainments required of a judge, said, "the words he must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he
will."'7 ' Hand would have been the first to limit the effect of his dictum,
uttered in the course of some extra-judicial remarks, were he called
upon to apply it to the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "due
process" clause is not "empty" as Hamilton foreshadowed and as is
generally agreed.72 The words "privileges or immunities" have a limited historical content earlier delineated.7 3 "Equal protection" was associated throughout the debates with the narrow enclave of rights
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act.7 4 Whatever the alleged "generality
of the words," Hand would not have "pour[ed]" into them the suffrage
and desegregation that the framers had so clearly excluded. Sitting as a
judge, he held that if the purpose is "manifest," it "override[s] even the
explicit words used. '75 Miller's penchant for empty generalization
leads him to disregard Hand's confession, against the background of
the desegregation case, of failure to understand the Court's function as
' 76
a "third legislative chamber" except as a "coup de main,"
emphasiz68. Miller Essay at 499.
69. Quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 375; see also Introduction, supra,at 528,
n.9.
70. Miller Essay at 501.
71. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (J. Dillard ed. 1953), quoted in Miller Essay at 499, 501.
72. Hamilton stated that due process applies "only" to proceedings in courts, "never" to
legislation. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962),
cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 194. See Mendelson Essay at 451-53, and Ely,
supra note 5, at 415-17.
73. Berger on Mendelson, at 549-59.
74. Id. at 560.
75. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). In Johnson v. United
States, 163 F. 30 (Ist Cir. 1905), Justice Holmes held that when a legislature "has intimated
its will... that will should be recognized and obeyed." Id. at 32.
76. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1962), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
166, n.4.
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ing at the same time that those who sought to escape the fact that economic due process was discredited by exalting "liberty" over
"property" drew a distinction that is a "strange anomaly."7 7 Again,
when Miller tells us that Jefferson said the Constitution is "'merely a

thing of wax,"' which the Court "'may twist and shape into any form
they please,'

"78

he misrepresents the fact that Jefferson was protesting

bitterly that the Court had made the Constitution "a thing of wax."79
Jefferson's dread of the greedy expansiveness of power was made explicit: "It is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited con-

stitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with
power. . . . In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the

Constitution."80
In truth, Miller could consign the Constitution to the dust heap,
for he maintains that "the Founding Fathers cannot rule us from their
graves."'" To make the words of the Constitution "empty vessels" into

which the Justices may pour any meaning they choose is to reduce it to
77. L. HAND, supra note 76, at 50-51, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 267.
Miller notices that "[tihe Court operated as an 'authoritative faculty of political economy'
for the period of roughly 1886 to 1936 .... The abrupt shift in the composition of the
Court in 1937 and succeeding years meant that the Court had to find a new role .... ITmhe
Justices on the post-1937 Court set themselves up as an authoritative faculty of social ethics." Miller Essay at 504. Not a word about the constitutional authority. For him, as for
Alexander Pope, "one thing is clear: Whatever is, is right."
78. 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278 (A. Libscomb & A. Burgh eds. 190407), quoted in Miller Essay at 499.
79. 12 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 135, 137 (Fed. ed. 1905), citedin GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 341 n.13.
80. 4 ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1836) quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
252 [hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Miller quotes Jefferson's "Some men look at the constitution with sanctimonious reverence ...and suppose that what they did to be beyond
amendment," quotedin W. DOUGLAS, STARE DECiSIs 31 (1949), and reads it as a counsel
against an "antiquarian view of constitutional interpretation." Miller Essay at 497 n.68. But
Jefferson contemplated amendment by the people, not by a judicial oligarchy; he expressed
confidence in the judiciary if "kept strictly to their own department." 5 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 81 (P. Ford ed. 1892-1899), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 365
n.10. And he sought for the meaning of the Constitution "in the explanations of those who
advocated it," the "meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the
time of its adoption." DEBATES, supra note 80, at 446, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 366-67.
81. Miller, Book Review, supra note 21, § E, at 8. Professor Kay comments that "the
fashion has grown in our generation of scoffing at the 'filio-pietistic' notion that we must be
restrained by the dead hand of the past," Kay, supra note 1, at 804, an argument equally
applicable to the Constitution itself, text and all. But the Court, as Robert Bork noted, still
purports to give effect to the value choices of the Founders. Berger on Lusky, supra, at 533,
n.3.
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a scrap of paper. It is because the Court is well aware that the people
would not, if they knew, tolerate the displacement of the popular will
expressed by the Framers and Ratifiers,12 that it cannot afford "truth in
judging", as is confirmed by its rejection, in the midst of the desegregation case, of Justice Jackson's plea to tell the people that the Court
"was declaring new law for a new day."84 As Robert Bork observed:
"The way an institution advertises tells you what it thinks its customers
demand."85 More baldly put, disclosure would have destroyed the
myth that the Court speaks as the voice of the Constitution rather than
as the voice of the Justices' own values.8" For the people have a greater
respect for the Constitution than for the Justices. 7
Two other manifestations of Miller's indifference to the Constitution deserve notice. He twits me for not mentioning John Rawls, A
Theory ofJustice,ll in which "a modernized theory of distributive justice [is] essayed," of "significance to analysis of constitutional adjudication."8 9 Rawls' philosophical theory would require a new Constitution;
I am concerned with honoring the old. 90 Were a convention-not a
school of philosophers-to adopt a new Constitution it would little advance analysis of the existing one. And in light of the current revolt
against increasingly oppressive taxation, it would appear that Rawls'
82. Professor Lusky justly stated that the people expect the Justices to view the Constitution as "expressing the will of those who made it" and "to ascertain their will." L. LUSKY,
BY WHAT RIGHT? 32 (1975), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 354; see Berger on
Alfange, infra, n.21.
83. Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?,63 A.B.A. J. 1212 (1977).
84. Quotedin R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 681, 689 (1976), cited in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 130. Miller casts doubt upon the decision. See note 37 supra.
85. Bork, Neutral Princiles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4
(1971), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 319.
86. See Berger on Lusky at 545, n.105.
87. Professor Hans Linde remarked that the "whole enterprise of constitutional law
rests, after all, on the premise that the nation cares about its Constitution, not about its
courts." Linde, Judges, Criticsandthe Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 256 (1972), quoted
in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 320 n.28.
88. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

89. Miller Essay at 507. Ely comments that Robert Nozicek's Anarchy, State and Utopia
(1974) "reach[es] very diffierent conclusions," that "virtually all the commentators on Raws'
work. . . have expressed serious reservations about Rawls' conclusions." Ely, FOREWORD:
ON DISCOVERING FUNDAMENTAL VALUES, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5,37 (1978). See also BARRY,
A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES
OF

A THEORY

OF JUSTICE BY JOHN RAWLS

(1973);

READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON

RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Daniels ed. 1975).

90. Yet Miller lectures, "one should distinguish between the 'is' and the 'ought.' The 'is'
may be simply stated: The Justices have used a number of standards of judgment." Miller
Essay at 496. The "standards" must correspond to the Constitution, for judges are bound by
oath "to support this Constitution." See Berger on Lusky at 535, n.17.
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proposal for even broader distributivejustice does not represent the "aspirations of this generation of Americans."'" More revealing is Miller's
reliance on Sanford Levinson.92 In his article, The SpeciousMorality of
the LaW, 93 Levinson brands various calls for maintenance of the rule of
law under the Constitution as a "ritualistic incantation," and maintains
that a law that is merely identified with the majority "will" is in terms
of "moral integrity" not "worthy of respect," because the majority "notions of justice" may be "perceived as manifest tyranny by someone
else." 94 Why, he asks, should those who feel tyrannized by the existing
legal order recognize it as legitimate?95 In short, Levinson invites disregard for law and the Constitution, at a time, as he acknowledges,
"when except for reverence for law.., there is no other basis for uniting a nation of so many disparate groups." 96 That Miller should cite
such an article, which counsels us to resist "the call for new faith in an
old gospel," 97 as a text for "constitutionalism" betrays his contempt for
the Constitution and democratarian government.
Finally, who are the demigods to whom Miller would entrust "the
awesome responsibility of.

.

. the last word in 'great governmental af-

fairs' -?gs They are for the most part political accidents-as was Chief
Justice Warren himself-ranging from mediocre to competent99 who,
Miller states, have not been prepared "for the task of constitutional
interpretation. '""°° "Few have," he states, the "broad-gauged approach
and knowledge" essential "to search for and identify the values that
should be sought in constitutional adjudication."'' 0 And the Justices
labor under the grave disadvantage of employing what Miller terms the
"faulty" "adversary system as a means of setting public policy," "faulty
91. See notes 55, 57 and accompanying text supra.
92. Miller Essay at 488, n.ll.
93. Levinson, The SpeciousMoraiy ofthe Law, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1977 at 35.
94. Id. at 38.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 41. For citations and a critique of the Levinson opus, see Berger, The Constitution and the Rule of Law, 1 W. NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 261 (1978).
97. Levinson, supra note 93, at 35.
98. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
99. See Justice Story, Berger on Abraham, supra at 578 n.88. So too, John Quincy
Adams wrote of the Justices, many of whom he knew personally: "Not one of them, except
Story, has been a man of great ability. Several of them have been men of strong prejudices,
warms passions, and contracted minds." S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION
406 n.79 (1956), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 335 n.85, paralleled in our own
time by James McReynolds and Pierce Butler. For current comments, see GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 334-36. Professor Kutler remarks on the futility of praying "for goodmen in
the seat of power." Kutler Essay at 513.
100. Miller Essay at 500.
101. Id. at 507.
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on at least three scores-the competence of the personnel, an inability
to know the consequences of alternative decisions and the flow of information to the judges."'' 2 The "system itself," he sums up, "is inadequate to the need."'' 0 3 And it is to defend this "inadequate" system that
he attacks my call for a return to self-government and an end to government by judiciary!

102. Id. at 508.
103. Id.

V.

Comment on Professor Stanley I. Kutler's Essay

Professor Kutler comes out swinging. His very title impugns my
claim to historicity: Berger is "ahistorical," that is to say, nonhistorical. 1 From two eminent practitioners of the historical art, Professors
Hugh Trevor-Roper and C.R. Elton, I learned that the essence of historical method is to ground "detail upon evidence and generalization
upon detail."2 The historian, therefore, must begin with scrupulous
regard for factual accuracy. Kutler's carelessness with, indeed distortion of, the facts impeaches his own credentials, as can quickly be
shown. He states, "Berger flatly rejects any notions of constitutional
change and growth-of history, in short-through means other than
constitutional amendment. John Marshall's famous dicta that 'it is a
constitution we are expounding,' which was 'intended to endure for
ages to come,' simply seem to have no standing with Berger."3 It
should also have no standing with Kutler, for Marshall himself repudiated the Kutlerian reading of his McCulloch v. Maryland4 dictum.
When the case came under attack Marshall rose to its defense, stating
that this dictum "does not contain the most distant allusion to any extension by construction of the powers of congress. Its sole object is to

remind us that a constitution cannot possibly enumerate the means by
which the powers of government are to be carried into execution."'
Again and again he repeated this repudiation and concluded by saying
that the judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right to change that

instrument,"6 ie. the Constitution. Commenting thereon, Professor
Gerald Gunther, who discovered Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v.
Maryland,wrote, "If virtually unlimited congressional [or judicial] discretion is indeed required to meet twentieth century needs, candid argument to that effect, rather than ritual invoking of Marshall's
1. Kutler Essay at 511.
2. Trevor-Roper, Book Review of Elton, The Practice ofHistory, London Times, Oct.
15, 1967, at 32.
3. Kutler Essay at 516 (footnote omitted).
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 185 (G. Gunther ed.

1969) [hereinafter cited as JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE], quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 377.
6. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supranote 5, at 209 (emphasis added), quotedin GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 377. Professor Lusky agrees that "[t]he famous McCulloch dictum was uttered not to justify judicial disregard of the original intent, but to repel the suggestion that the Constitution ought to speak with the same specoly as a statute ordinarily
does." Lusky Essay at 405.
[590]
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authority, would seem to me more closely in accord with the Chief Justice's stance." 7 It is this stale canard that Kutler invokes to bypass the
exclusive power of amendment and to discredit a fellow scholar. Not
only is this a departure from the fastidious accuracy we are entitled to
expect of an historian, but it represents a failure to take account, as Sir
Herbert Butterfield enjoined, of "the evidence that is discrepant," 8 a
failure he exhibits throughout.
Kutler's treatment of "due process" displays similar deficiencies,
let alone that it is a singular effort to resuscitate a discredited doctrine.
Preliminarily he states,
[the] ultimate perversion of the original intentions, as Berger sees
it, has been the judicial use of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. For judicial activists
in the late nineteenth century, the due process clause served as
the cutting edge for the protection of economic privilege; in our
time, the equal protection clause has served judges who wish to
further civil rights and liberties.9
Now economic due process, by the Court's own confession, is discredited. 0 "The hostility to substantive due process," Professor Gunther
explained, "was largely a hostility to the Supreme Court fishing out of
thin air its own predilections with inadequate textual, structural and
historical justification.""l I Professor Philip Kurland added, "The new
equal protection, like the old equal protection, is the old substantive
due process . . . .The difference between the new equal protection
and the old substantive due process is essentially the difference in the
hierarchy of values of the Court."'" How due process changes color
when applied for libertarian ideals is not explained by Kutler, though it
presented a problem for Learned Hand and others.' 3 So it is not only
"as Berger sees it."
7. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 5, at 20-21, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 378 n.19.
8. H. BUTTERFIELD, GEORGE III AND THE HISTORIANS 225 (rev. ed. 1959).
9. Kutler Essay at 519-20 (emphasis added). But see Berger on Mendelson at note 2,
supra.
10. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 265. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
11. Forum: EqualProtection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 664
(1975).
12. Id. at 661. Herbert Packer pointed out that "the new 'substantive equal protection'
has under a different label permitted today's justices to impose their prejudices in much the
same manner as the Four Horsemen once did." Packer, TheAim ofthe CriminalLaw Revisfted" 4 Plea/ora New Look at 'SubstantiveDue Process, 44 S.CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92
(1971), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 191-92.
13. See Berger on Abraham at 566-67, nn.26-30; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973).
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More dispiriting is Kutler's free and easy way with the historical
due process materials. He begins by dismissing out-of-hand Alexander

Hamilton's statement in the New York Assembly on the eve of the
Convention-that due process applied "only" to proceedings in courts,

"never" to legislation,14 that is, it is purely procedural, never substan-

tive-as a "self-serving" disclaimer.' 5 This is surely a cavalier, unex-

plained dismissal of an interpretation by a great contemporary,
nowhere controverted in any of the Conventions, and which faithfully
reflects 400 years of English and colonial history. 16 To the statement
by John A. Bingham, draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendment, during
the congressional debates, that the "courts have 'settled' [the meaning
of due process] long ago," 17 Kutler replies that the "decisions were
hardly settled," and delivers himself of some generalities about the

wrestling by state judiciaries "with a variety of implications for the centuries-old concept."' 8 Not Kutler's present-day reading, but what
Bingham, the draftsman, understood, is decisive. 9 In fact, however,
only two cases have received scholarly attention, Dred Scott v. Sanford20 and Wynehamer v. New York. 2 1 Kutler himself records that
Bingham "heaped scorn on Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's bold [e.
novel] substantive gloss on due process in the DredScott case."2 2 That
Bingham would then incorporate due process in the amendment "as a
14. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962),
quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 194 n.4.

15. Kutler Essay at 522 n.70. Hamilton declared: "The words 'due process' have a
precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the
courts of justice; they can never be referred to as an act of the legislature." quotedin GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 196 n.l 1.
16. See Berger, Law of the Land Reconsidered,74 Nw. L. REv. I (1979). To "quarrel
with the records without abundant cause is to engage in a desperate contest." Richardson &
Sayles, Parliamentand the Great Councils in Medieval England, 77 L.Q. REV. 213, 235-36
(1961).
17. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866) [hereinafter cited as GLOBE], quoted
in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 203.
18. Kutler Essay at 522.
19. As Charles Evans Hughes said of the colonists' reliance on the Magna Carta: "It
matters not whether they were accurate in their understanding of the Great Charter, for the
point is. . . what the Colonists thought it meant." C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 186 (1928), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 361 n.46.
20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
21. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). Corwin wrote that: "The Wynehamer decision found no place
in the constitutional law that was generally recognized.. . in the year 1856.. . nor was it
subsequently accepted. . . ." Of Dred Scott, Corwin wrote, "[Taney carried] with him only
two of his associates" and was convincingly refuted by Justice Curtis. Corwin, YThe Doctrine
of.Due ProcessofLaw Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 474-76 (1911).
22. Kutler Essay at 522.
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handmaiden for entrepenurial liberty"23 borders on the grotesque.
Wynehamer was shortly repudiated by the New York court,2 4 and was
roundly criticized on traditional grounds by the Rhode Island court.25
Recently Professor John Hart Ely has written that these two cases
"were aberrations, neither precedented nor destined to become precedents themselves," adding that "it should take more than two aberrational cases to convince us that those who ratified the fourteenth
amendment had some eccentric definition in mind. '26 References to
due process in the 1866 debates were solely in procedural terms,27 a
point ignored by Kutler, who is apparently unfamiliar with the judicial
rule that evidence cannot be defeated by speculation or no evidence.2 8
In these pages Professor Mendelson confirms that due process was procedural only.29 Resort to substantive due process had to wait for the
1890s when the Supreme Court undertook to save the nation from socialism.30 Of course, it is open to Kutler to hold that "judges, however
lacking prescriptive warrants . . .would continue to search for new
parameters of due process,"3 1 but this merely illustrates the familiar
greed for ever more power and does not meet my challenge to their
right to do so.
It is with the legislative history that Kutler has himself a field day.
First he taxes me with failure to "confront the reconstruction of the
setting of the Fourteenth Amendment" as described by a number of
listed scholars,32 the sum total of which is "that the history surrounding
the origins of the Amendment is complex and deeply immersed in a
context of intra-party, personal and ideological conflicts-all of which
led to confusion, deception, and even to a deliberate muting of differences," which Berger, relying on the "'black letters' of the Congressional Globe" "ignores. ' 33 He warns that the Framers "engaged in
their share of sham, deception, planned legislative colloquies and even
23. Id.
24. Metropolitan Bd. of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 668 (1866).
25. State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497 (1858), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 256.

26. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretatior"
Its Allure andImpossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 417,
420 (1978).
27. See discussion in GOVERNMENT BY JuDIcIARY at 201-14.
28. Id. at 74.
29. See Mendelson Essay at 453-4. Professor Ely concluded that the view that the due
process clause incorporates "a general mandate to review the substance of legislation...
was probably wrong," and that it is now "universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper." Ely, supra note 26, at 415.
30. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
31. Kutler Essay at 523.
32. Id. at 515 nn.27-31.
33. Id.
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humor [that should caution us] against a literal reading of their
words." 3 Confronted by unassailable "evidence" he takes refuge in a
cloud of rhetoric. For the moment I defer showing that the historians
he mentions confirm the Globe's "black letters," and turn to the touchstone whereby to test his "complexities," namely, the exclusion of suffrage and segregation, which constitutes the core of my thesis.
There is no need once more to summarize the indisputable facts.
Let it suffice to recall that Roscoe Conkling, John Bingham, Thaddeus
Stevens, Senator Jacob Howard, members of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction which drafted the Amendment, and Senator William
Fessenden, its chairman, all categorically stated that suffrage was excluded; and the Committee's Joint Report signed by all of them unmistakably confirmed the exclusion. 5 Such statements, courts hold, are
the best criteria of legislative intention,3 6 here buttressed by a unanimous chorus of statements to the same effect. Kutler summons no contradictory statements and, if memory serves me, there are none. Then
there is the fact that radical opposition to readmission of Tennessee
because its constitution excluded Negro suffrage was voted down in the
House by 125 to 12, and Senator Sumner's suffrage proposal was rejected by 34 to 4.37 Bingham, draftsman of the equal protection clause,
who vigorously led the defense of Tennessee's exclusion of Negro suffrage, declared, "We are all for equal and exact justice. . . [but] justice
for all is not to be secured in a day,"3 an admission that equal protection did not comprehend suffrage. So too, proposals to abolish all discriminations were repeatedly voted down.3 9
Add to this that Berger does not stand alone. Professor Nathaniel
Nathanson, an adherent of Kutler's activist camp, stated about my argument that the 39th Congress considered that the Fourteenth Amendment would not require school desegregation or Negro suffrage, "These
are not surprising historical conclusions. The first was quite conclusively demonstrated by Alexander Bickel. . . the second was also convincingly demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
...
. Mr. Berger's independent research and analysis confirms and
34. Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
35. See Berger on Miller at 580-81, nn.30-35. For Bingham's views, see text accompanying note 95 infra.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942); Wright
v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440,463-64 n.8 (1936). See also GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
157 n.2.
37. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 3980, 4000, cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 105.
38. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 3979, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 111.
39. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 1287.
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adds weight to those conclusions."4 Professors Abraham, Lusky and
41
Mendelson concur that suffrage was excluded from the Amendment;
and Professor Gunther wrote that "most constitutional lawyers agree"
that the "one person-one vote" doctrine "lacks all historical justification."4 2 Against this, Kutler's list of those "who did not see the Warren
Court as judicial messiahs," namely, "Southern politicians. . . prose-

cutors promoting societal rights" and "the John Birch Society
peddl[ing] its Impeach Earl Warren Kits,"4 3 without mentioning the

protests of Justices Black and Harlan against the Court's exercise of the
amending power,' Judge Learned Hand's large doubts about the de-

segregation decision and the Court's role as a "third legislative chamber,"4 5 hardly demonstrates the impartiality one expects of an
historian. To refer against this background, moreover, to what Berger
"interprets as the original intention underlying the Fourteenth Amend-

ment," betrays an invincible addiction to preconceptions that facts cannot penetrate. 46
Consider next the charge that Berger fails "to manifest, any feel
for political context or nuance . . . He repeatedly states that many
white Americans harbored strong negrophobic sentiments. That, of
course, is indisputable . . . ."I "Many" scarcely does justice to the
pervasive feeling mirrored in George Julian's lament in the House:
"The real trouble is that we hate the negro. ' 48 To quote one of the

authorities whom I am charged with failing to "confront," Harold Hyman: "Negrophobia tended to hold even the sparse Reconstruction in40. Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEx. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978).
41. See Abraham Essay at 002. Lusky refers to "Justice Harlan's irrefutable and unrefuted demonstration in dissent that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to protect
the right to vote. .. ." Lusky Essay at 406; See also Mendelson Essay at 452.
42. Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1977, at 4. Professor Robert Bork wrote
that "The principle of one man, one vote. . . runs counter to the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political practice
of Americans from colonial times up to the day the Court invented the new formula." Bork,
NeutralPrincoplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1971), quoted in
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 89-90 n.71. See also Introduction at 530 n.20.
43. Kutler Essay at 514.
44. For Justice Black's views, see Berger on Miller at 583 n.52. Justice Harlan stated,
"When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has
invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed
...
." Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
at 330.
45. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1958), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
166 n.4.
46. Kutler Essay at 523.
47. Id. at 518-19.
48. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 257, quoted inGOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 233.
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stitutions that the nation created to low throttle, and played a part in
Reconstruction's.

.

. incompleteness."49 Its role in blocking black suf-

frage is copiously detailed in Government by Judiciary. This was a basic fact, not a mere "nuance," which screams from the "black letters" of
the Globe, but does not really break through Kutler's preconceptions.
He casually glides over another such fact, merely mentioning that the
Republicans "[t]ime and again . . . invoked notions of state sover-

eignty and said that only the states could fix the qualifications for voting."50 A Hyman disciple, Professor Phillip Paludan, repeatedly
emphasizes that state control of local institutions was "the most potent
institutional obstacle to the Negroes' hope for protected liberty."'51
Having found these two overtowering, super-"nuances,"-negrophobia
and states' fights-I turned to the Reconstruction historians mentioned
by Kutler (as well as others) and found that a "complex" setting
notwithstanding, they confirmed my views.
Harold Hyman wrote, that "One reason the Reconstruction of the
South loomed high to northerners was less that blacks were involved
than that every one understood the pre-eminence of states.

. .

in af-

fecting all their citizens' lives;" "virtually unhampered state powers
52
were considered fundamental for liberty, federalism and democracy."
On the issue of states' rights, another Kutler authority, Howard Jay
Graham wrote, "No one reading the debates carefully will question the
framers' devotion to federalism . . . ,51 Another Kutler authority,
M.L. Benedict, disposed of Kutler's contemptuous dismissal of some
"simplistic radical/moderate dichotomy." 54 Benedict classified the
Republicans as Conservatives, Moderates (Centrists) and radicals (with
5
a small r)Y.
The radicals, he concluded, "did not dominate Congress
during the Reconstruction era."'56 The "Centrists' work centered on
two committees: Fessenden's Joint Committee on Reconstruction and
Trumbull's Senate Judiciary Committee. Between them they fashioned
49. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 447 (1973), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDI233 n.17.
50. Kutler Essay at 517.
51. P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 15 (1975), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 155.
52. H. HYMAN, supra note 49, at 426 (1973), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
63 n.50.
53. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION 312 (1968), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 63 n.50.
54. Kutler Essay at 516.
55. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 237.
56. M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 27 (1975), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 237.
CIARY at
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the conservative Reconstruction program of the 39th Congress." 5 7 In
short, "the non-radicals had enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence of some radicals and over the opposition of many."5 8 What
Benedict supposedly drew from the "context" so warmly recommended
by Kutler I deduced from the "black letter" rejection of suffrage proposals by votes of 125 to 12 and 34 to 4, and from repeated rejection of
proposals to abolish all distinctions.59
Chairman Wilson, it will be recalled, assured the framers that the
60
terms "civil rights and immunities" did not embrace mixed schools.
Richard Kluger tells us that Graham, one of counsel in the desegregation case, "was particularly troubled by Representative Wilson's insistence during the phase of the debates dealing with the 'no
discrimination' clause that the Civil Rights Bill was not intended to
outlaw separate schools. That negative reference, Graham reported,
was 'unfortunate, particularly since he was House Manager of the...
bill.' ",61 Graham himself recorded that "[t]here were many reasons
why men's understanding of equal protection, as applied to educational
matters, was imperfect in 1866. . .. Negroes were barred from public
schools of the North, and still widely regarded as 'racially inferior' and
'incapable of education.' Even comparatively enlightened leaders then
accepted segregation in schools."'62 Here is a "context" that cries out
for consideration in "the reconstruction of the setting of the Fourteenth
Amendment" but all it receives from Kutler is that such learning "is
hardly new." 63 Does that disentitle it to consideration in evaluating the
Warren Court's "revolution?"
In the face of such testimony by his own witness, Kutler has the
temerity to charge that "Berger carefully culls out every legislative statement [on school segregation]" . . . "[tio demonstrate that modem
Supreme Court decisions... conflict with a monolithic, irresistible history."' To "cull out" some statements is to reject others that presumably go the other way, a genteel style of charging me with suppression of
57. M. BENEDICT, supra note 56, at 146-47 (1975), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
at 238 n.41.
58. M. BENEDICT, supranote 56, at 210 (1975), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
239.
59. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
60. Berger on Mendelson at 551 n.34.
61. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 634-35 (1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
at 119 n.12.
62. H. GRAHAM, supra note 53 at 290 n.70 (1968), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 127.
63. Kutler Essay at 515.
64. Id. at 519 (emphases added).
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65
evidence. I challenge Kutler to produce the rejected statements.
Bickers documented study of the 1866 debates let him to conclude,
It was preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools, for example, when hardly a beginning had been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously special efforts, suitable only for
the Negroes, would have to be made . . . . It is impossible to
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be
abolished .
66
And in 1962 he again wrote: "The framers did not intend or expect
then and there to outlaw segregation, which, of course, was a practice
widely prevalent in the North, ' ' 67 as Graham recognized.
Wishful thinker that he was, Graham 68 was yet far readier to face
reality than Kutler: Brown v. Board of Education,69 he wrote,
[was] decided . . . with scant reference to the historical rebriefings or to framer intent or original understanding. Rather, political and judicial ethics, social psychology-what the equal
protection of the laws means, and must mean, in our time,
whatever it may have meant to whomever in 1866-1868-these
of Chief Justice Warren's opinwere the grounds and the essence
70
ion for a unanimous Court.
In short Warren revised the Amendment, or in Kutler's blander version, "the equal protection clause has served judges who wish to further
civil rights and liberties. 7 1
Remains Alfred Kelly, who was one of the most arrant wishful
thinkers in the field, as the reader may gather if he pursues the citations
to Kelly in my index, where I painstakingly analyzed many of Kelly's
utterances-what Kutler labels "polemical"'7 2 -and which, along with

65. He also refers to my "limited, selected evidence," id. at 523, when in fact I faced up
to every discrepant fact, whereas Kutler cannot bring himself to do so. Compare Kutler's
own undeniable "culling," supra at notes 43-45. See also, Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUm.
L. REV. 685 (1978).
66. R. KLUGER, supra note 61, at 654 (1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
100.
67. A BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 100 (1962), quoted in GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 101.
68. Confronted with the Framers' imperfect "understanding of equal protection, as applied to education matters," he asked, "Does it follow-dare it follow-[that] we today are
bound by that imperfect understanding of equalprotectionof the laws?" H. GRAHAM, supra
note 53, at 290 n.70, 291 (1968) (emphases in original), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 282. Here is the apogee of self-delusion: the Framers had an "imperfect understanding" of the words they employed, words that expressed their intention, not those of Graham
& Co.
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. H. GRAHAM, supra note 53, at 269 (1968), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
131 n.62.
71. Kutler Essay at 520.
72. Id. at 514.
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other similar labors, led an eminent British political scientist, Professor
Max Beloff, to say of that neo-abolitionist school: "The quite extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving the contrary [of my
view] make sad reading for those impressed with the high quality of
American legal-historical scholarship. '7 3 And it makes even sadder
reading that Kutler should continue to rely on such authorities, as
Kelly's recantation alone should demonstrate. Kelly had been of counsel in the desegregation case, and by his own admission "distorted" the
history,7 4 a lovely admission by an historian. In 1966, he adverted to
the limitation imposed by the essentially federal character of the
American constitutional system, which at last made it impossible
to set up a comprehensive and unlimited program for the integration of the Negro into the southern social order. Such a program
could have been effected only by a revolutionary destruction of
the states and the substitution of a unitary constitutional system
S.
.. [T]he commitment to traditional state-federal relations
meant that the radical Negro reform program could be only a very
limited one. 5
What he learned from an "extraordinary revolution in the historiography of the Civil War and Reconstruction 7' 6 I picked up from the
"black letters" of the CongressionalGlobe. Kelly's recantation, which
he could not bring himself expressly to avow, amounts to a confession
that a generation of historians had misread the "setting and context";
Kutler's failure to weigh Kelly's recantation further impeaches his
judgment.
Such are the "complexities and setting" which I allegedly "ignore[d]." And in my "unoriginal" way,7 7 seeing 2 and 2 side by side, I
73. Beloff, Arbiters of American Destiny, The Times (London) Apr. 7, 1978 (Higher
Educ. Supp.) at II. Nevertheless Kutler condemns my "unrelenting, ungracious treatment of
other writers." Kutler Essay at 523. The progress of science, LW.N. Sullivan wrote, is due
to the fact that the scientific world has "one simple but devastating criterion, 'Is it true?"' J.
SULLIVAN, THE LIMIrATIoNs OF SCIENCE 277-78 (1933). I took pains to demonstrate that
the views of Kelly et al. were untenable, whereas Kutler is content to sprinkle his pages with
prejoratives. When he does essay proof it is at the cost of the historical facts.
74. The NAACP "carefully doctor[ed] all the evidence to the contrary, either by suppressing it. . . or by distorting it when suppression was not possible." Kelly, Clio and the
Constitution: An Illicit Love Affair, Sup. CT. REv. 119, 144 (1965).
75. Kelly, Comment on HaroidM Hyman's Paper,in NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (H. Hyman ed. 1966) (emphases added) quotedin GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 242.
76. Kelly, supra note 75 at 55, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 242.
77. Kutler derides me for being "largely unoriginal," Kutler Essay at 515, the classic
academican's dismissal, as if that dispenses with the need to reconsider the problem in light
of the Warren Court's "revolution." See notes 140-44 and accompanying text infra.
Problems do not go away because academicians like Kutler ignore them.
As one who has reached the age of 78, I may be permitted to deny the charge, rise to a
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proceeded to deduce that they added up to 4, that is, given negrophobia
and the deep-seated attachment to states' rights (plus a host of assurances that the Fourteenth Amendment excluded suffrage and segregation) I submitted to the evidence despite my predilections, as Huxley
counselled,7 8 and did not shrink from saying that the Court was not
authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere therewith. If

any of the Reconstruction historians cited by Kutler forthrightly said as
much, it escaped my notice; indeed, I have seen a couple of them
squirm when confronted by that inescapable deduction.

When Kutler seeks to wring from section 2 of the Amendment an
impeachment of the foregoing materials, his passion for "context"
markedly subsides. Because he insists that Berger fails "to manifest
any feel for political context or nuance"7 9 it needs to be demonstrated

that this devotee of "context" glaringly disregards it when it suits his
own purposes. Section 2 provides for reduced representation when
states deny or abridge the right to vote. It did not derive from tenderness for the blacks but from the desire to preserve Republican ascen-

dancy. Emancipation brought the startling realization that the
Southern representation would no longer be limited in the House of

Representatives to three-fifths of the blacks, as Article I, section 3 provided. Now each voteless freedman counted as a whole person; and as
a result southern states would be entitled to increased representation,

and in union with northern Democrats would have, as Stevens pointed
out, "a majority," which must be forestalled to "secure perpetual ascendancy" to the Republicans. 0 Senator George Williams, a member of
the Joint Committee, frankly avowed that it was more important to
question of "personal privilege" and point out a number of "firsts," which only an uninformed reader can fail to perceive. No prior commentator collected the historical materials
that show what privileges or immunities, due process and equal protection meant to the
Framers who used the terms, rebutted the Slaughter House emasculation of privileges or
immunities, rebutted the neo-abolitionist attempt to read abolitionist theology into the
Amendment, examined the meaning of the "Congress shall enforce" provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, examined the Marshall-Holmes-Frankfurter dicta that are the cornerstone of the activist case, examined the widely-held view that the Harlan dissents were
refuted by William Van Alstyne, exposed the erroneous reliance on those who opposed the
Amendment, and rebutted the "open-ended" theory. Against Kutler, I cite Professor C. Van
Woodward: "Berger's Government by Judiciaryraises scores of fascinating questions that no
one in the field can afford to ignore." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (cover).
78. T. HUXLEY, MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE (1863), quotedin H. SMITH, MAN AND Hs
GODS 372 (1953), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 1: "My colleagues have learned
to respect nothing but evidence, and to believe that their highest duty lies in submitting to it,
however it may jar against their inclinations."
79. Kutler Essay at 518.
80. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 74, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 16.
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limit southern representation than to provide "that negroes anywhere
should immediately vote."8 1 In the House James Blaine said, "The effect contemplated. . . is perfectly well understood, and on all hands
frankly avowed. It is to deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair
advantage of a large representation in this House, based on their
colored population, so long as that people shall be denied political
rights."" z If the state gave them the vote, it was anticipated, of course,
that they would vote for their benefactors and thereby perpetuate the
Republicans in power.
Exactly the same concern later prompted the Fifteenth Amendment, for as Kutler states, "That measure was designed to guarantee
black voting rights in the northern states in order to further Republican
party fortunes." 3 This, he tells us, "underscores the contention that
legislative history must be viewed as more than a frozen section of tissue; there also is, to repeat, a context of action, purpose, and pacing to
be understood."'
Indeed there is, but he does not grasp that it was
perpetuation of Republican hegemony that section 2 and the Fifteenth
alters the repeated
Amendment sought, and that "context" in nowise
85
assurances that section 1 did not confer suffrage.
His analysis of section 2 throws "context" to the winds; now he
relies on "words." The acknowledgment by Fessenden, Stevens and
others, "that the Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere with the
states' prerogatives," Kutler states, is "negate[d" by "their own
words."'8 6 By "their own words. . . Republicans acknowledged the reduced representation principle to be a remedial provision permitting
national action against a state which Congress could not otherwise
punish directly. In short, Berger's devotion to literalness led him to
ignore the legislative convolutions, indeed sarcasm, conveyed by such
language."8 7 Now the attempt by, section 2 to induce states to grant
81. GLOBE, supra note 17, app. at 94, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 52-53.
82. GLOBE, supranote 17, at 141, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 66.
83. Kutler Essay at 519. Ward Elliott remarked, "The post-Civil War Radical Republicans... cared very little for the black vote until they came to believe that it would help to
secure their position.. . against a Democratic resurgence." W. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF A
GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 2 (1974), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 53 n.4.
84. Kutler Essay at 519.
85. Professor Mendelson agrees that: "By treating suffrage separately and differently in
section 2, those who gave us the Fourteenth Amendment made clear their purpose to exclude voter problems from the equal protection and related clauses of section 1. In short, the
MenFifteenth Amendment makes good the omission of suffrage rights in section 1 .
delson Essay at 453.
86. Kutler Essay at 518 (emphasis added).
87. Id.
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black suffrage was not an "interfere[nce] with the state prerogatives";
control of suffrage was unmistakably left with the states. Why could
Congress "not otherwise punish directly" denial of the vote that section
2 was "indirectly forcing the states" to give?88 The answer was plainly
given by the Report of the Joint Committee: "It was doubtful, in the
opinion of your Committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached."8 9 Hence the Committee concluded that section 2 "would
leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to
all the advantage of increased political power asan inducement to allow
all to participate in its exercise." 90 Since the point at issue is that suffrage was left to the states and therefore was unaffected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the fact that section 2 was "indirectly forcing the
states to let [blacks] vote"91 in nowise affects my demonstration that
suffrage was left to the states. Kutler fails to perceive the difference
between "an inducement" to a state to act and a provision authorizing
federal action in the area.
Where is the "sarcasm" 92 in James Garfield's statement that he
wanted suffrage guaranteed but said, "I am willing.

. .

to take what I

get"? 93

How is the point made by the Report, signed by Chairman
can
Fessenden, affected by his statement that "if the states use their constitutional power to 'make an inequality of rights,' then they would 'suffer
such and such consequences' "?94 Both statements acknowledged that
power was to remain in the states. 'What "legislative convolutions" or
"sacrcasm" are hidden in Bingham's statement that "[t]he Amendment
does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of
regulating suffrage in several States," 95 or in Senator Howard's explanation that "[t]he second section leaves the right to regulate the elective
franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with the right." 96
Kutler's argument, I submit, grasps at straws to bolster his preconcep88. Id.
89. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, S. REP. No. 112, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1866), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 84.
90. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 89, at 8 (emphasis added).
91. Kutler Essay at 518 (emphasis added).

92. Id.
93. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 2462, quoted in Kutler Essay at 519.
94. Kutler Essay at 519 (emphasis added), quoting GLOBE, supra note 17, at 1279.
95. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 2542, quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 65 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 2766, quoted inGOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 65 (emphasis added).
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tions, a course that does little honor to the historian's craft. Consider
too Kutler's verbal gymnastics in his version of Stevens' views:
The Pennsylvanian repeated the litany that "the States have the
right . .. to fix the elective franchise," and that section 2 did
nothing to alter that. But the wily Stevens was at his cleverest
when he said that he preferred section 2 to a direct declaration
for black suffrage because he would rather that blacks not vote
until they had been educated in "their duties . . . as citizens."
Stevens thus had the best of all worlds: he could make a gesture
to northern bigotry by suggesting that blacks were not ready for
suffrage, and he could erode southern white power in Congress
either by reducing representation based on a denial of the
franchise to blacks or by indirectly forcing the states to let them
vote.97
This pretty exercise in psychoanalysis cannot wash out Stevens' recognition, whatever his motives, that the Amendment "falls far short of my
wishes . . . [but] it is all that can be obtained in the present state of
public opinion."9 8 Such are the "words" which Kutler reads as "negating" my view that the "leading Republicans" acknowledged that "the
Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere with the states' prerogatives." 99 To ape his style, "Some negation"!
His discussion of the judicial role has several facets."° First he
rejects the view that it was confined to the "policing of [constitutional]
boundaries and [excluded from] policymaking reserved to the legislature," a distinction he scornfully labels as "mechanistic jurisprudence," 10
' notwithstanding it was earlier drawn by Madison, Justice
James Iredell, James Bradley Thayer and Learned Hand."0 2 Neverthe97. Kutler Essay at 518 (footnotes omitted). In repeating the "litany," that is, the appointed form, Stevens showed he knew what his constituency demanded. See note 129 infira.
98. GLOBE, srupra note 17, at 2459.
99. Kutler Essay at 518.
100. Where others-Abraham and Ely, for example- are deeply troubled by the problem of drawing "limits" for unrestrained discretion, Kutler blithely dismisses it. All that is
needed, he asserts, is to "presume the constitutionality of legislative policy" and "apply severe scrutiny to legislation affecting processes of free political discourse, association, or balloting, which are the foundation for making substantive legislative and executive policy
choices." Kutler Essay at 525. How do such "limits" account for judicial substitution of
"one person-one vote" for the manifest exclusion of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment?
101. Kutler Essay at 522.
102. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66, 31 (1958); Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrineof ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REV.129, 135 (1893). Although Hamilton stressed that the courts were to serve as "bulwarks of a limited Constitution against
legislative encroachments," "within those limits," Madison said, there were "discretionary
powers." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 304.
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less Kutler maintains that "there is an abstract artificiality in distinguishing between 'policing boundaries' and 'policymaking.' "103 All
line-drawing, Justice Holmes reminded us, is a matter of degree; twi-

light imperceptibly merges into night, yet we do not hesitate to distinguish day from night, as did the Framers. They were exclusively

concerned with preventing a department from "overleaping its
bounds"; 4 they had no intention of permitting a judicial takeover of
legislative discretion within those bounds, as is evidenced by their rejec-

tion of judicial participation in policy-making on a Council of Revision, by their deep-seated distrust of judicial discretion,10 5 by their

attachment to the separation of powers, made explicit by John Adams'
1780 Massachusetts Constitution ("the judiciary shall never exercise
the legislative" power), 0 6 and by Hamilton's assurance that judges
could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature.""' 7 What "abstract artificiality" is there in giving effect to
the Framers' decision to exclude suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment?10 8 Instead of name-calling and derision Kutler would have been

better occupied in accounting for such "discrepant evidence."
Second, Kutler attacks my comment on Archibald Cox's acknowlThe matter was put plainly in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), by Justice
James Iredell, who had made one of the most cogent arguments for judicial review prior to
the Convention: "The power of the legislatures is limited" by the several constitutions. "Beyond those limitations,. . . their acts are void, because they are not warranted by the authority given. But within them, I think, they are in all cases obligatory ... because... the
legislatures only exercise a discretion expressly confided to them by the Constitution ....
It is a discretion no more controllable (as I conceive) by a court of justice, than a judicial
determination is by them ..
" Id. at 265 (emphasis added). Similarly, executive discretion lies beyond judicial control. See Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803). See also Abraham Essay at 481.
103. Kutler Essay at 521.
104. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 13-16 (1969).
105. See generaly GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 300-08. For the "profound fear of
judicial.., discretion," see G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERIC %NREPUBLIC, 17761787, at 298, 304 (1969).
106. 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 960 (B. Poore ed. 1878). For the same
utterance by Madison, see 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435-36, both quoted in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 250 n.5.
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) at 526-27, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 294.
108. Kutler suggests: "[I]t can be argued that the Republican framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment 'may have foreseen' the judicial activism of a later period stemming from 'the
possibilities of their language."' Kutler Essay at 520-21. For this he cites a 1950 statement
by Professor Willard Hurst. See W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERIC &N LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 227-28 (1950). I wonder whether Hurst would reject my detailed proof that the
"open-ended" theory cannot stand up in the face of the historical evidence. See Berger on
Abraham at 570-72, nn.56-66.

Spring 19791

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

edgment that libertarian impulses "were felt more strongly in the world
of the highly educated" and were "not shared so strongly and widely as
to realize themselves through legislation,"109 because I see this simply
as a problem of "evil that the people were, and remain, unready to
cure,"110 exclaiming, "What an exquisite example of majoritarianism.""' That our system is built on majoritarianism scarcely needs
demonstration.' 1 2 But Kutler has it that I am "oblivious" to the concern of the Founding Fathers "about legislative tyranny and majoritarianism," citing, ironically enough, No. 10 of The Federalist for its
"recognition of minority rights.""' 3 There Madison was concerned
with the protection of the propertied minority, with protection "of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property," with preserving the
"unequal distribution of property" against a "rage for paper money, for
an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property,""' 4 which of
course included Negro chattels. Discrimination against the black minority, for whom Kutler is concerned, was, however, built into the Constitution. In fact, as Gordon Wood observed, "[1]n the minds of most
Whigs in 1776 individual rights, even the basic civil liberties that we
consider so crucial, possessed little of their modern theoretical relevance when set against the will of the people.""' 5 Nowhere in the Constitution or its history is there an intimation that judges were given a
power of attorney to fashion unenumerated "minority rights" in order
to remedy "injustice, as theypereeive it.""' 6 To the contrary, Marshall
held.that the Constitution did not protect against all abuses." 7 When
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 came to the rescue of the blacks, it enumerated a narrow group of rights, picked up in the "privileges or immunities" clause, and the Framers made clear that they intended to
exclude all others."' To speak of "minority rights" en gros is therefore
to read into the Constitution limitations on "majoritarian" government
for which there is no constitutional warrant.
109. A.

Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 35

(1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 313.

110. A. Cox, supra note 109, at 409.
111. Kutler Essay at 524.
112. It is freely acknowledged by Ely, a friend of an activist Court. Ely, supra note 26, at
411.
113. Kutler Essay at 524.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 55-56, 62 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
115. G. WOOD, supra note 105, at 63. Anti-majoritarianism was the refuge of the propertied classes. Id. at 502-05.
116. Kutler Essay at 525 (emphasis added).
117. Berger on Lusky at 543, n.85, see also pp. 609-10, infra.
118. Berger on Mendelson at nn.33-36, 45-47, 56-63.
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Lamenting that "our political system has often malfunctioned
when entrenched interests confront rising demands for change,"1 1 9
Kutler forgets that for generations the Court served as the handmaiden
of such "entrenched interests," to mention only the overthrow of income tax legislation 12 ° and Lochner v. New York.' 2 1 Henry Steele
Commager excoriated the pre-1937 Court for blocking all efforts to
ameliorate the lot of Negroes, labor and the like.' 22 In the Slaughter
House Cases12 3 the Court aborted even the slender protection afforded
to blacks by the "privileges or immunities" clause, so that for about 60
years they were exposed to violence and oppression.
Third, Kutler's version of the framers' distrust of the judiciary is
again distorted and inaccurate. He begins: "Underlying [Berger's]
analysis is a traditional assumption that the Republicans of the era instinctively distrusted the judiciary and, what is more, constantly
schemed to debilitate or destroy itsfunctions. Those expressing such
views seemingly dominate the reports in the CongressionalGlobe-but
only in verbiage."' 2 4 His supporting citation contains not the slightest
support for the italicized statement. Again in attributing to me the
view "that the judges have engaged in self-conscious aggrandizement,
motivated by contempt for the wishes of the sovereign people,"'" he
suggests that such proof is needed to make out a case. It suffices, however, that the Court has confirmed what John Stuart Mill referred to as
"the disposition of mankind. . . to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others," and that, as Mill said, is
enough reason to withhold judicial power to do so.' 26 Be it never forgotten that Justice Holmes and Chief Justice Stone condemned the Justices' identification of their own predilections with constitutional
mandates. 2 7 And if the Court has not exhibited "contempt for the
119. Kutler Essay at 524.
120. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 582 (1895).
121. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
122. See Commager, JudicialReview and Democracy, 19 VA. Q. REV. 417, 428 (1943).
Leonard Levy wrote that "the Court crippled and voided most of the comprehensive program for protecting the civil rights of Negroes after the Civil War." JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE SUPREME COURT 23 (L. Levy ed. 1967), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 332.
123. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
124. Kutler Essay at 520 (emphasis added). Professor R. J. Harris wrote: "The Radicals
did not trust the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular." R. HARRIS, THE
QUEST FOR EQUALITY 53-54 (1960). Professor Morton Keller stated: "Radical Republicans
sought to deny the postwar court the power to review congressional Reconstruction." M.
KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 73 (1977). See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 223 n.9.
125. Kutler Essay at 523.
126. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1885), quotedin Berger on Abraham at 575 n.90.
127. Berger on Abraham at 573 nn.74,78.

Spring 19791

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

wishes of the sovereign people" it certainly has exhibited disregard, as
is disclosed by its rebuff of Justice Jackson's plea to tell the people that
by the desegregation decision "we are declaring new law for a new
day.' 12 8 That rejection demonstrates that the Court was well aware

that the people would not stomach its decision unless it was rested on
the will of the framers, and therefore proceeded in disregard of the
popular will. 129 And that is pointed up by its current disregard of pop-

with its decisions on death penalties, obscenity, busing
ular discontent
130
and the like.

Nor is it true that the framers expressed their undeniable distrust
"only in verbiage," in what Kutler, in a "triumph" of sarcasm refers to
as Charles Sumner's success "in delaying an appropriation for commis-

sioning a bust of Taney for the Supreme Court library."' 131 It is true
that "the Republicans of this era actively promoted new courts and,
above all, new jurisdictional authority," and that "habeas corpus, admiralty, bankruptcy, and removal legislation" were expanded. 32 The
Civil Rights Act itself marked a significant departure from the seventyfive year exclusion of the inferior courts from the "arising under" jurisdiction; but that was because the southern state courts were not trusted
33
to enforce the unpopular measures for the protection of the blacks.
128. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 609 (1976), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
130.
129. As Robert Bork stated, "The way an institution advertises tells you what it thinks its
customers demand." Bork, NeutralPrincplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND.
L.J. 1,4 (1971), quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 319.
130. Kutler acknowledges that: "The actions of a federal judge in taking over [the Boston] school system probably run counter to a 'national consensus.'" Kutler Essay at 523-24.
Of busing, the New York Amsterdam News, the leading weekly newspaper for the black
community, stated, "(1) That polls have indicated that 51% of black Americans oppose busing, as do 85% whites. (2) That studies of best social scientists indicate that forced busing
heightens racial identity and (3).. .is a sociological disaster .. " Quotedin Wall St. J.,
Oct. 24, 1978, at 24, colA. An equally jaundiced view is taken of "affirmative action" to
correct past discrimination by a leading black educator, Professor Thomas Sowell. Sowell,
Are Quotas Goodfor Blacks?, 42 COMMENTARY 39 (June 1978).
Justice Stewart acknowledged, "[1It is now evident that a large proportion of American
society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary criminal
sanction," pointing to legislative enactments providing for the death penalty after the
Court's adverse decision. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976), quoted inGOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 261 n.53. Professor Louis Jaffe stated that it is "overwhelmingly" the
case that "the 'public conscience' does not support the claim of constitutional protection for
'obscenity."' Jaffe, The Court Debated-Another View, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1960 (Magazine), quotedin THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN (L. Levy ed. 1972), quotedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 326 n.50.
131. Kutler Essay at 520.
132. Id.
133. GLOBE, supra note 17, at 653, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 225 n.16.
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The "removal legislation" served a similar purpose-to secure to both
loyal whites and blacks a less partial tribunal than the state courts.
Bankruptcy was a traditional judicial staple, and Congress could not be
expected-indeed it was not authorized-to take over the judicial function; so too with habeas corpus, all representing traditional litigation.
But in his eagerness to tree his quarry, Kutler gallops past the fact that
these were nonpoliticalmatters, unlike Taney's intervention in the Dred
Scott slavery issue. When it came to the political decisions such as
were involved in determining the extent to which rights conferred by
the Amendment reached, Congress reserved paramountcy to itself by
section 5, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article." In 1879
the Court underscored this reservation of power: "It is not said that the
judicialpower . . . shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to

protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. . . . Congress is au'
thorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation."134
This
is not the place to recapitulate the source of and consequences that flow
from that reservation. Suffice it to say that the jurisdiction of the inferior courts is only such as Congress chooses to give, that what it gives it
can at any time withdraw, 135 and that given Congress' exclusive power
to enforce, which it may in part delegate to the courts, it is reasonable
to conclude that the ultimate judgment as to what enforcement requires
was left to Congress, not to the Court. Even the Court's appellate jurisdiction needs to be reconsidered in light of this excluirive grant to Congress. That adds up to a little more than excluding Taney's bust from
the judicial pantheon.
Not the least remarkable aspect of Kutler's distorted account of
the era is his reference to "thefeeble congressionalresponse to Ex Parte
' 3 6 Congress had withdrawn jurisdiction to consider a ReMcCardle."'
134. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (emphasis partially added), quoted in
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 221. This was but an application of the traditional rule that
to give to A only is to withold from B. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464,471
(1959); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 725 (1832), both citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY at 223.
In April 1862, William Dunn of Indiana, stated: "I am not willing to trust the court in
relation to this question of slavery, because very much of the trouble in which we are now
involved may be attributed to the fact that we had a pro-slavery judiciary." CONG. GLOBE,
37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1792 (1862).
In the 42nd Congress, John Farnsworth of Illinois, stated on March 31, 1871: "We
passed laws, Mr. Speaker, and the country knows it, which we did not like to let go to the
Supreme Court for adjudication." CONG. GLOBE App., 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 116 (1871).
135. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850), cited in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 224.
136. Kutler Essay at 521 (emphasis added).
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construction measure upon a petition for habeas corpus, then "in the
bosom of the Court";13 7 and it was the Court that meekly declared that
its appellate jurisdiction was subject to regulation by Congress. It
needs only to be added that congressional distrust of the judiciary for
the protection of Negro rights-kindled by the fugitive slave cases and
.DredScott-was before long richly vindicated when the Court in the
Slaughter House Cases aborted the protection afforded by the "privileges or immunities" clause, so that those rights remained without protection for several generations. 38 Doubtless Kutler would
triumphantly inquire: so why didn't Congress do something about it?
Perhaps the answer is that Republican zeal had evaporated, as the malodorous Hayes-Tilden turn-over of the blacks to the mercies of the
South very soon indicated. 139 Confidence in Kutler's scholarly judgment, I submit, is seriously undermined by such distortions, particularly when they are at the service of his slavish devotion to the "new
faith."
Heresy is usually predicated upon a departure from an old, established faith, e.g., the extirpation of the Albigensians by the Holy Inquisition. But Kutler stands orthodoxy on its head; he would
excommunicate me because I cling to the old pieties, the "new faith"
notwithstanding. He himself has written that:
From the early twentieth century throughout the late 1930s, academic and liberal commentators, as well as groups such as organized labor, criticized vigorously the abusive powers of the
federal judiciary. They accused judges, particularly those on the
Supreme Court, of consistently frustrating desirable social policies, allegedly sanctioned by popular sentiment,140
pointing out that "the judges had arrogated a policymaking function
not conferred upon them by the Constitution," which "negated the basic principles of representative government." "After 1937," he writes,
137. Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifyingthe Supreme Court'sIndependence,35 A.B.A. J.
1, 3 (1949).
138. See Lusky Essay at 421. See also note 122 supra.
139. "inhere seems no doubt," wrote Samuel Eliot Morison, "that a deal was made by
the Republicans with Southern Democratic leaders, by virtue of which, in return for their
acquiescence in Hayes's election, they promised on his behalf... to wink at non-enforcement of Amendment XV [sic] guaranteeing civil rights to the freedmen. The bargain was
kept on both sides." S. MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 733-34
(1965). See also A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONsTrrUTION: ITS ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT 489-94 (1970).
140. Kutler Essay at 512 (emphasis added). His "desirable social policies, allegedly sanctioned by popular sentiment" is of a piece with his constant distortion. Passage of the inome tax amendment showed that Polock, supra note 120, in fact was opposed to majority
sentiment, as is also indicated by numerous state statutes seeking to govern maximum hours
for bakers that had been frustrated by Lochner,supra note 121.
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"most of the judiciary's longtime critics suddenlyfounda newfaith and
promoted it with all the zealousness of new converts,"' 14 1 apparently
unaware that he is possessed by the same zeal. 142 Now the courts
"matched a new libertarianism promoting 'preferred freedoms' as enumerated in the Bill of Rights with an activist judiciary to protect those
values";14 1 or as Alfred Kelly put it, the Court was -determined to
carry through a constitutional revolution. . . a degree of political activism rivalled only in the days of DredScott, Pollock and Lochner."'"
For historians it seemingly suffices to record the events, because
Kutler makes no effort to find constitutional warrant for the "new
faith," or for a "constitutional revolution." Instead he derides those
who do, as when he exults that judges have "prompted, even forced,
legislatures and executives to deal with the problems they would rather
ignore. That result admittedly violates Berger'snotions of constitutional
purity and somewhat confirms his concept of judicial policymaking,
145
but how else should judges respond to injustice, as they perceive it?"'
What could better illustrate Kutler's contempt for constitutional limitations on power than his "exquisite" phrase-"Berger's notions of constitutional purity?" For him it suffices that "judicial policymaking
generallyfllsa vacuum created when politically-accountable legislators
. . . abdicate theirproper policy roles."' 146 But legislative power does
not descend on the shoulders of the judiciary when Congress neglects
or refuses to exercise it, 1 47 even though there are "grievous injustices to
which the political institutions could not or would not respond."'' 48
Judges are sworn to support the Constitution, not to revise it in the
interest of "justice as they perceive it." Chief Justice Marshall held that
"[Tlhe constitution. . . was not intended to furnish the corrective for
every abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments. The interest, wisdom and justice of the representative body, and
its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security. . against
141. Kutler Essay at 513 (emphasis added).
142. See text accompanying note 145, infra.
143. Kutler Essay at 513.
144. Kelly, supra note 74, at 158. Kutler notices that the "result-oriented jurisprudence"
of the Warren Court "witnessed the crumbling of sometimes century-old precedents and the
charting of new politics and social goals. . . ." Kutler Essay at 514. It needs no argument
that the Court was not designed as an instrument of "revolution."
145. Kutler Essay at 525 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). Given legislative discretion within constitutional
boundaries, it is for the legislature to determine how properly to exercise it.
147. Berger on Lusky at 540, n.58.
148. Kutler Essay at 523.
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. . . unwise legislation [and a fortiori, no legislation] generally.'" 49
The Framers, the records show, wanted no part of judicial "guardians,"
a position reaffirmed in our time by Judge Learned Hand. 15 0
As to the Court's usurpation of the amendment power, sharply
criticized by Justices as different as Black and Harlan,' 51 that Kutler
meets with stark simplicity: "[T]he path for amendment. . . is often
blocked by inertia or irresponsibility,"' 152 as if such difficulties endow
the Court with power exclusively reserved to the people. Poor deluded
women who continue their struggle to obtain the Equal Rights Amendment when there is the so-much-easier path of judicial amendment!
The fact that problems of "change . . . have been effectively and
responsibly handled by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis, rather
than through the larger, more cumbersome, instrument of an amendment"' 153 merely acknowledges the usurpation. Be it assumed that "injustice, as [judges] perceive it" coincides with the view of the people,
even so, as said by Hamilton, "the peoples' representatives" cannot depart from "the established form" prior to an amendment by the people154 If to rely on such historical facts is "ahistorical," I commend a
dose of it to Kutler as an antidote to wishful thinking.
In truth, Kutler belongs to a coterie of whom Professor Joseph
Bishop wrote, "Those who favor abortion, busing. . . and oppose capital punishment. . obviously have no faith whatever in the wisdom
or will of the great majority of the people, who are opposed to them.
They are doing everything possible to have these problems resolved by
This was candidly avowed by
a small minority in the courts ... .
Professor Robert Cover, who wrote that the Constitution is of no moment because "we" have decided to "entrust" judges with forming an
149. Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830), quoted in GOVERN379.
150. Elbridge Gerry rejected setting judges up "as the guardians of the Rights of the
people" and was sustained by the Framers' rejection of their participation in a Council of
Revision. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97-98 (M. Farrand
ed. 1937), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 301. Nor did Learned Hand want any
part of "Platonic Guardians." See R.H. Jackson, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 37 (1941); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71 (1962), both cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 331.
151. For Justice Black, see Berger on Miller, at 583, n.52; for Justice Harlan, see Berger
on Lusky, at 538, n.39.
152. Kufler Essay at 525.
153. Id.
154. THE FEDERALIST No.78 (A. Hamilton) at 104, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 316.
155. Bishop, Whqat isa Liberal-f,/ho is a Conservative?, 62 COMMENTARY 47 (Sept.
1976), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 314 n.6.
MENT BY JUDICIARY at
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"ideology" whereby to measure "majoritarian politics," the reason being that majoritarianism is not to be trusted.1 56 But the people have yet
to be told that they have surrendered such powers to the Court.
It is for this reason that I urged "an end to pretence," and "submission of Court-wrought constitutional amendments to the people so as to
legitimate 'government by judiciary,' " which Kutler states "hardly
.. .
Yet the call for honest
merits microscopic examination ..
avowal was issued by Learned Hand--"If we do need a third [legislative] chamber it should appear for what it is, and not as an interpreter
of inscrutable principles ' ' - 158 and recently reiterated by Professor
W.R. Forrester. 59 For as Alpheus Thomas Mason stated, "only that
power which is recognized can be effectively limited.""'6 That the
power needs at the very least to be limited is the tenor of the Abraham
and Ely articles. In deriding and obscuring these issues, in pretending
that the people have surrendered the right of self-government to the
Justices, Kutler and his like betray rather than serve our democracy.

156. Cover, Book Review NEw REP., Jan. 14, 1978, at 27. It "is for us, not the framers, to
decide whether that end of liberty is best served by entrusting to judges a major role in
defining our governing political ideas and in measuring the activity of the primary actors
[Congress and the legislatures] in majoritarian politics against that ideology." Id.
157. Kutler Essay at 523. Kutler is merely expressing his satisfaction (for the moment)
with judicial rule. For uneasiness with such rule, see Abraham Essay at 472-73, 481-82;
Mendelson Essay at 444-45.
158. L. HAND, supra note 150, at 70 (1962), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
416.
159. Forrester, 4re We Readyfor Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A. J. 1212 (1977).
160. Mason, Myth and Reality in Supreme Court Decisions, 48 VA. L. REV. 1385, 1405
(1962), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 415-16.

VI.

Comment on Professor Dean Alfange, Jr.'s Article

Professor Alfanget acknowledges that "Berger presents convincing
evidence that the Thirty-Ninth Congress had a narrow purpose, and
meant to protect neither political equality by guaranteeing the right to2
vote nor social equality by prohibiting the segregation of the races."
But he questions "the extent to which history, however clear, should
control interpretation of the Constitution,"3 in other words, the Court
may substitute its own policy choices for those of the framers.4 Nothing, according to him, stands in the way of that course.
Repeatedly he makes unfounded allegations. He insists, for example, that Berger "would forbid alljudicial policymaking,"5 whereas I
consider that if the terms of a particular constitutional provision are
ambiguous and no framers' choices are discernible, there is room for
judicial policymaking. Allied with such arguments is a constant unwillingness to recognize that "Berger's" views have respectable authority. Thus he writes, "as Berger sees it, the power of judicial review...
1. Alfange, On JudicialPolicymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at the
"Original Intent" Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Alfange Essay]. The editors have afforded me the privilege of
responding to this critique, published in a prior issue.
Alfange opens on a pettish note, reproaching me for having "borrowed" my title from
Louis Boudin's 1932 opus "without acknowledgment," id at 603, though he notices that our
goals are widely disparate. Id. at 603-604. The words "government by judiciary" are part of
the common currency of legal discourse.
When William Cullen Bryant intimated that James Russell Lowell's "To the Past" had
been suggested by a Bryant poem of the same title, Lowell asked, "Does he think that he
invented the past and has a prescription title to it?" M. DUBERMAN, JAMES RusSELL LowELL at 413 (1960). In any event, since Alfange labels Boudin's work as "eccentric," Alfange
Essay at 603, I had more to lose than to gain by the "borrowed" title.
Alfange notes that Boudin attacked the legitimacy (as distinguished from the scope) of
judicial review, whereas I had published a book in its defense, finding "that the historical
record was not 'vague and conflicting' as other scholars had found it," id. at 604. Presumably Alfange endorses those "other" scholars. See id at n.6. If that be the case, he undermines the case for judicial review altogether, how can one defend the extreme extension of
judicial review in opposition to the popular will if it is altogether without secure constitutional basis?
2. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 622; see also id. at 606-607. Yet Alfange states:
"Berger disputes those historians who have viewed section one of the amendment as embodying the desire of the abolitionists to guarantee blacks full social and political equality." Id.
at 605.
3. Id. at 608.
4. 'The meaning of a constitutional provision is too vital to be decided by any formula
that would exclude modem-day judgment-and, given judicial review, that judgment will
most probably be exercised by the justices of the Supreme Court." Id. at 638.
5. Id. at 618; see also id. at 617, 626 (emphasis in original).
[613]
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is nothing more than an authorization to police the boundaries of the
Constitution .... "I Dispassionate scholarship demands recognition
that this was the view of some of the greatest figures in our constitutional history-James Madison, James Iredell, Judge Learned Hand
7
and James Bradley Thayer.
Notwithstanding that he considers my "skill as a constitutional
historian is extraordinary," 8 he questions my judgment respecting canons of interpretation. His competence to challenge my reading of law
is impeached by his astonishing version of Hamilton's No.78 of The
Federalist: "Hamilton was there arguing for the power of judicial' review as a means of allowing judges to control the power of the legislature, and to enhance their own authority."9 Let Hamilton speak: (1)
"The judiciary . . . can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment,"" ° that is, it cannot initiate policy, (2) There "is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers."" (3) Quoting Montesquieu, "Of the three [departments] the
judiciary is next to nothing."' 2 (4) The courts may not "on the pretence
of a repugnancy. . . substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature," that is, they may not intrude within the
boundaries of the legislative power.' 3 (5) "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents. .. " 4 And he assured the Ratifiers
in No. 81 that the judges could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legisature."' I5 Their function was merely
to insure that the other departments did not "overleap their bounds."
The struggle to "inter" the original intention represents an attempt
to escape from the unmistakable intention of the framers to exclude
suffrage and segregation from the Fourteenth Amendment, an intention that undermines a series of decisions so dear to the hearts of the
"True Believers." Leonard Levy wrote of an earlier and similar attempt, that it is "of comparatively recent vintage, raising the suspicion
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
cited as

Id. at 604 (emphasis added); see also id. at 618.
See Berger on Kutler at 603, n.102.
Alfange Essay, supra note 1,at 637-38.
Id. at 630 n.124 (emphasis added).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 504 (Modem Lib. ed. 1937) [hereinafter
THE FEDERALIST].

Id. (quoting I SPIRIT OF LAWS 181).
12. Id., (quoting I SPIRIT OF LAWS 186).
13. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 507.
14. Id. at 510.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) at 526-27 (Modem Lib. ed. 1937).
11.
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that the arguments have been concocted to rationalize a growing satis' 16
faction with judical review among liberal intellectuals and scholars."
One of the neoabolitionist trio 7 that Alfange would rehabilitate, Jacobus tenBroek, stated that the Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional construction
is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the
instrument ... ,,iTo be sure, he went on to say that "the pretense of
a disinterested search for the original intent is judicial hokum"; 9 but

the purpose of such "fairy tales," as Professor Mendelson justly observed, is to "obscure. . .a raw exercise of judicial fiat,"2 because to
tell the truth would be "suicidal." 2 1 Only because the people have been
led to believe that busing, affirmative action and the like are demanded
by the Constitution rather than by the -Justices are such decisions reluctantly swallowed.2 2 So that in interring the original intention doctrine
Alfange is more royalist than the king.
True it is that in 1930 Max Radin attacked resort to legislative
history for ascertainment of the intention of the legislature; 23 but he
16. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 24 (L. Levy ed.), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 285 n.5.
17. The principal neoabolitionist spokesmen defended by Alfange are Howard Jay Graham, Jacobus tenBroek, and Alfred Kelly. See H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION
(1968); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1965); A. Kelly, The FourteenthAmendment Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956).
18. TenBroek, Use by the UnitedStates Supreme Court ofExtrinsicAids in Constitutional
Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV. 399, 399
(1939) [hereinafter cited as tenBroek], quoted in Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 610 n.38.
19. TenBroek, supra note 18, at 410 citedin Alfange Essay, supra note 1,at 610 n.38.
20. Mendelson Essay at 441.
21. Martin Shapiro wrote, "Suicide is no more moral in political than in personal life.
It would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to
disavow publicly the myth upon which its power rests." M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964). Power in the service of moral imperatives must not rest on
a sham. It is not "scholarship" but obedience to constitutional limitations that calls for a
halt.
Alfange explains that 'Judicial assertions of the necessity for fidelity to the original
intent ... [are] nothing more than an instinctive mechanism of self protection against those
who may object to a particular line of constitutional interpretation." Alfange Essay, supra
note 1, at 610.
22. See text accompanying Berger on Lusky at 545, n.105.
A devout activist, Thomas Grey, observed, "if judges resort- to bad interpretation in
preference to honest exposition of deeply held but unwritten ideals, it must be because they
perceive the latter mode of decisionmaking to be of suspect legitimacy." Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 (1975).
23. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 n.14 (1930) [hereinafter
cited as Radin], cited in Alfange Essay, supranote I, at 609. "A legislature certainly has no
intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted, which a
considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might
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noted that by that time "the number of American cases declaring the

primacy of the rule that statutes should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of their framers 'run[s] into the hundreds.' "24 And the
Supreme Court likewise is committed to legislative history as an index
of legislative intention.2 5 Against the premature "interment" of the
original intention by tenBroek and Charles Curtis,2 6 there is the fact
that the Court continues to invoke it - in one case Justices Black and

Goldberg did so in support of opposing positions;27 that Justice Holmes
held that when a legislature "has intimated its will, however indirectly,
that will should be recognized and obeyed. . . it is not an adequate

discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but
you have not said it."'2 8 Judge Learned Hand held in 1959 that if the
purpose is "manifest" it "override[s] even the explicit words used."'29

Such rulings have their roots in a centuries-old tradition and in
Supreme Court cases, 30 against which the criticism of tenBroek and
Curtis break on the rocks.
Next Alfange echoes the argument that a rule of construction ap-

plicable to contracts and statutes is inappropriate to interpretation of a
Constitution. 3 1 The Founders, however, turned to the rules of statutory
construction for interpretation of the Constitution. 32 This reflected the

Founders' fear of unbridled judicial discretion,33 so that Hamilton felt
constrained to assure the Ratifiers in FederalistNo. 78 that to "avoid

an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strictrules and precedents. . .

.3

Such rules, Jus-

have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs." Radin at 870. This
is irrelevant to the all but unanimous exclusion of suffrage.
24. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 609, (quoting Radin, supra note 16a, at 870 n.13.
25. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Assn. 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968); Association v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 348 U.S. 437, 444 (1955); Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S.
476, 479 (1943); Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922).
26. See C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE (1947), cited in Alfange Essay, supra
note 1, at 611 n.42.
27. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting, id. at 342; Goldberg, J.,
concurring, id. at 288-89), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 367-68.
28. Keifer & Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939) quoting Johnson v. United
States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 369.
29. Cawley v. United States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959).
30. See Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 620 n.79, where Alfange notices my citation of
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903): "A thing may be within the letter of a statute
and not within its meaning... The intention of the law maker is the law," See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 7. Alfange, however, does not profit from the reference.
31. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 609-10, 626-27.
32. See text accompanying Berger on Lusky at 544, nn.92-95.
33. Id. at 537, nn.33-35.
34. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 510 (emphasis added).
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tice Story later declared, provide a "fixed standard" for interpretation
of the Constitution.3 5 Alfange would sidestep the historical materials
by arguing that "no such rule of interpretation is specified in the federal Constitution. ' 36 Neither is there specification for the separation of
powers, nor, most consider, for judicial review itself. On Alfange's rea-

soning both would fall. Alfange also argues that the framers did not
intend such a rule to apply because of "their deliberate use of general
language. '37 Hamilton's statement that "strict rules" would prevent

"arbitrary discretion" is incompatible with that reading, and it is reinforced by Marshall's view, as Professor Lusky notes, that "The Consti-

be applied in accordance with the intent of those who
tution should
38
made it."

Apart from the 1787 presupposition respecting resort to original
intention, there is solid evidence that the 1866 framers regarded original intention as controlling. First there is the statement by the foremost
libertarian, Charles Sumner, that resort to the original intention should
where the language had no fixed meaning, i.e. was
be had precisely
"general. '39 Then there is the 1872 Report by a unanimous Senate Ju-

diciary Committee, which included framers, stating that it was "compelled" to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of the
intention of those who framed it,' and contemporary confirmation by
the leading constitutional authority of the time, Judge Thomas Coo-

ley.41 These statements are contemporaneous constructions by those
who had first-hand familiarity with the framers' intention, which are
entitled to great weight,42 greater weight than current efforts, unbacked
by any evidence whatsoever, to rationalize the "new faith." To refer
35. Berger on Lusky at 544, n.95.
36. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 609.
37. Id.
38. Lusky Essay at 405; see generalo Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332
(1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824); Osbom v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824); all citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 37879.
39. See Berger on Lusky at 534, n.13.
40. Report of Jan. 25, 1872, A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTs DEBATES
571 (1967).
41. T. COOLEY, CONsTITtrroNAL LIMITATIONS 68-69 (6th ed. 1890).
42. Speaking of contemporaneous observers, Justice William Johnson stated, "they had
the best opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers of the
constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by them ....
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827). Respect for contemporaneous constructions is deeply rooted in the past. In 1454 Chief Justice Prisot stated, "the judges who
gave these decisions in ancient times were nearer to the making of the statute then we now
are, and had more acquaintance with it." Windham v. Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen. 4, f. 38, 41
pl. 7, quoted in C. K. ALLEN, LAWS IN THE MAKING 193 (6th ed. 1958).
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against this background to a "mindless transfer to the area of constituof statutory
tional interpretation of a rule that is justified in the context
43
fact.
to
invulnerable
mind
a
construction" is to exhibit
Alfange relies on the "overriding fact that if the legislature finds its

previous intent [as judicially determined] to be inadequate, it can alter
it by the simple expedient of passing a new law."" Precisely that fact
argues for giving "intent" overriding force in a constitutional context,

because while judicial mistakes of statutory interpretation are thus curable, errors of constitutional construction are beyond cure except by the
"cumbersome" process of amendment. If judges may dispense with the
Article V amending process because it is cumbersome-the well-worn

justification for judicial adaptation of the Constitution- 45 why is it not
true that this very cumbersomeness calls for even more faithful adherence to constitutional than to statutory intent? What difference there is

between statutes and the Constitution argues for more not less fidelity
to the intent of the framers. As an ardent apologist for the Warren
Court, Judge J. Skelly Wright, explained, "Constitutional changes are
in fact different from ordinary decisions. . . the most important value
choices have already been made by the framers" and judicial "value

choices" are to "be made only within the parameters" of those
choices.4 6 It cannot be that the choices of legislators-mere delegatesare entitled to greater respect than the clearly discernible choices of the

sovereign people.
Alfange argues, however, that although statutes may be amended

by the legislature, a Constitution, in "Marshall's classic statement, [is]
'intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs.' ",4 Like his fellow "True Be-

lievers" Alfange rings the changes on Marshall's "classic statement"; it
is his Rock of Ages, his refuge from historical fact.48 He cannot bring
43. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 626-27 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 627.
45. Because "the process of amendment is politically difficult, other modes of change
have emerged." McDougal & Lans, Treaties and CongressionalExecutive or Presidential
Agreements: InterchangeableInstrumentsofNationalPolicy, 54 YALE L. J. 181, 293 (1945).
46. Berger on Miller at 576 n.2; see also Berger on Mendelson at 549 n. 15.
47. Alfange Essay, supranote 1, at 609-10, quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original).
48. "Of course judges ought not to be free to manipulate [the Constitution's] words at
will to arrive at whatever results their personal inclinations commend to them. Of course
. . . George Washington. . . urged that modifications in the Constitution be brought about
by 'amendment,' not by 'usurpation.'... Nevertheless, a constitution is intended to endure
for ages to come." Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 629-630 (quoting 356 THE WRrrINGs OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940)). Alfange relies on Marshall as if a
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himself to admit that Marshall repudiated that very reading, categorically stating that the judicial power "cannot be the assertion of a right
to change that instrument."4 9 This he dismisses as Berger "arguingthat
the Chief Justice himself firmly repudiated any such implication," 5
thus betraying either an incapacity or an unwillingness to distinguish
incontrovertible fact from opinion. If I may trade counsels with him,

the first essential for scholarship is to learn to live with the facts, however unpalatable. And, if "McCulloch is an abnegation of judicial au-

thority to limit the powers of Congress," as he concluded,5' it cannot
amount to an assertion of a right "to change" the Constitution, the paramount voice of the people. Like his fellow "True Believers," Alfange
insists that "although Chief Justice John Marshall may have abjured
the existence of judicial authority to change the Constitution. . .and

may have written in a judicial opinion that 'the intention of the instrument must prevail,' he nevertheless manifestly went beyond the intent
of the framers. .

".."I'

A fervent advocate of "the best ideals and

finest aspirations of the nation '53 should begin by rejecting a contradiction between word and deed on the part of those whom he would
entrust with the national destiny. Let there be an end to pretense; in
the words of Judge Learned Hand, "If we do need a third [legislative]
chamber it should appear for what it is, and not as an interpreter of
inscrutable principles."5 4
Similar reluctance to face up to the facts is illustrated by Alfange's
judicial dictum affords warrant for rewriting the Constitution. See also Alfange Essay,
supra note 1, at 624.
49. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 185 (G. Gunther ed.
1969); see also Berger on Kutler at 590-91, nn.3-7.
50. Alfange Essay, supranote 1, at 624. So too, Alfange finds it impossible to reconcile
my view that a rollback of the desegregation decision is "unrealistic and probably impossible" with my statement that I should have felt constrained in 1954 "to hold that the relief
sought lay outside the confines of the judicial power," Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 626
n.103, illustrating an inability to distinguish between recognition that water can not be made
to flow back over the dam and the issue of constitutionality as a guide to future action. He
also fails to notice that Justice Stevens wrote that "the legislative history discloses an intent
not to outlaw segregated public schools," and that he would have given effect thereto "were
we writing on a clean slate." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-90 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), quoted in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 412 n. 19.
51. Alfange Essay, supra note 1,at 625.
52. Alfange Essay, supranote I, at 631 (citing JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed. 1969) (emphasis added) and Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)). Alfange's use of the word
"may" is of a piece with his persistent attempt to cast doubt on indisputable fact.
53. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 629.
54. THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1962), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 416.
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56
reference to a chapter, 55 in which I analyzed the McCulloch dictum

and the Holmes dicta in Missouri v. Holland57 as Berger "denies that
either constitutes a valid argument for departing from the framers'
original intent. ' 58 Of course I was not content with a mere "denial," as
Alfange so often is, but mustered the facts upon which I grounded my
opinion. Since those dicta are a cornerstone of the "new faith," Alfange should have rebutted my proof. It speaks volumes that Alfange
continues to rely on such exploded dicta, whereas a more dispassionate
observer, the British political scientist Professor Max Beloff, stated,
"the familiar phrases about the nature of the Constitution and the canons of interpretation taken from Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes
are when tracked back to their sources
no authority for judicial review
59
except in the narrowest sense."

Alfange concedes that where "a desired change would be unmistakably contrary to an unambiguous provision of the Constitution,
there is no doubt that the only legitimate mode of accomplishing it
would be by formal amendment. ' 60 Why in the name of common
sense is it not equally true where the legislative intention is also "unmistakable? ' 61 For generations, in fact, the courts have held that when
55. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 373-86.
56. Chief Justice Marshall stated that, "we must never forget, that it is a Constitutionwe
are expounding. . . a constitution intended to ensure for ages to come, and, consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
57. In discussing the relationship between the treaty-making power conferred by Article
II, § 2 of the Constitution and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the states,
Justice Holmes opined: "[w]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted
of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that
they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in
question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The
only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of
the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what
that Amendment has reserved." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). For discussion of this dictum see Berger on Miller at 584.
58. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 614-15 n.56.
59. Beloff, Arbiter ofAmerican Destiny, The Times (London), Higher Education Supp.
April 7, 1978 at II.
60. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 619.
61. See Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REv. 801, 804 (1978). The 1872 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, see Berger on Lusky, at 535, n.14, stated, "A construction which
should give the phrase 'a republican form of government' a meaning differing from the sense
in which it was understood and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express language of the
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the intention is clear, it is as good as written into the text;62 and one
suspects that Alfange is thus ready to acknowledge the paramountcy of
the text only because the shoe is not presently pinching in a textual
63
context.
Consider next Alfange's views on the amendment process: "[A]s
Bergersees it, the power of judicial review. . . is. . . not a grant of
authority to alter'the Constitution"; 6 Article V "sets down what Berger
sees as the only valid mechanism for effecting any change" in the Constitution.6 5 "What Berger sees" had been perceived at the very outset
by Washington,6 6 Hamilton,67 Elbridge Gerry," and in our time, by
Justices Black, 69 Harlan 70 and others. Scholarly fairness demands that
the reader be told that Berger's views have the sanction of such authority, 7 1 not misleadingly to suggest that they constitute an "eccentric" departure from historical fact.7 2 In similar fashion, Alfange quotes
Berger, "'Article V constitutes the exclusive medium of change, under
the long standing maxim that to name a particular mode is to exclude
all others.' It is more than a little suprising to find one of the ancient
canons of statutory construction put forward as an authoritative guide
to constitutional interpretation, since it would be difficult today to find
any judge or commentator who would be prepared to treat them as
binding." 73 To begin with, I did not rely on the "ancient canon" alone
Constitution in any particular." A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES
571 (1967).
62. See note 30, supra.
63. Thus he states, "Blaisdell demonstrates that there may be compelling reasons for a
judicial reluctance to be bound by the intent of the framers even when a deviation from that
intent requires a conscious distortion of the actual words of the Constitution." Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 622 (emphasis added), citing Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See also Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 613 n.54.
64. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
66. See 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 228-29 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940),
cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 299.
67. See THE FEDERALIST, supranote 10, at 509, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
316.
68. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 503 (1789), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
318.
69. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black J., dissenting), citedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 101 n.9.
70. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting), cited in
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 1.
71. See also text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
72. Alfange Essay supra note 1, at 603. "Eccentric" is defined as a departure from the
usual custom. It is the "new faith," spawned "after 1937," Kutler Essay at 513, that constitutes a departure from the 150-year-old custom and is therefore "eccentric."
73. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 618-19, quoting GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 318
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but showed that this was the interpretation of Washington, Hamilton
and Gerry.7 4 Nor is it true that no judge or commentator would invoke
the canon. The Supreme Court has often held that "When a statute
limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative
of any other mode"; and the rule was applied by the Supreme Court in
7
1959. 5
More important, such rules were among the presuppositions of the
Founders. If their attachment to a "fixed constitution" was to be safeguarded, judges could not, as Chancellor Kent stated, "be left to a dangerous discretion to roam at large in the trackless field of their owi"
imaginations. '76 For this reason Hamilton assured the Ratifiers that
"strict rules" were "indispensable" to "avoid an arbitrary discretion in
the courts. 7 7 The very expresslo unius maxim referred to by Alfange
was cited in the First Congress in which sat many Framers and Ratifiers. 78 To be sure, the rule is in bad odor with free-wheeling judges
who denounce every restraint, and with commentators like Alfange
who halloo them on to ever more heroic derring-do. But even libertarian commentators do not shrink from invoking the rule. In a handbook on impeachment, published at the height of the Nixon-Watergate
investigation, Professor Charles Black glanced very briefly at the legislative history of "high crimes and misdemeanors" and concluded, "we
have to have recourse to an old and quite sensible rule of legal construction. . . 'eiusdem generis' " which says that "when a general word
occurs after a number of specific words, the meaning of the general
word ought often to be limited to the kind or class of things within
which the specific words fall." 79 Thus casually did he solve a vexing
problem by resort to an "ancient canon" of construction that carried
greater weight with him than the actual intention of the framers.8 0 The
expressio unius rule, to borrow his words, is "quite sensible"; when a
(emphasis in original). The maxim referred to by Alfange is "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius." See generally J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th
ed. Sands 1972) §§ 47.23-47.25.
74. See notes 66-68 supra.
75. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959); Botany Worsted Mills
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). It was recognized as the "general rule" in
Springer v. The Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 206 (1928).
76. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858), cited in GovERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 308 n.34.
77. THE FEDERALIST, supranote 10, at 504, 510 citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
308.
78. For citations in the First Congress, see, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 505, 517
(Comments by Benson and White), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 223 n.1l.
79. C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 36-37 (1974) (emphasis in original).
80. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 53-102 (1973).
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testator leaves his farm to his son he does not leave it to his daughter.
What is sound sense for the impeachment of Richard Nixon does not
become nonsense when applied for refutation of Chief Justice Warren.
Alfange's resort to the stale "general words" argument exhibits a
striking inconsistency: he rejects the hard evidence of explicit intent"convincing evidence that the Thirty-Ninth Congress had a narrow
purpose" (excluding both suffrage and segregation)8 '-but builds on an

assumed intent to override that explicit intent by the use of "general
words," that is "privileges or immunities," "due process of law," and
"equal protection of the laws." Men do not use words to defeat their
purposes. Nor was "due process" "general"; it had a fixed historical

content.82 "Privileges or immunities" was traced by Senator Trumbull
to Article IV and its judicial constructions, then incorporated in the
Civil Rights Act, which the framers and the people were told was
"identical" with the Fourteenth Amendment.8 3 "Equal protection"

constantly had been associated with a guarantee against discrimination
respecting rights enumeratedin the Act,84 and only by doing violence to
the framers' admitted intention can the suffrage and segregation they
had unmistakably excluded be read into the terms. 85 Then why didn't
they say so? asks Alfange.8 6 When a similar query challenged judicial
review itself, Henry Hart remarked, "Professor Crosskey is a devotee of
that technique of interpretation which reaches its apogee of persuasiveness in the triumphant question, 'If that's what they meant, why didn't
81. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 622.
82. See Berger on Mendelson at 548, nn.2-4; see generaloy GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
at 193-214,249-82. When Alfange invokes the word "commerce" as a "general" word which
can be "applied to new developments that could not have been forseen by the framers,"
Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 620, he fails to perceive the basic distinction between an
amorphous term which had no fixed historical content and one which, as Charles Curtis said
regarding "due process," when the Framers put it "into the Fifth Amendment, its meaning
was as fixed and definite as the common law could make a phrase." Curtis, Review and
MajorityRule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 170, 177 (E. Cahn ed. 1954), citedin
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 200.
Presumably Justice Brandeis had such language as "commerce" in mind when he cited
an earlier passage, "general language should not" be "confined to the form that evil had
theretofore taken." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), citedin Alfange Essay,
supra note 1, at 621 n.85. He concurred with Justice Holmes in rejecting the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or
moral beliefs in its prohibitions." Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
83. See Berger on Mendelson at 550-55, nn.30-67.
84. Id. at nn.78-83, 107-118.
85. See id. at note 15.
86. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 622.
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they say so?' "S7-- a test summarily dismissed by Justice Holmes. 88
Notwithstanding this anti-"general" demonstration, Alfange singles out what he labels as my "only" answer to the "vague" language of
the amendment, avoidance of prolixity.8 9 It was Marshall who said
that a Constitution cannot be as prolix as a Code,9 0 and Bickel who
stated that "a specific and exclusive enumeration of rights" in the act
presumably was considered "inappropriate in a constitutional provision." 91 Alfange disposes of Marshall by invoking his all-purpose
poultice--"a constitution intended to endure for ages to come";92 and
Bickel is explained by his qualifying "open-ended" hypothesis, of
which more anon.93 For Alfange my thesis would result in a Constitution that is "exceedingly prolix";9 4 he cites Bickers remark that "[tihe
familiarity of amendment will breed a species of contempt and incapacitate the document." 95 But is free-wheeling judicial "incapacitation" which thwarts the design of the framers the lesser evil? Then too,
Alfange wanders outside the frame of my analysis--the Fourteenth
Amendment. It would require only one amendment (and I do not suggest that there may be no statutory means of dealing with judicial usurpation) to limit the Court's jurisdiction thereunder.96 In truth, once the
people become aware that the Court is exercising powers that were
withheld, allegedly for their own good, the Court will feel itself constrained to retreat.9 7
Since "it would have taken only a few additional lines" to embody
the restrictions of the Civil Rights Act, Alfange concludes that the
87. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1462 (1954).
88. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
89. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 622-23.
90. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). See note 56 supra.
91. A. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 61 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Bickel], citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 39.
92. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). See Alfange Essay,
supra note 1, at 624.
93. See note 108 infra.
94. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 627.
95. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 105 (1962), cited in Alfange Essay,
supra note I, at 627.
96. Alfange instances the DredScott decision, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), holding
that the word "citizen" was not intended to encompass blacks, as showing "it would be
difficult to know how to amend the document." Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 626. The
framers found no difficulty in defining citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment so as to
overcome that holding.
97. Justice Frankfurter stated, "scholarly exposure of the Court's abuse of its powers"
would "bring about a shift in the Court's viewpoint." J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 59 (1974), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 415; see also note 131
infra-
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framers' "deliberate failure to take this simple course. . . strongly suggests that they desired a constitutional provision that would be adaptable to future exigencies."9 To the contrary, having throughout used
"equal protection" in a restricted sense, the framers could safely assume that that meaning had not been changed when those words were
incorporated in the Amendment, 99 and certainly not to include the very
privileges they had repeatedly been assured were barred. Alfange turns
a blind eye to John Bingham's (the draftsman of the Amendment) rejection of a broad, "oppressive" anti-discrimination clause in the Civil
Rights Bill, 10° and without explanation now has him embrace in the
Amendment exactly what he had rejected in the bill. Alfange also ignores that an early draft had distinguished between "equal protection
of the laws" and "the same political rights and privileges,"' '0 1 and that
the deletion of the latter phrase set the seal on the restricted scope of
"equal protection."' 2 If, as Alfange urges, "surely the members of
Congress must have seen that the language they were using in the
amendment was an open invitation,"'10 3 why did they then turn to the
cumbersome process of procuring the Fifteenth Amendment' °4 when it
would have been so much simpler and easier to confer suffrage by statute? Who would know better than the framers that they had left an
escape hatch open? Instead, Charles Sumner told the Thirty-Ninth
Congress that we are to turn to the framers for light as to words "which
seem to have no fixed signification."'0 5 And when the Senate Judiciary
Committee was asked to review a petition in 1871 to confer suffrage on
women, it unanimously held that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had not intended to confer suffrage on women. 0 6
98. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 624.
99. This is the effect of the pan materia rule, see Berger on Mendelson at 561, n.113. It
is therefore no answer to quote Bickel that, "equal protection of the laws [is] a clause which
is plainly capable of being applied to all subjects of state legislation." Bickel, supra note 91,
at 60-61, cited in Alfange Essay, supranote I, at 626. Bickel also stated that the Moderate
leadership (which prevailed) had in mind a "limited and well-defined meaning... a right
to equal protection in the literal sense of benefitting from the laws for security of person and
property." Berger on Mendelson at 561, n.1 12. No explanation is proferred for a shift from
this opinion.
100. Berger on Mendelson at 551, nn.35-36.
101. Bickel, supra note 91, at 31, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 171.
102. Id. at 163-65.
103. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 623 n.91.
104. U.S. CONST. Amend. XV provides, in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any States
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
105. See note 39, supra.
106. A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 571-572 (1967).
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Throughout, Alfange reveals that facts are uncongenial to him; speculation is easier and not so confining.
Alfange merely reiterates the "open-ended" theory which Bickel
first proferred as an hypothesis in 1954.1°7 To my lengthy exposition of
the historical materials which rebut that theory, 08 Alfange merely retorts, "But surely the members of Congress must have seen that the
language they were using. . . was an open invitation to such speculation. .
,,"0 Yet that "invitation" escaped the notice of the Court for

three quarters of a century. Alfange would controvert evidence that the
terms had a restricted meaning for the framers with mere speculation.10 Nor is it enough to say that "Alfred Kelly found the framers'
choice of broad language.

. .

to be particularly significant. .

.

.Ber-

ger examines and rejects Kelly's suggestion." ' ' If the detailed recital
of facts and reasoning on which my rejection was based is faulty, it was
incumbent upon Alfange to expose the flaws. Then too, Alfange shuts
his eyes to Kelly's recantation in 1966, induced by the "extraordinary
revolution in the historiography of the Civil War and Reconstruction."112 Such persistent oversights, all geared to his predilections, vitiate Alfange's credibility.
As a clincher Alfange parades some judicial lynchings and asks
with respect to Brown v. Mississppi' 3 (murder convictions of blacks
based upon confessions extorted by torture) whether Berger "really
[would] have contended that because the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not intend the due process clause to apply to state
criminal procedures, the state could, as far as federal constitutional law
was concerned, substitute the 'rack and torture chamber' for the witness
stand."1 14 Alfange is sadly confused. True it is, as he recognizes, that
the due process clause of the "Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize the
107. See note 108 supra.
108. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 99-116; see also Berger on Abraham at 570-72,
nn.56-66.
109. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 623 n.91.
110. The courts require that evidence must be met by evidence, not speculation. See,
e.g., Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 164 F.2d 996, 999, n.8 (3d Cir. 1947); Meosson v.
Liberty Fast Freight Co., 124 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1941); Phillips v. Gookin, 231 Mass.
250, 251, 120 N.E. 691 (1918); see also Miller v. Herzfeld, 4 F.2d 355, 356 (3d Cir. 1925);
Magg v. Miller, 296 F. 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1924), all citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
74 n.15.
111. Alfange Essay, sufpra note 1, at 624 n.93, (citing Kelly, The FourteenthAmendment
Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1071-86 (1956)).
112. See Berger on Kutler at 599, nn.74-76.
113. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
114. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 634 n.154.
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administration of criminal justice in the states."" 5 But it does not follow, and I did not suggest, that the due process clause in its historical

procedural sense, was not intended "to apply to state criminal procedures." On the contrary, the Amendment expressly provides, "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." Fourteenth century statutes had guaranteed
proper service in due course so that a defendant would have the opportunity to answer and defend-the primal meaning of due process, 1 6 a

right that could not be emptied merely by going through the motions of
a hearing. Thus a fair trial was implicit in the requirement of due process. John Bingham, who was to be the draftsman of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated in Congress in 1859, that a State could not deny
"Free, native-born Negroes a fair hearing in maintenance of their
rights in the courts of justice. . . 7
In holding that a due process hearing demands a fair trial in a
State court, the Court, therefore, was acting within the perimeters of
procedural due process. And it was giving effect to the framers' inten-

tion to "secure protection" of the courts against "the enormities prac18
ticed upon" blacks, to afford them "security of person and property,"'
a guarantee that would be eviscerated were State courts permitted to

sanction a lynching merely by going through the forms of a judicial
proceeding." 9 In short, Alfange fails to distinguish the proceduraldue
process thatgoverns injudicialproceedingsfromthepervertedsubstantive
dueprocess that would displacelegislative policy-making.120 Moreover,
the Mississippi court itself had outlawed convictions secured by torture, 21 so that the right to be protected therefrom might well have been
115. Id. at 607.
116. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICLARY at 197-98.
117. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (February 11, 1859). Justice Holmes stated,
"Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase 'due process of law,'
there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial.. . . Mob
law does not become due process 6f law by securing the consent of a terrorized jury." Frank
v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915), dissenting opinion, Hughes, J., concurring. Such was
the holding in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923), per Holmes, J. In none of these
cases was the applicability of procedural due process to such State proceedings questioned.
118. GOVERNMENT BY JuDIcIARY at 201.

119. The Mississippi court held that the right to a "fair and impartial trial" "rises above
mere rules of procedure." Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 134 (1926).
120. That distinction was drawn by Hamilton in 1787: "The words 'due process' have a
precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the
courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of legislature." GOVERNMENT BY
JuDICL4ARY at 196 n.11.
121. See note 119 sufpra Accord, Collier v. State, 115 Ga. 803, 810 (1902); Sanders v.
State, 85 Ind. 318, 321, 323 (1882): State v. Weldon, 91 S.C. 29, 38 (1911).
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regarded as one of the "privileges or immunities" that must be afforded
without discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, had not the
Court in Slaughter House aborted the clause.'"
Throughout, Alfange confuses law with morals, although Justice
Holmes, whom he is fond of quoting to me, wrote, "nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a
moral sense are equally rights in the sense of the constitution and the
laws."' 21 3 The point had been made by one of the leading architects of
the Constitution, James Wilson: "Laws may be unjust, may be unwise,
may be dangerous, be destructive, and yet not be so unconstitutional as
to justify the Judge in refusing to give them effect."' 4 At stake too was
the attachment of the framers, both in 1787 and in 1866, to State sovereignty. Alfange's inarticulate premise, that somewhere there must exist
power to deal with horrors and therefore the Court has it, is a non25
sequitur, as Madison pointed out.1
"Of course," Alfange writes, "judges ought not to be free to manipulate [the Constitution's] words at will to arrive at whatever results
their personal inclinations commend to them"--except apparently
when those inclinations coincide with his own.'2 6 But he repeats,
"Nevertheless, a constitution is intended to endure for ages to
come,"' 1 7 notwithstanding Marshall's disclaimer of a judicial power
"to change that instrument."' 2 8 To cling to that dictum is to confess
that he has nothing better to offer. But then he quotes Archibald Cox:
"Law ought to be binding upon even the highest court, but it must also
meet the needs of men and match their [ethical] sensibilities."' 129 That
122. The evidence that this was squarely in contradiction of the framers' clearly expressed intention is collected in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 37-48.
123. 0. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171-72 (1920).
124. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 73 (1911)
[hereinafter cited as FARRAND], citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 301. See also Berger
on Lusky at 537, nn.27-35. Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote, "wisdom and justice are not
the tests of constitutionality." Abraham Essay at 474, n.35.
125. See text accompanying Berger on Lusky at 544, n. 96; see also, Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514. 563 (1830): "Tlhe
constitution of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every abuse
of power which may be committed by the state governments." Even where power exists, it
does not follow that it is vested in the courts, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out with respect
to claimed presidential power. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 604
(1952) (concurring opinion).
126. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 629; see note 62, supra.
127. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819), quotedin Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 630.
128. See notes 49 and 52 supra.
129.

A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 109-10

(1976) [hereinafter cited as Cox], quotedin Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 628.
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does not answer the question: where was the Court empowered to contradict the intention of the framers in order to "meet the needs of men."
Then too, Cox also wrote that
in the new era those impulses were not shared so strongly and
widely as to realize themselves through legislation. They came to
be held after the early 1950s by a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices, perhaps by the fate which puts one man upon the Court
were more
rather than another, perhaps because the impulses
130
strongly felt in the world of the highly educated.
So we do not have a "strongly and widely shared" "ethical" sense, but
instead only views held by an elite of the "highly educated" which contrary to John Stuart Mill's caution, knows what is best for the people
and maintains that the Court must be free to impose its will on the
nation. 13 1 To maintain that the Court must be free to read the Constitution "in a way that comports with the demands of justice, as broadly
3 1 is to ignore both that desegregation of the schools could
understood"1'
not have commanded popular support in 1954, and the continuing
resistance today to busing, reverse discrimination and the like.'3 3 And
when Alfange insists that "it is one of the tasks of the federal courts to
insure that the Constitution is not substantially at variance with
broadly held conceptions of justice,"1 34 he runs head on into Hamilton's statement in No. 78 of The Federalist: "Until the people have, by
some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established
form, it is binding. .. and no presumption, or even knowledge, of [the
people's] sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure
from it, prior to such an act."' 135 Alfange argues in turn that
if one more than one-quarter of the states were unwilling to
ratify an amendment that was specifically intended to mean what
the Fourteenth Amendment actually says, the vast majority of
the nation would have to suffer under a fundamental law that
embodied and perpetuated what they recognized as a fundamental injustice.136
130. Cox, supra note 129, at 35, citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 313.
131. See text accompanying Berger on Abraham at 575, n.90. Crane Brinton wrote of
Robespierre, "If Frenchmen would not be free and virtuous voluntarily then he would force
them to be free and cram virtue down their throats." 2 C. BRINTON, S. CHRISTOPHER & R.
WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CmLIZATION 115 (1955).
132. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 637.
133. See Berger on Miller at 583, n.55; Berger on Kutler at 607, n.130.
134. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 627.
135. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 509, cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
316.
136. Alfange Essay, supranote 1,at 628. Suffrage undeniably was to be excluded, so that
in this respect the amendment was not "specifically intended to mean what the Fourteenth
Amendment actually says."
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I daresay that Alfange could not in a referendum obtain the vote of a
bare majority of the people for busing or affirmative action, let alone
three-quarters of the States. So he speaks for "a vast majority" that is
probably at odds with him, as Professor Cox frankly recognized in saying that the "impulses" that animate such as Alfange "were not so
strongly and widely shared as to realize themselves through legislation."13 7 And were they more widely shared they would still furnish no
excuse for throwing a constitutional provision-article V-into the discard. Judges are sworn to support the Constitution, not to revise it.
Why too should the judgment of 9-often only 5 Justices, or even, as in
Bakke,13 8 of a "lone 'swing man' " 1 3 9-weigh more heavily than the
will of one-quarter of the States?
It cannot be unduly emphasized that it was late in the day when
the Court began to enter the field of civil liberties.140 As late as 1922 it
held that the Constitution "imposes upon the States no obligation to
confer upon those within their jurisdiction . . . the right of free
speech." 14 1 When Justice Holmes, in a 1925 dissenting opinion, maintained that "the Constitution prohibited the states from abridging freedom of speech," 142 he explained that free speech "must be taken to be
included in the Fourteenth Amendment in view of the scope that has
been given to the word 'liberty' ",143 under the now discredited "liberty
of contract" doctrine, whereunder the Court held that the right of
44
bakery workers to work 10 hours a day 6 days a week was sacred.
Holmes took no account of the rejection by the First Congress of
Madison's proposal to extend the free speech guarantee to the States, 145
nor, if memory serves me, did he ever turn to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which by Alfange's own account "[ineluctably
137. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at 313; Cox, supra note 129, at 35.
138. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
139. Lusky Essay at 434 n.153.
140. See Berger on Abraham at 566, n.18. Leonard Levy wrote, "'millions of Negroes
suffered lives of humiliation for five or more decades. . . because the Court betrayed the
intent of the Reconstruction Amendments." JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT
143 (L. Levy ed. 1967), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at 332 n.68.
141. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 538 (1922), cited in GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY at 270.

142. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), citedin
Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 632.
143. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 270-71 (emphasis added) (quoting Gitlow v. New

York, 268 U.S. at 672).
144. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
145. See C. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the FourteenthAmendment, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 431, 434-35 (1926) and 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 435, 755, both citedin GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY at 272.
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proves] that incorporation [of the Bill of Rights] was not intended."14' 6

Our reverence for Holmes must not lead us to convert his oversights
into gospel.
Alfange recognizes that "both the Warren and Burger Courts have

often extended their authority to give meaning to the Constitution past
the point that is compatible with a proper role for the judicial branch in
a democratic society."' 147 He states that:
There can be no doubt that the lessons of the half-century from
1887 to 1937 teach that there may be great costs in a system of
law in which judges feel free to disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution and to rely instead of their own views of
what the Constitution ought to say, and Berger has learned those
lessons well. But, as decisions like DredScott demonstrate, there
may also be great costs in a system of law in which judges mindlessly apply the putative intention of the architects of the Consti148
tution.
Chief Justice Taney was far from "mindless"; the "costs" of that disas-

trous decision arose not so much from applying a "putative intention"
as from an ill-fated hope of settling the slavery issue that was tearing
the nation apart. 1 4 9 That is the lesson of DredScott-that judicial intrusion into divisive national issues wounds the Court-not that the
146. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 607.
147. Id. at 625.
148. Id. at 616. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney had held that blacks "are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution,"
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1857), and Alfange asks, "why should the meaning of that word
not be allowed to change with the passage of time." Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 613.
The gulf between his thinking and that of the framers is disclosed by the fact that despite the
Thirteenth Amendment's alteration of black status, the framers placed no reliance on a
"change" in the meaning of "citizen" but expressly defined it in the Fourteenth Amendment
to include blacks. See GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 370-71.
149. See text accompanying Berger on Miller at 581, n.41. Home Building & Loan Assn.
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), citedin Alfange Essay, supranote 1, at 613, 615, 620, 622, is
a stronger case; it dealt with a genuine emergency-a moratorium on mortgage payments
during the depression, leading Alfange to conclude that "there may be compelling reasons
for a judicial reluctance to be bound by the intent of the framers. . . ." Alfange Essay,
supra note 1, at 622. Chief Justice Hughes could summon no better authority than Alfange's
favorite Marshall dictum, see note 56 supra, and his Court then went on to gut the New
Deal. Put not your trust in saviors. And as Justice Holmes observed, "hard cases make bad
law," resulting from "some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment." Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 400 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
Moreover, the additional vice of such "emergencies," as Hamilton foresaw is that,
"every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity. . . forms a precedent
for other breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all." THE FEDERALIST
No. 25 (A. Hamilton) at 158 (Modem lib. ed. 1937), citedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at
329. Witness the abortion, death penalty and six-man jury decisions. Power grows by what
it feeds on.
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Court was betrayed by reliance on a rule of construction. In balancing
the "costs" of judicial misrule against DredScott Alfange exposes the
weakness of the argument on behalf of government by judiciary.
Again and again Alfange eschews fact for fancy: "the framers
could not have been so naive as to believe that they could confer the
power of judicial review without also necessarily conferring policymaking power."' 150 Yet that unmistakably was the view taken by the
foremost proponent of judicial review, Hamilton, as we saw at the out' Alfange resolutely shuts his eyes to the undeniable intention of
set. 15
the Framers to exclude the Justices from participation in policymaking
in the Council of Revision, to their deep-seated distrust of judicial discretion. 152 In the Convention, Gerry, one of the most vigorous proponents of judicial review, declared, "It was quite foreign from the
nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of public measures.

.

.It was making Statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as

the guardians of the Rights of the people,"' 53 exactly what Alfange now
seeks to accomplish. Nathaniel Gorham observed that judges are "not
to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of
public measures."' 54 Throughout, Alfange mistakenly identifies his
own predilections with constitutional power to effectuate them. 155 But
like his fellows, he also sees the need "to find and describe limits to the
proper scope of judicial policymaking"' I56 a strange oversight on the
part of Framers so fearful of illimitable power. He locates the limits in
Justice Stone's Carolene footnote, 57 which Professor Abraham properly considers proved "to be a veritable Pandora's box,' 1 58 so that
150. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 637.
151. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra. Professor Richard Kay has written:
"[A]cceptance of government limited by law is premised on the faith that in the long run the
evil which is prevented is greater than the good which is denied or deferred .... Indeed the
history of constitutional adjudication presents striking examples of the dangers of governmental power unlimited by law." Kay, Book Review, CONN. L. REV.801. 809 (1978). When
we accept the substitution of judicial values on moral grounds, we ought to be clear that "it
is in contradiction with and subversive of the design of constitutional government to which
we purport to adhere." Id. at 810.
152. See Berger on Lusky at 537, nn.28-29, 32-35.
153. 1 FARRAND, supra note 124, at 97-98; 2 FARRAND, supra note 124, at 75.
154. Id. at 73, quotedin GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 301.
155. With respect to the slave trade, Chief Justice Marshall held, "this court must not
yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, and must obey the mandate of
the law." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114 (1825).
156. Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 625-26.
157. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), citedin Alfange Essay, supra note 1, at 626 n.102.
158. Abraham Essay at 476. In a paper read before the American Enterprise Institution
for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., December 13, 1978, p. 4 . Professor Robert
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before long Chief Justice
Stone himself was disenchanted with its re59
straining influence.

In sum, Alfange's attempt to meet my criticism of judicial activism
exposes its historical and analytical inadequacies.

Bork stated with respect to the Carolene footnote: "I am thinking of putting errata sheets in
every copy of volume 304 of the United States Reports stating that footnote four was a
typographical error, thus wiping out an entire jurisprudential industry and bringing two
dozen academic careers to an abrupt conclusion."
159. Chief Justice Stone wrote in 1945, "My more conservative brethren in the old days
[read their preferences] into the Constitution... [h]istory is repeating itself. The Court is
now in as much danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution making body enacting
into law its own predilections, as it was then." GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 278.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:613

Conclusion
But for Professor Lusky's assumption that the Founders made the
Justices their "surrogate" for updating the Constitution '-regardless of
the amendment provision for that purpose-my critics make no attempt to bridge the chasm that yawns between the limited role the
Founders assigned to the judiciary and the "new and grander"2 role the
Court has carved out for itself. Their constitutional law is derived not
from the Constitution and its history, but from what the Justices have
said about the Constitution. So they rely on a few scattered dicta such
as Marshall's "it is a constitution. . . ,"I overlooking that such dicta, at
best, are pronouncements by judges who have a stake in the cause. Another alleged source of judicial power to proceed in direct contradiction
of the Framers' clearly discernible intention is the so-called "general"
words they employed, which the True Believers read as an invitation to
rewrite the Constitution in order to attune it to modem exigencies.'
Nevertheless they are profoundly uneasy with the creature of their
imaginings; they search for limits on the unrestrained judicial power
they have conjured,5 limits which find no warrant in the "general"
words or dicta they summon and the absence of which undermines
their argument for a judicial revisory power. A people fearful of power
in 1787 and distrustful of the judiciary in 1866 were hardly likely to
grant unconfined judicial power on the supposition that academicians
would limit it after the lapse of more than 100 years.
The most candid approach, that of Professor Miller, "The Founding Fathers cannot rule us from their graves," 6 would equally authorize
disregard of the text and constitute the Court as a continuing constitutional convention. The people have yet to be told by the Court that it
has taken over that function and to give their assent.7 That is the issue
1. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT?, 21 (1975).
2. Lusky Essay at 408.
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
4. Alfange Essay at 609, 620, 638.
5. See Abraham Essay at 469-7 1.

6. Berger on Miller at 586, n.81.
7. To my statement that the people would prefer to live under the constraints of the
Constitution rather than the idiosyncratic rule of the Justices, Professor Alfange responds
that if the people "were asked whether the Court should interpret the words of the Constitution according to current common understanding or according to the specific meaning intended by the framers, the vote would be much closer...." Alfange Essay at 636. Instead
let us frame the issue in a way the people can fully understand: whether they prefer the
framers' exclusion of segregation from the Fourteenth Amendment to judicial insistence on
[634]
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I sought to bring to public attention, and it deserves to be examined on
its merits, not obfuscated by derision and casuistry. For myself I ask
no more than to be judged by the criteria of historicity, factual accuracy and faithful examination of discrepant facts and opposing opinion.

busing and the like. Martin Shapiro stressed that the Court cannot "disavow publicly the
myth on which it rests." Berger on Alfange, note 21. Alfange considers that my views posit
a "large measure of naivet6 on the part of the American public." Alfange Essay at 637. Yet
Frankfurter wrote that the people have been led to believe that it is the Constitution rather
than the Justices that speaks. Berger on Lusky at 545, n.105. Robert Bork observed that
"[t]he way an institution advertises [e.g., it is effectuating the framers' intent] tells you what
it thinks its customers demand." Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (1971), cited in GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 319.

